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ABSTRACT 
 
By undertaking a case study of three of the most prominent groups on the religious right in 
the United States – Concerned Women for America (CWA), Focus on the Family (FOF), and 
Eagle Forum (EF), and an historical comparison with the temperance movement – this study 
reveals that rather than focusing solely on the sinful, immoral nature of pornography, these 
groups are broadening their antipornography narrative to also include consideration of the 
misogynistic themes of pornography, and the harm it causes to women. These Christian Right 
groups are pursuing a rhetorical approach marked by the co-option, manipulation, and 
reconceptualisation of the arguments of antiporn feminists. This strategic shift has been 
facilitated by the lull in antiporn feminist activity following the deep intra-movement rifts of 
the 1980s between feminists who were opposed to pornography and others who saw it as 
merely an expression of free speech. On the other end of the political spectrum, within 
conservative movement politics, an identity shift in the 1990s away from inflammatory, 
militaristic rhetoric towards a softer, somewhat secularised tone reflected a desire by 
movement leaders to appeal to adherents outside the movement’s usual constituency, 
including women for whom feminist ideas have resonated. In order to reconcile this pro-
woman construct with the image of the subservient woman central to fundamentalist 
Christian interpretations of scripture, these groups use antiporn feminist rhetoric in the 
service of preserving the patriarchal nuclear family. Meaningful parallels can be drawn 
between the rhetoric of today’s Christian Right in response to pornography and the way in 
which key figures in the temperance movement dealt with the crisis of male drunkenness in 
nineteenth-century America, which resulted in a push for the enhancement of women’s rights 
coalescing with deeply held beliefs about family values. As the temperance precedent makes 
clear, movements for moral reform are not always ideologically pure, and can involve trade-
offs and a negotiation of values to ensure their political survival. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“We’ve had very little contact with the Christian Right. They stay away from us,” revealed 
antiporn feminist Gail Dines during a 2009 roundtable discussion in Leeds on pornography, 
adding “what they have done, though, is adopt some of our language, and that’s not a terrible 
thing, because we’ve got them thinking about harm to women” (Dines in Boyle, 2010: 28). 
Once preoccupied with pornography’s corrosive effects on men and the nuclear family, the 
Christian Right started to pay closer attention to the way women’s lives are affected by 
material that tends to represent them as subordinate and hypersexual. Not known for 
centreing women’s rights in their political discourse, it was a striking development for a 
movement that has traditionally framed women’s role as that of the ‘helpmate’, a mere 
appendage to the God-given leadership potential of their husbands (Pearl, 2004).  
For definitional purposes, the term ‘Christian Right’ refers to the politicised religious 
movement that emerged in the United States in the 1940s but became especially influential in 
the 1970s. The Christian Right is closely aligned with the secular New Right movement 
which emphasised social conservative policies in addition to earlier American conservatism 
which had focused more narrowly on classic liberal economic reform. The Christian Right 
appeared in the larger context of the New Right, but was more specifically oriented toward a 
religious crusade, and had its roots in religious institutions. 
The Christian Right’s adherents span a number of religious denominations, including 
evangelical Protestants and Catholics, as well as some Jewish and Mormon adherents (Smith, 
2008). The movement’s defining characteristic is its obsessive focus on social issues such as 
pornography, abortion, birth control, stem cell research, prayer in public schools, sex 
education, homosexuality, and intelligent design. Its leaders tend to be charismatic and 
deliberately inflammatory, relying on conflict-based rhetoric premised on the idea of a “holy 
war” in the United States between the forces of good and evil (Hedges, 2006). The movement 
has an impressive ability to organise and agitate for political change using its vast network of 
radio and television programs, church groups, published books and magazines. Through this 
tradition of evangelical populism, churches have been able to capitalise on the therapeutic, 
individualistic, and anti-establishment desires characteristic of many older generation 
Americans in order to expand their reach (Kyle, 2006: 225). 
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The movement’s co-option of feminist rhetoric has been precipitated by two overarching 
developments: the political and social relevance of fundamentalist Christianity, and the 
evolving theoretical precepts of the feminist movement in America. For the Christian Right, 
extraordinarily successful efforts in the 1960s to mobilise constituents around issues such as 
abortion, gay rights, and anti-feminism in the form of opposition to the Equal Rights 
Amendment, an amendment which would have guaranteed women equal rights under the law, 
saw the movement gain political momentum and access to the institutions of power. The 
movement’s leaders were adept at exploiting disparate identities, whether that involved 
pitting the virtuous rural American against the degenerate urban American, or the employed 
against the jobless, at a time when unprecedented social change in the form of the sexual 
revolution and the civil rights movement were defining the new face of the country 
(Williams, 2010).  
Rather than losing steam, the unyielding persistence of the Christian Right saw it survive the 
turn of the century, and throughout the early 2000s the movement played an integral role in 
George W. Bush securing two presidential victories (Layman and Hussey, 2007). This 
influence has since plateaued and the Christian Right no longer holds the same degree of 
power to determine presidential election outcomes due to a number of interrelated factors 
(Merritt, 2012). For example, the size and scope of the fundamentalist Christian constituency 
has contracted at the same time as there has been a diversification of ethnic and religious 
demographics in the United States. This shrinking base is partly attributable to the ageing 
face of the Christian Right. A strict adherence to sexual morality, perceived homophobia, and 
antiquated views on women have alienated many younger Americans who now identify as 
less religious and attend church less frequently than did their youthful counterparts in 
previous generations (Putnam and Campbell, 2010). There is a theory that younger people 
abandoned the Christian Right at around the same time as the movement’s visibility in the 
public media increased, signalling a backlash against religious conservatism from the 
younger generation (Hout and Fischer, 2002). What is more, young people are now coming 
of age in a country with an increasing partiality to liberalisation, particularly on issues such as 
same-sex marriage and marijuana,1 which has, in turn, made religion and religiosity a less 
salient point of political division.  
                                                          
1 The United States Supreme Court legalised same-sex marriage in all fifty states as a result of the Obergefell v. 
Hodges ruling on June 26, 2015. A number of states have, in recent years, also decriminalised or legalised 
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But aside from the maturing impulses of Americans away from traditionalism when it comes 
to the relationship between church and state, the Christian Right has also suffered from a 
rhetorical problem. The charismatic leaders such as Jerry Falwell, James Dobson, and Pat 
Robertson who so effectively agitated for a cultural backlash in the 1960s and 1970s by 
framing their argument in terms of a moral crusade, have either died or retreated from the 
focal point of political activity over the last decade. In their absence the movement has seen 
the elevation of some younger faces, such as Pastor Rick Warren of Saddleback Church, 
Joyce Meyer, T.D. Jakes, and Franklin Graham, son of celebrity evangelist Billy Graham. 
But this new generation of pastors have adopted a distinctly different tone to their forebears. 
Rather than cling to the messianic, often aggressive rhetoric of the movement’s forefathers, 
today’s Christian Right leaders have chosen to bring their message in line with the inclusive, 
rights-oriented themes prevalent in American society at large.  
In articulating their disdain for pornography, leaders on the Christian Right are diversifying 
their arguments, adopting a more compassionate, rights-conscious approach in order to reach 
new constituents, and embolden existing ones. But they also rely on a familiar repertoire of 
harsh rhetoric and punitive policy recommendations,2 reminding observers that pornography 
remains a moral issue as much as a rights-based one. With the emergence of new 
technologies such as smart phones, tablets, laptop computers, and the ubiquitousness of the 
internet, it is now possible for unprecedented numbers of people to consume pornography 
without the social impediments that once meant only the most determined could gain access. 
The way in which these tools are facilitating easier access to obscene materials has given 
greater enthusiasm to the ongoing panic about declining moral standards and sexuality in the 
United States.  
Within this debate, certain figures have dictated the moral boundaries in discussions of 
sexuality. Becker (1963) describes these figures as “moral entrepreneurs” or “moral 
crusaders”, whose task it is to spread warnings about sexual immorality by creating 
“vocabularies of motives” that explain the harms of pornography in ways that will be 
meaningful to people. The aim is to shame, deviantise, and vilify entire sub-sections of the 
population, providing vivid illustrations for the clash of different “symbolic-moral universes” 
                                                          
possession of marijuana for medicinal or recreational use. These states include California, Colorado, Oregon, 
and Washington. 
2 Cynthia Burack (2014) makes this case in her book by highlighting the way in which a new brand of 
‘compassionate conservatism’ has had to compete with the exclusionary, marginalising rhetoric once favoured 
by Christian Right leaders. 
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(Ben-Yehuda, 1990: 121). For today’s Christian Right, moral symbolism expresses itself as a 
unique composite of old Victorian sexual mores obsessed with shielding children and 
preserving female purity within patriarchal terms, and a newer somewhat contradictory 
discourse on pornography, which constructs women’s sexual defiance a moral imperative, 
even if it undermines that central notion of male primacy.  
As a result, the narrower biblically inerrant discourse premised on divine law, a 
preoccupation with sin, and hierarchy within the church and the nuclear family has been 
supplemented by a consideration of rights and equality traditionally associated with 
progressive-left movements. This new rhetoric has penetrated the movement’s discourse on 
multiple policy fronts, from abortion to gun control. But the focus of this study will be on the 
movement’s response to pornography, an issue which reveals a tense interplay between two 
of the most crucial voices in this debate, the Christian Right and the dwindling antiporn 
feminist movement.  
Underlying this relationship is a political paradox, characterised by the Christian Right’s 
strategic use of the feminist movement as on the one hand a hostile political enemy, serving 
the movement’s aim of attracting adherents opposed to women’s liberation. On the other 
hand, pro-woman arguments against pornography have considerable appeal to some existing 
and prospective adherents, and cannot be altogether shunned for the sake of maintaining 
ideological purity.  
Aiding the co-option of feminist arguments by the Christian Right has been the relative 
political invisibility of the feminist case against pornography in the present-day United 
States. At the same time as the Christian Right was first broadening its scope and influence, 
antiporn feminists were engaged in a suicidal battle with so-called ‘sex-positive’ feminists. 
This conflict, which came to be known in feminist literature as the “feminist sex wars” of the 
1980s, eventually saw antiporn feminism vanish almost entirely from the mainstream 
political conversation about the status of women (Duggan and Hunter, 1995). Accusations of 
sexual moralising, prudishness, perceptions of hostility towards the queer and transgender 
community, collusions with conservatives, and classism in the form of middle-class 
respectability overwhelmed antiporn feminism and saw the position largely abandoned, 
sparing pornography from meaningful, progressive critique throughout the 1990s and early 
2000s. 
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This fallow period for feminist antiporn activism opened up new opportunities for 
conservative activists to claim that they best represented women’s interests in the 
pornography debates. They no longer needed to jostle with the feminist movement for 
representational claims, because what had prevailed from the ashes of the sex wars was a tacit 
commitment to silence on the issue. Therefore conservatives were free to occupy this political 
space unchallenged. Using the women’s rights arguments it had cultivated from being closely 
involved with feminists on the development of the Attorney General’s Commission on 
Pornography and the Antipornography Civil Rights Ordinance in the 1980s, the Christian 
Right pursued a new rhetorical strategy, appropriating the feminist case for eradicating 
pornography.  
In addition to the waning influence of the Christian Right, which forced the movement into 
secularised territory, and the decline of antiporn feminism in response to intra-movement 
tensions, other social, economic, and political factors have played a central role in the 
development of antipornography politics. These include the migration of women from the 
domestic sphere to the paid workforce (Abraham and Hipple, 2006); the destabilisation of the 
nuclear family (Bengtson, 2001); the increased marketisation of private and public life 
including the commodification of the most intimate elements of human interaction (Graham, 
2006); and the entrenched polarisation of the political system and its constituents (McCarty, 
Poole and Rosenthal, 2016).  
The Christian Right have had to grapple with the uncomfortable reality that the free market 
economy on which its political ideology stands also permits the ruthless pursuit of profit at a 
moral cost, occasioning the explosive availability of pornographic material. The multi-billion 
dollar a year pornography industry would not be possible without the unrestrained capitalism 
the Christian Right’s Republican allies’ champion. But in critiquing the merits of unfettered 
capitalism with respect to pornography, the Christian Right again find themselves relying on 
arguments developed by those on the progressive-left. To temper the impact of such a 
betrayal of the Right, the movement more forcefully assigns blame to the feminist movement 
for the moral decay of society. In both instances, the movement is condemning what it sees as 
the underlying ethos of both feminism and neoliberalism: self before family and church, 
profit before virtue, and leadership before obedience (Lienesch, 1993: 72).  
The backlash against pornography has not been the first crusade to unite disparate coalitions 
of women, and where a religious defence of “family values” has coalesced with a push for the 
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enhancement of women’s rights. Indeed, the women’s temperance movement of the last two 
decades of the nineteenth century serves as a useful historical parallel to today’s 
antipornography efforts.   
Posing as concerned mothers seeking to protect their sons and husbands from the seductive 
allure of rum sellers, temperance reformers became prominent public agitators, not only for 
curbing the drink, but for women’s suffrage (Martin, 2008). The case for suffrage was made 
on the basis that granting women the vote would allow the fairer sex to bring her womanly 
virtues to bear on the world, and oversee the moral transformation of America at a time when 
rapid industrialisation, urbanisation, and racial diversification threatened the stability of the 
middle-class. Just as today’s social conservative women in the antipornography movement 
are actively renegotiating a social identity which has been affixed to their role as the 
subservient sex by experimenting with feminist language, earlier temperance activists 
redefined traditional social roles by challenging the ‘republican motherhood’ notion that 
women’s contributions as citizens were best served through the rearing of God-fearing, 
economically productive sons.  
Instead, women released themselves from the confines of domesticity and its limited 
prospects for power by defending the sanctity of that very role, urging lawmakers to extend to 
them some of the same rights afforded to their male counterparts if the home was to be spared 
from the destructive potential of the drink (Epstein, 1981). In both the temperance and 
antipornography cases, a moral reform agenda has been the platform on which conservative 
women have sought to assume a greater presence on the political stage. Ostensibly 
positioning themselves as a softer pro-woman alternative to feminism, all the while 
legitimising feminist arguments and helping to move feminist consciousness into the political 
mainstream.  
Other underlying assumptions link the philosophical basis of temperance and conservative 
antipornography reformation. Both movements are premised on the belief that men are 
aggressive by nature and lack control over their impulses, and that women ought to civilise 
male lust and temper their propensity to sin. Only through the exercise of self-control and 
individual morality can upward social mobility be attained. This study draws out these 
striking resemblances in an effort to place the current right-wing appropriation of antiporn 
feminist discourse in an historical context to further an understanding of how social 
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conservative groups interpret, reconstruct, and manipulate feminist theory for their own 
political ends.  
In order to achieve a clearer understanding of the movement’s co-option of feminist rhetoric, 
this study focuses on two overarching questions. First, what is the nature and extent of the 
American Christian Right’s co-option of women’s rights discourse in their opposition to 
pornography? And further, why is the movement adopting this approach?  
Conceptual Framework 
 
To answer the research questions this study adopts a rich, two-pronged method that uses (1) 
three case studies of influential groups on the Christian Right to understand the phenomenon 
of co-option in the movement; and (2) an historical comparison with the temperance 
movement which provides the background for the modern context. Today’s antipornography 
movement has been described as a kind of ‘new temperance’ obsessed with once again 
regulating and repressing deviant behaviour (Wagner, 1997). But temperance envisaged a 
more complex coalescence of forces that united devoutly religious, conservative women with 
political radicals seeking profound political and social reforms. In this respect it mirrors many 
of the characteristics of today’s antipornography movement, offering insights that go towards 
addressing why today’s Christian Right have adopted feminist arguments. Given the 
historical relevance, parallels with the temperance movement are weaved into the analysis 
and discussion of the case studies, placing the modern phenomenon of the Christian Right’s 
rhetorical co-option into historical perspective. 
     Strengths and limitations of the case study 
      
Attempting to pin down precisely what constitutes a case study is somewhat of a definitional 
morass. In his work on the principles and practices of case study research, John Gerring 
(2007) defines a case study as a piece of work that is qualitative in nature and deals with a 
small, delimited unit observed at a single point in time. Given that this study is attempting to 
explain the phenomenon of rhetorical co-option on the Christian Right, the unit is the 
organisations. The organisations under special focus are not perfectly representative of the 
entire Christian Right, but they wield a vast amount of influence over the policy preferences 
and rhetorical tone of the broader movement. This is due to their large membership base, a 
long timeline of activity in politics in the United States, and proficiency in the use of various 
forms of media to reach adherents.  
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The advantage of using the case study method to address the nature and extent of the 
appropriation of pro-woman rhetoric on the Christian Right is that it enables the development 
of a more in-depth, holistic understanding of the way in which these organisations are 
reconciling rights-based, pro-woman language on pornography with their more traditional 
family values platform. The expectation is that the three cases in question –  CWA 
(Concerned Women for America), FOF (Focus on the Family), and EF (Eagle Forum) – will, 
in the words of Gary Thomas (2011), “illuminate and explicate.” This differs from a more 
evaluative or experimental research design which are concerned respectively with seeing if 
something is working or establishing causation.  
What the case study method is particularly useful for is getting a rich picture from which 
analytical insights can be drawn, in other words, understanding the details of what is 
happening. What in the discourse of Christian Right groups indicates that an assimilation of 
pro-woman, rights-based rhetoric into antipornography discourse is taking place? Is this part 
of a broader pattern of rhetorical transformation in the movement? What are the socio-
political factors that have accompanied this transformation? And what are its ideological 
parallels with the coalitions of disparate women’s groups who led the temperance movement? 
These are all questions which can be addressed by the broad methodological umbrella of a 
case study. 
The three groups whose material on pornography has been examined are Concerned Women 
for America (CWA), Focus on the Family (FOF), and Eagle Forum (EF). Multiple sources of 
evidence are drawn to address some complex features of the research, these consist of web-
based articles, magazine articles, brochures, fact cards, manuscripts, television appearances, 
podcasts and other audio material, books published by organisational leaders, and testimonies 
by organisational spokespeople in congressional hearings, as well as a smaller sample of 
archival records. These sources include FOF’s bimonthly magazine Thriving Family, EF’s 
monthly Phyllis Schlafly Report, and CWA’s now out of print Family Voice. No stone was 
left unturned, as it were, as all available sources of antipornography material published by the 
groups have been examined.  
In terms of a time period from which the material has been drawn, this study looks primarily 
at a snapshot of the movement through the examination of contemporary material which has 
been published by the groups in the recent five year period from 2010 to 2015. However, a 
diachronic approach which explores how the movements’ language and strategies have 
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evolved through time has also been utilised as a way of highlighting the peculiarities of the 
movement’s current approach. 
However, the case study as a methodological approach is not without its flaws. There is a 
certain degree of ambiguity in the enterprise of the case study and this has led some 
researchers to dismiss the case study as a “weak sibling among social science methods” (Yin, 
1994) due to the perception of a lack of rigour in case study research. The fact that case 
studies can take on various permutations and trajectories leaves it vulnerable to accusations 
of bias, too open to subjective interpretation by the researcher. Because the case study 
involves focusing on a single unit, the risk of generalisation looms larger here than with other 
types of qualitative research (Merriam, 2009: 51).  
It is hoped that by undertaking multiple case studies the generalising effects of the approach 
will be minimised. Of course that still leaves a large cross-section of the Christian Right 
unaccounted for. But as Erickson (1986) points out, the general lies in the particular, and 
what we learn in a particular case can be transferred to similar situations. It is also important 
to note that this study deals exclusively with the perspectives of movement leaders, not their 
adherents, and cannot therefore make any definitive or precise claims about what impression 
the leaders’ rhetorical co-option is leaving on the movement’s adherents. Such an analysis 
would require further probing. Fortunately that perspective is not essential to deconstructing 
the matter at hand – the nature and extent of rhetorical appropriation by select groups on the 
Christian Right. 
There are a number of prominent organisations on the Christian Right which could have been 
examined for this study. Tony Perkins’ Family Research Council, one of the country’s most 
politically embedded fundamentalist groups operating out of Washington, D.C., is one 
example. The American Family Association, Traditional Values Coalition, as well as Pat 
Robertson and Jerry Falwell’s respective empires would have been worthy case studies as 
well. Therefore the rationale behind selecting CWA, FOF, and EF for analysis must be 
clarified. Firstly, CWA and FOF in particular have large revenues and far-reaching 
audiences, which means the strategic approaches they take can be seen as emblematic of the 
direction of the movement as a whole. CWA boasts around 500,000 members, and FOF’s 
print and digital magazine Thriving Family reaches some two million subscribers. One of the 
most recognised Christian radio programs, FOF’s daily broadcast, is carried on two thousand 
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radio outlets.3 EF also has a regular presence on the airwaves, with Phyllis Schlafly’s weekly 
Eagle Forum Live, broadcast to one hundred stations across the United States, as well as her 
‘daily 3-minute commentaries’ of pugnaciously delivered takedowns of all facets of liberal 
policy, focusing in particular on feminist activities. As key arbiters of Christian Right policy, 
any appropriation of feminist language by these groups should be regarded as an accurate 
representation of the movement’s unfolding paradigm, and not merely a series of irrelevant, 
outlying examples. Secondly, CWA and EF were both founded on the principles of 
antifeminism. Their founders, Beverly LaHaye and Phyllis Schlafly respectively, have taken 
prominent positions in the movement as figureheads of a conservative counterpoint to 
feminism. These two groups are particularly invested in criticising the goals and 
achievements of the feminist movement and rely on this strategy to maintain their 
relationship with conservative political institutions. As such, the integration of pro-woman, 
equality-oriented arguments into the discourse of these antifeminist groups is a betrayal of the 
groups’ raison d’etre and an indication of the lengths the movement is willing to go to remain 
relevant to new generations of conservative women for whom pro-woman language has 
become little short of a requirement of their advocacy on women’s policy issues. 
But there are important differences between the three groups as well. Perhaps the most 
pronounced difference lies in the disparities in membership numbers, which gives EF 
significantly less clout in terms of direct grassroots mobilisation. EF’s membership base is 
much smaller than CWA and FOF, at 80,000. Moreover, CWA and EF position themselves 
primarily as “women’s organisations”. Their activism is centred on women’s issues and they 
operate as the political counterpoint to feminist organisations like the National Organisation 
for Women and Planned Parenthood. On the other hand, FOF were not formed on this 
premise. They do not tailor their message for a particular audience on the basis of sex, and 
their executive is made up of a fairly even mix of men and women. EF makes up for their 
comparatively smaller membership base by exercising influence at the top of the political 
pyramid. Though arguably less democratic, it does cement their relationships with key 
Republican Party figures. The enduring grasp the late Phyllis Schlafly held over the fate of 
conservative political hopefuls was well demonstrated by her official endorsement of 
Republican presidential nominee Donald J. Trump at a St. Louis, MO rally in March 2016. 
After her endorsement, Trump called Schlafly “a great lady” who is “very, 
                                                          
3 Focus on the Family 2016, Focus on the Family daily broadcast, Focus on the Family, viewed January 2016, 
<http://www.focusonthefamily.com/media/daily-broadcast>. 
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very exceptional.”4 At a time when Trump’s social conservative credentials were being 
probed and measured against that of his main opponent, Senator Ted Cruz, Schlafly’s 
endorsement helped to reassure evangelical voters that Trump was indeed one of them. 
Despite these differences in size, membership, scope, presence in different media, number of 
employees and extent to which the groups are considered mainstream or fringe, it is still 
possible to observe a widespread emergence of an inclusive rights-based discourse around 
women. 
Similar positions were taken by religiously devout women in relation to the nineteenth-
century temperance movement in which men’s propensity for falling victim to the drink, 
rather than pornography, came to symbolise the innumerable societal ills accompanying an 
unfolding industrial America, with women and children being most vulnerable to the 
unpredictable rage of intoxicated men. With this historical parallel in mind, the three case 
studies of the contemporary Christian Right groups will be held up to historical comparative 
consideration to further draw out the way in which moral reformists seize and reconceptualise 
the rhetoric of more politically radical women. In this regard, the temperance example is a 
comparative phenomenon more generally aligned with other movements as well, but which is 
useful in terms of examining how the Christian Right’s rhetoric on pornography, including its 
tendency to appropriate arguments conceived in the feminist tradition, compare with an 
earlier moral crusade. The intemperance that nineteenth-century crusaders were agitating 
against is a concept that can be applied to the intemperate imagery of pornography. In this 
sense pornography represents a twenty-first century version of the kind of vice and 
immorality that nineteenth-century teetotallers were confronting. Like the Christian Right, the 
temperance movement also had its origins in religious conservatism, but became increasingly 
dependent on more radical notions of women’s emancipation that were being developed by 
suffragettes, making it a particularly useful historical case for comparison (Craig, 1992: 53).  
The case studies are built around two salient theoretical concepts drawn from the literature – 
a theory of appropriation and a theory of frames. Scholars who have examined similar 
research questions have begun to develop an argument based on versions of these two 
theories. Of the most relevant research, Schreiber’s (2000; 2002a; 2002b; 2008; 2010) studies 
on conservative women’s co-option of pro-woman language, Rose’s (2011) analysis of the 
                                                          
4 Full Speech: Donald Trump Rally in St. Louis, MO- Peabody Opera House 2016, YouTube, Right Side 
Broadcasting, 11 March, viewed March 2016, <https://youtu.be/3oeUhiIym-U>. 
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pro-life movements’ acquisition of a pro-woman frame, and Saurette and Gordon’s (2015) 
book on the Christian Right’s reframing of anti-abortion politics as grounded in progressive 
values all engage extensively with frame theory and the question of rhetorical and strategic 
co-option in their analyses. This study builds on that continuum of inquiry and is grounded in 
Lijphart (1971) and Eckstein’s (1975) notion of ‘disciplined configurative case studies’. This 
refers to research involving the use of established theories to explain a case, rather than the 
development of new theory. This approach is particularly useful for capturing the major 
elements of a historical case, such as thematic parallels between the Christian Right’s 
approach to pornography and the temperance movement, as it involves transforming specific 
explanations into the concepts of the more general theoretical framework.  
Theory and definitions 
 
     A radical feminist definition of pornography 
 
This study uses the 1983 definition of pornography defined by antiporn feminists Andrea 
Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon as an interpretive framework. Dworkin and 
MacKinnon’s definition describes the parameters of what actually constitutes pornography 
from a feminist perspective, enabling parallels to be drawn between the pro-woman rhetoric 
of CWA, FOF, EF, and antiporn feminists.   
The 1983 Minneapolis Antipornography Ordinance was the first time pornography had been 
framed as a civil rights issue, rather than a question of obscenity. The fundamental difference 
being that obscene material is determined by what is likely to offend, appeal to prurient 
interests, or lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.5 MacKinnon and 
Dworkin’s efforts to redefine and reconceptualise pornography as a civil rights issue meant 
rejecting obscenity law, which MacKinnon describes as “useless” and which actually protects 
pornography “while pretending to stop it” (MacKinnon and Dworkin, 1998: 20). In their view 
obscenity law inappropriately deals with the problem of pornography by sending a message 
that “sex is dirty, that my body is dirty because it is associated with sex, and that I should be 
ashamed” (p. 191). A civil rights-based interpretation of pornography lifts the burden of 
shame from women and instead recognises their right to not be harmed in the making of 
pornography.  
                                                          
5 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) 
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In achieving this, Dworkin and MacKinnon defined pornography as the sexually explicit 
subordination of women, graphically depicted, whether in pictures or in words, entailing one 
or more of the following: 
(a) women are presented dehumanized as sexual objects, things or commodities; or 
(b) women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or humiliation; or 
(c) women are presented as sexual objects who experience sexual pleasure in being 
raped; or 
(d) women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or bruised or 
physically hurt; or 
(e) women are presented in postures of sexual submission; or 
(f) women's body parts-including but not limited to vaginas, 
breasts, and buttocks-are exhibited, such that women are reduced to those parts; or 
(g) women are presented as whores by nature; or 
(h) women are presented being penetrated by objects or animals; or 
(i) women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury, abasement, torture, 
shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that makes these 
conditions sexual (Appendix D, Section 2). 
The Indianapolis Ordinance later omitted (i) and (vii) from the definition. The 1985 US Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit case of American Booksellers v. Hudnut, which examined 
the constitutionality of the Antipornography Civil Rights Ordinance, took issue with the 
problem of vagueness found in the original ordinance, noting, “that terms such as 
“degradation,” “abasement,” and “inferior” are subjective terms which are inherently void for 
vagueness (Sandler, 1984: 912). Although the court made subsequent amendments to the 
ordinance, this has no bearing on this study. The original definition, however vague, provides 
a strong indication of the most problematic aspects of pornography from a feminist 
perspective.  
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     Theory of appropriation 
 
The second interpretive framework on which this study is based is the theory of 
appropriation. In this case, how language can be co-opted, reinterpreted, and employed for 
political ends. Tracy Strong (1996), writing on the political misuses of Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
work, described appropriation as follows: “I have appropriated something when I have made 
it mine, in a manner that I feel comfortable with, that is in a manner to which the challenges 
of others will carry little or no significance.” Nietzsche’s writings were used as an anti-
Jewish propaganda tool by the Nazis because of his profound opposition to priestly Judaism 
and the prophetic tradition. However, this is an incomplete picture. While Nietzsche was 
indeed sceptical of the priestly tradition in Judaism, this criticism was grounded in a visceral 
opposition to prophetic aspects of Christianity, a strand of the Christian faith he believes 
emerged from archaic traditions in ancient Judaism (Santaniello, 1994). In fact, Nietzsche 
was strongly opposed to anti-Semitism and the German nationalism with which it was 
connected (Yovel, 1994: 223). A series of disappointing experiences were the impetus for 
Nietzsche’s alienation from German Christian culture, namely his sister’s alliance with 
members of the Nazi Party through the Wagner circle led by Cosima Wagner, the daughter of 
Hungarian pianist and composer Franz Liszt. Evidently, Nietzsche’s writings were too 
tempting for Nazi exegetes to overlook, as they “clearly and knowingly misinterpreted many 
of Nietzsche’s ideas, especially his hatred of anti-Semitism, in order to benefit their own 
ideological purposes” (Santaniello, 1994). Of particular relevance to this study is 
Santaniello’s assertion that the Nazi appropriation of Nietzsche was a “means of silencing 
him.” Due to Nietzsche’s increasing popularity and relevance, it was a tactic of the Nazis to 
confuse and discredit Nietzsche’s original work (p. 151).  
James Sosnoski (1993) describes appropriation as an ‘arrogation’ and a ‘seizure’ of concepts 
outside a movement’s governing framework. Underpinning the concept of appropriation is a 
presumption of theft. Appropriation is an act of taking. The dominant culture adopts 
something “belonging” to the minority culture. It is important to note that inequitable claims 
to power underpin this concept of appropriation. The conservative groups in this study 
occupy the dominant position relative to the feminist authors whose arguments they are co-
opting. The hetero-patriarchal, capitalist ideology of the groups’ leaders is the dominant 
worldview. In Gramscian terms, the groups engage in the production and maintenance of 
beliefs and values that uphold the apparatus of political and cultural hegemony (Thomas, 
2009). Male dominance, the preservation of the nuclear family, and endorsement of the free 
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market are cultural norms. CWA, FOF and EF are engaged in the practice of preservation 
rather than subversion. The groups’ governing framework reinforces the dominant worldview 
and uses language to naturalise the status quo. Conversely, antiporn feminism is counter-
hegemonic, challenging and interrogating the dominant ideology sanctioned by the Christian 
Right. Antiporn feminism is not a disorganised, apolitical resistance, but rather an organised 
political opposition built on decades of critical theory. As Lather (1984) writes, an organised 
resistance is crucial to counter-hegemony: 
The task of counter-hegemonic groups is the development of counter-institutions, 
ideologies, and cultures that provide an ethical alternative to the dominant hegemony, 
a lived experience of how the world can be different (p. 55). 
Emerging from the radical feminist perspective within feminism, antiporn feminism relies on 
a materialist analysis to deconstruct patriarchal systems of power and the way it interacts with 
white supremacy and capitalism. As Stewart Van Leeuwen et al (1993) assert, radical 
feminism is ‘the most pointedly and consistently woman-centered’ of all the feminist 
perspectives (p. 56). Liberal feminism, the most dominant form of feminist action in the 
United States, regards assimilation with masculine norms as sufficiently progressive, and sex-
positive feminism imagines that women can have individual agency under conditions of sex 
inequality. On the other hand, antiporn feminists maintains a rigid and uncompromising 
stance advocating for women’s complete emancipation from the sex industry. Because 
antiporn feminism has taken the form of critiquing many of the structures and practices that 
are central to Anglo-American, Protestant life, namely compulsory heterosexuality, gender 
roles, and the nuclear family, it has therefore found itself on the margins of a broader feminist 
debate about women’s roles in society, and even further isolated from mainstream political 
debate.  
Although the Christian Right has been able to penetrate the ranks of the Republican Party and 
to drive an agenda which has seen an unprecedented focus on social issues among 
conservative lawmakers, antiporn feminists have not had the same institutional success. The 
marginalised position antiporn feminists are in makes them vulnerable to co-option by the 
politically powerful Christian Right.  
In Adaptation and Appropriation (2006) Julie Sanders defines appropriation as ‘a decisive 
journey’ away from the master frame ‘into a wholly new cultural product and domain’. 
Intrinsic to appropriation is a wholesale rethinking of the terms of the original work; 
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developing new meanings and applying them to an existing set of governing principles. 
Leeds-Hurwitz (1993) echoes this interpretation, asserting that beyond the act of taking, 
appropriation allows the dominant group to reinvent the meaning of the stolen arguments. In 
other words, “appropriation refers to the taking […] by one culture for use in another culture, 
giving it new meaning in the process.”  
This process is often inconspicuous or shadowy. Collaboration between adversarial groups 
can precede an eventual co-option (Fiorenza, 1992), and this is reflected in the sequence of 
events which have defined the trajectory of antipornography politics. As the following 
chapters will explore, strategic collaboration took place between antiporn feminists and 
Christian Right campaigners during the push for antipornography ordinances in the early 
1980s. Since then, strategic collaboration between the two movements has not materialised as 
explicitly on the issue, and the nature of the relationship has transformed into one of 
subversion and usurpation by the dominant Christian Right over the subordinate feminist 
position. 
     Theory of frames 
 
Frame theory is the third interpretive framework for addressing the research question. 
Leading scholars in frame theory Snow, Burke Rochford, Worden and Benford (1986), 
Goffman (1974), and Lakoff (2004) explain that a “frame” simply refers to a schemata of 
interpretation. Frames imbue certain events or issues with political meaning, and help to 
guide and persuade an audience’s interpretation of the issue. They are often used for political 
ends, and convey a message about an organisation’s values. Social movement organisations 
are actively engaged in attempts to control how audiences understand their rhetoric in this 
process referred to as framing. The result is a package of rhetorical devices favouring certain 
interpretations of meaning and against others, typically effacing subordinate voices. 
Organisational leaders decide which frames to emphasise depending on the political climate 
at the time. “Movement frames are in dialectic relationship with political opportunity,” 
explains Rose (2011). Political events and evolving public opinion forces organisations to 
adapt if they wish to survive. This means organisations will consider the use of certain frames 
for tactical advantage. For example, Melody Rose’s empirical study on leaders in the 
Christian Right found that since the 1970s leaders have decided to adopt a pro-woman frame 
in the antiabortion debate, to supplement their old argument that abortion is primarily harmful 
to the foetus. Benford and Snow (2000) point out that a process within frame theory referred 
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to as “frame alignment” can often be deployed by an organisation with the intent of attracting 
“prospective constituents and actual or prospective resource providers” (p. 624), which was 
evident in Rose’s case study and has implications for this study as well. Crucially, a shift in 
framing is not without risk to an organisation and can raise questions from existing 
constituents about the purity of the movement.  
There are indeed advantages to adopting new frames. For a movement like the Christian 
Right which has been around in its current politicised form since the 1960s, a shift in framing 
can breathe new life into a waning movement, attracting support from external and internal 
sources, therefore boosting the revenue of the movements’ most prominent organisations 
(Zald, 1997). New frames can also renew an organisation’s relevance from the perspective of 
the media. The Christian Right has a lengthy and entrenched history in the United States. In 
order to keep up with the demands of a dynamic media environment which is always seeking 
new and different causes to put a spotlight on, the movement must employ a message that 
will survive in such a cursory, headline-grabbing atmosphere. In the case of antipornography 
politics, adopting a pro-woman frame has the added advantage of subverting the strength of 
feminist organisations competing with conservative organisations for political resources. 
Such a rhetorical heist undermines feminist claims to speak for women and reframes a rights-
based approach to antipornography activism as the equal domain of the religious right and 
feminism. 
The first part of this thesis traces the broad timeline from the inception of the new Christian 
Right in the 1960s, which was at first deeply invested in militaristic symbolism warning 
adherents of the battle between the forces of good and evil, to today’s more pluralistic, 
secularised movement. This has taken place within the broader secularisation of American 
political discourse, which now characterises religious rhetoric as narrow, outdated, and 
exclusionary (Bates, 1995).  
Despite there being little evidence in the 1960s that the movement was interested in appealing 
to women constituents, it is possible to pinpoint precise turning points in the movement’s 
direction, most of which began to take hold in the 1980s in an anxious response to the 
intensification of pro-woman politics emanating from the second-wave of feminism.  
In the second chapter, the focus narrows in on how the Christian Right is both participating in 
and exploiting the politics of gender consciousness to further its own political ends. 
Elaborating on Ronnee Schreiber’s (2002a; 2002b; 2008; 2010) body of work which has 
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explored the battle over representational claims between conservative women’s groups and 
feminist groups, this chapter deconstructs the notion of “gender consciousness” as it relates to 
the Christian Right, and whether the politicisation of gender by conservatives is establishing 
new normative boundaries of gender relations within the movement, but also whether such a 
politics has been absorbed by the movement because it simply reinforces neoliberalism and 
its attendant elimination of class-based analyses from contemporary political discourse, and 
therefore represents no fundamental threat to the orthodoxy of free market capitalism that is 
central to the Christian Right’s worldview.  
The third chapter delves deeper into the issue of appropriation at the heart of this study, and 
broadly examines other policy areas where the Christian Right has demonstrated its 
willingness to co-opt the language of rights and equality. These atypical concepts have not 
only found their way into the movement’s rhetoric on pornography, but also on abortion, 
contraception, gun control, and military action abroad. On abortion, the demonisation of 
women which has traditionally featured so strongly in antiabortion campaigns has been 
replaced by a softer, gentler, more sympathetic perspective that positions the abortion-minded 
woman and her foetus as dual victims of an aggressive, profit-driven abortionist; a narrative 
which capitalises on anti-patriarchal and anti-capitalist sentiment (Rose, 2011). On a range of 
social issues, the movement is pivoting to a rights-based, science-based, pro-woman frame 
indicating that their new rhetorical approach to pornography is part of a larger frame 
transformation. 
Covering the way in which the nineteenth-century temperance movement mirrored many 
features of today’s antiporn movement, the fourth chapter explores this historical perspective 
as a background to the modern phenomenon of co-option by the Christian Right. As with the 
parallels on abortion rhetoric, the issue of temperance offers a crucial insight into how 
strategies from progressive causes can be seized upon by moral reformists, as well as 
revealing the way a defence of “moral values” and the preservation of the domestic sphere 
interact with a progressive, women’s rights agenda when both schools of thought have an eye 
to the same overarching goal. In many respects, temperance reformers were an early 
incarnation of today’s Christian Right opponents of pornography, in that they made use of 
conservative ideals about women’s natural affinity for the domestic sphere, pairing this with 
more radical proposals for how women’s roles might evolve to give them greater political 
influence. The fate of the movement has enduring implications for today’s activists on both 
the left and right engaged in antipornography politics. 
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This discussion then moves into the fifth chapter which explores how the Christian Right are 
engaged in a contemporary revitalisation of the notion of separate spheres central through the 
doctrine of true womanhood. This has occasioned a discourse on pornography that 
problematises the harms done to women in pornography using women’s rights-based 
arguments, while simultaneously affirming a set of ideals that undermines women’s 
autonomy. At the heart of this is a tension within conservative ranks about what women’s 
ideal role should be. Oscillating between the homemaker archetype and the independent 
woman, leaders in the movement are working through how to frame pornography’s harms to 
women in a way that caters to the broad spectrum of interpretations about women. From this 
a rhetorical duology has emerged, where women’s rights and domesticity converge to form a 
new approach to pornography. 
The final chapter consists of two parts: first, a detailed discussion of the case studies, which 
are organised thematically and are presented with numerous quotes from the groups; and 
second, in an attempt to provide some context in terms of why the groups have opted for the 
tactic of appropriation, is a discussion of the attendant socio-political factors which have 
motivated the groups towards this rhetorical strategy. Where relevant, the temperance parallel 
is drawn into the discussion to add depth and clarity to the analysis. 
Each chapter attempts to make the case that today’s Christian Right are breaking away from a 
traditional gendered narrative that solely places women within a subservient, domestic frame, 
to appeal more broadly to constituents persuaded by pro-woman, rights-based arguments. 
Through the vehicle of pornography, today’s Christian Right are distancing themselves from 
their political forebears who used strict, biblically-driven rhetoric to naturalise women’s 
unequal access to power. Instead, they are borrowing from feminist discourse to extend the 
boundaries of their narrative to include the concepts of equality and rights into their 
assessment of pornography. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
The new Christian Right, second-wave feminism and the emergence of 
antipornography politics 
 
The debate between rivalling perspectives on what role, if any, pornography should play in a 
civilised society has been well drawn out by theorists in works such as Susan Faludi’s 
Backlash (1991), Donald Alexander Downs’ The New Politics of Pornography (1989), and 
more recently Whitney Strub’s Perversion for Profit (2010). The focus tends to be on the 
broader set of competing claims between free-speech liberals who regard the suppression of 
pornography as tantamount to censorship, and those opposed to pornography on either moral 
or civil rights grounds. But fewer inquiries have been made into the rhetorical and strategic 
characteristics of the two groups principally opposed to pornography: the Christian Right and 
antiporn feminists.  
The relationship between these groups is generally regarded as a classic example of how the 
radical impulse of women’s liberation can be tempered by aligning itself with proponents of 
moral reform. In other words, antiporn feminists were gradually made more conservative 
over the course of their engagement with antipornography politics, a trend reflected more 
broadly in left-wing movements across the West.6 What has not been explored in any great 
depth is the appearance of the opposite phenomenon – how the Christian Right has exploited 
the radical impulse of the feminist position for its own political ends. Through various tactics 
of co-option and reframing, the tone of the Christian Right on pornography has evolved into a 
distinctly secularised narrative, appearing as concerned with women’s rights and equality as 
with the preservation of the nuclear family and the moral compass of America.  
This move by the Christian Right towards secularised rhetoric on pornography is not an 
atomised phenomenon, and exists within a broader historical context that has determined the 
course of antipornography politics in postwar America. Before delving into the intricacies of 
the Christian Right’s current framing of pornography, the key social, political and economic 
tensions and transformations which played a central role in the development of 
antipornography politics must be explored. 
                                                          
6 Bill Clinton and Tony Blair were political manifestations of this move on the left to “civilise” capitalism, 
rather than agitate against it. For a more detailed discussion see: Romano, F 2006, ‘Clinton and Blair: the 
political economy of the third way,’ Journal of Economic and Social Policy, Vol. 10, No. 2. 
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Social issues like pornography took on new political significance in postwar America as 
fiscal and economic differences between the two major political parties diminished. Broad 
agreement on a set of neoliberal policy imperatives referred to as the “Washington 
Consensus” have obscured many of the important distinctions between institutionalised 
parties on Left and Right, and have forced the electorate to shift their focus to more 
pronounced differences in party positions on morally-charged social issues (Lavelle, 2008).  
The parties differing stances on key social issues was crystallised by the period of 
unprecedented social change in the 1960s. An era that spawned the new Christian Right and 
the second wave of feminism, and occasioned what Andrew Hartman (2015) refers to as “a 
war for the soul of America.” Homosexuality, abortion, feminism, art, censorship, and 
affirmative action came to dominate political discourse, precipitating a period of marked 
political polarisation which still persists strongly today. Such polarisation is believed to exist 
between two broad coalescing groups, motivated either by religious orthodoxy or 
progressivism. The emergence of identity politics has further intensified these tribal conflicts 
over values, which its critics suggest has little to do with finding a common humanity and 
more to do with provoking oppositional cultures (Sullivan, 1995; Tomasky, 2013). 
Therefore, the culture war of the last fifty years has been between groups largely divided over 
what Hunter (1991) calls “the impulse toward progressivism” versus the “impulse toward 
orthodoxy” (p. 43). While Christian groups tend to arrive at their moral conclusions based on 
biblical principles, the moral basis of progressivism is less straightforward. “Some draw upon 
scientific evidence about the human condition” states Jensen (1998), an approach which 
derives from the intellectual tradition of Enlightenment naturalism. Others draw on personal 
experiences, a kind of subjectivism (Jensen, 1998). Broadly speaking, progressives are united 
by the understanding that moral precepts evolve and adapt to social change, while orthodox 
individuals regard moral principles as originating from a divine source and existing in a fixed 
state.  
For leaders on the Christian Right, anxieties about the decline of morality in the United States 
are expressed through a fixation on the stability of the nuclear family, which is tasked with 
everything from maintaining normative gender relations to preserving myths about the 
national identity. 
The supposed moral supremacy of the patriarchal nuclear family grew out of colonial 
structures linked centrally to Britain. Upon settling in the United States, white colonisers 
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imposed the ideology of the nuclear family on Native American populations, whose varying 
family structures – often matrilineal – were interpreted by colonisers as a violation of the 
natural and instinctual roles men and women ought to assume within the family structure 
(Chambers, 2001).  
Although leaders on the Christian Right employ a narrative essentialising the patriarchal, 
Anglophonic family, early colonisers as well as today’s Christian Right leaders understand 
that the family is a vulnerable, contested, and constantly evolving structure. Meanings about 
the family and gender roles are constructed not through a single site but through a range of 
discursive sites, including biological, scientific, psychological and historical codes of 
knowledge that attempt to “universalise and dehistoricise the [nuclear] family” (Chambers, 
2001: 33). The concept of the ideal family, wherein men and women occupy separate, 
unequal spheres, has been anchored within the patriotic symbolism of the nation state. The 
decline of the nation is inextricably tied to the instability of the nuclear family model.  
Christian Right leader and FOF founder James Dobson has repeatedly emphasised this view. 
Responding to the impending legalisation of same-sex marriage in the United States, Dobson 
(2015) wrote that “the family that has existed since antiquity will likely crumble, presaging 
the fall of Western civilization itself.” This myth of the naturalness and universality of the 
patriarchal nuclear family is repeatedly appropriated by the Christian Right in order to 
construct the inferioritisation of women as fixed and immutable (Chambers, 2001: 34). 
Feminism has been the great moral challenge over the last century to this orthodoxy on 
family, exposing the malleability of the nuclear family and the roles within it.  
Mixing the politics of family values with metaphors of violence has been Dobson’s preferred 
aproach. Justifying such tactics, Dobson asserted that the heated dispute over values in 
Western countries was simply a “continuation of the age-old struggle between the principles 
of righteousness and the kingdom of darkness” (Dobson in Diamond, 1998: 2). He added that 
opposition to violent pornography among other sins did not merely represent a battle between 
the Christian Right and their philosophical opponents, but against Satan, “who leads the 
whole world astray.” Conflating the progressive-left with Satan sought to deepen the 
movement’s perception that it was locked in a biblical battle between the forces of good and 
evil.  
A key component of this deeply hostile strategy by the Christian Right was to hijack and 
exploit key national events and use them to demonstrate that the country was in the midst of 
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the ‘end times’. Dr Dobson, now in his late seventies but still exerting his influence through a 
daily broadcast titled Family Talk, has stayed true to the movement’s pre-1990s style and is 
quick to employ this tactic. For example, following the December 2012 massacre at Sandy 
Hook Elementary School in Connecticut where 20-year-old gunman Adam Lanza shot and 
killed twenty children and six staff members, Dr Dobson went on the air alleging that Sandy 
Hook was the direct result of the breakdown of the American family, and served as a dire 
warning that the country would soon be beyond redemption if it did not repent for its sins and 
return to biblically sanctioned ways of living.7 The timing of the broadcast was regarded by 
some as highly insensitive and its content misguided and poorly judged,8 but by connecting 
current events with biblical prophecies, the polarising broadcast appealed to the eschatology 
ethos of many evangelicals who are waiting patiently for the rapture when Jesus returns for 
his believers. 
The Christian Right’s longstanding warlike strategy came under review during the period of 
self-reflection within the movement in the 1990s, and since then a discernibly kinder, gentler 
moral conservatism has replaced the conflict-based tactics of the early years.  
     Casting a wider net: pornography and the Christian Right’s mainstream agenda 
 
In 1993 influential Christian Right leader Ralph Reed Jr. wrote that the movement had failed 
to connect its agenda up until that point with average voters. “The pro-family movement still 
has little appeal among the 40 million voters who attend church frequently,” Reed asserted, 
reasoning that the political rhetoric of the Christian Right had been value-laden but policy-
thin, failing to inspire voters. The movement had limited its effectiveness, Reed argued, by 
concentrating “disproportionately on issues such as abortion and homosexuality” (p. 31). 
Reed cited surveys which showed that only twelve percent of Americans regarded abortion as 
a key motivator in who they decided to vote for.  
Pornography had similarly failed to ignite voters’ passions, and was being passed over in 
favour of bread-and-butter issues, such as taxation, the rising cost of health care, government 
deficit, and stagnating wages. To restore voters’ attention to core social issues such as 
abortion, homosexuality, and pornography, the movement would have to tie morality to 
                                                          
7 Cleaning house: raising responsible kids – 1 2012, podcast, Dr James Dobson’s Family Talk, August 13, 
retrieved June 2013, <http://www.oneplace.com/ministries/family-talk/listen/cleaning-house-raising-
responsible-kids-i-295805.html>. 
8 Being a smart stepmom – 3 2012, podcast, Dr James Dobson’s Family Talk, November 21, retrieved June 
2013, <http://www.oneplace.com/ministries/family-talk/listen/being-a-smart-stepmom-iii-308477.html>. 
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economics (Reed, 1993). This new strategy regards pornography as the catalyst to sexual 
promiscuity, which can be linked to sexually transmitted diseases and must be treated at great 
expense to the taxpayer in the health care system. Sexual promiscuity is also believed to be 
the cause of children being born out of wedlock, an increasing phenomenon the Christian 
Right identify as the root of numerous problems – poverty, violent crime, and drug addiction 
(Green, Rozell and Wilcox, 2003). Focus on the Family explicitly link premarital sex with an 
increased likelihood of later marital breakdown, asserting that “[…] divorce is more likely 
among the sexually active and cohabitors because they have established their life together on 
relatively unstable sexual relationships.”9 
Conservative groups routinely cite statistics showing that children raised by their married, 
biological parents have better educational and health outcomes, thus resulting in fewer costs 
to the taxpayer and employers who provide health insurance for around half of all insured 
Americans (Janicki, 2013). Because marriage is regarded as a civilising institution for men, 
imbuing them with a sense of purpose that can then be channelled into providing for the 
family, removing the marriage incentive has grave economic repercussions. When men are 
not working to support a family, their work ethic erodes and productivity is undermined at 
great cost to company profit margins. Exacerbating the already grave threats sexual 
promiscuity posed to marriage was the introduction of no-fault divorce, which Phyllis 
Schlafly insists in her book Feminist Fantasies (2003b) has caused “economic devastation” 
for women. The logic goes that prior to it being so easy to seek a divorce, men were obliged 
to provide for their wives, but now that women can exit marriages without enduring fault 
criteria, the ex-husband leaves with a higher standard of living, while the ex-wife loses 
considerable economic power, which must be ameliorated elsewhere, chiefly by government. 
To social conservatives, all economic problems have a social origin. Therefore, although 
social issues like pornography may have been greatly eclipsed by economic concerns by the 
1990s, threatening the survival of the Christian Right, the movement adapted to this shift by 
framing pornography differently. Pornography was no longer simply a matter of sexual 
impropriety, but a violation of women’s rights and a threat to the economic stability of a 
nation.  
                                                          
9 Stanton, GT 2011, Premarital sex and greater risk of divorce, Focus on the Family, viewed January 2013, 
<http://www.focusonthefamily.com/about_us/focus-findings/marriage/premarital-sex-and-divorce.aspx>. 
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With the increasing casualisation of the workforce and the outsourcing of manufacturing 
jobs, job insecurity was reaching its highest level in decades (Farber, 2007). Many families 
had already come to the conclusion that one income was no longer enough to support the 
family, and more and more women were taking up part-time or full-time work to help pay the 
mortgage and cope with rising health and education costs. Within this context of increasingly 
interchangeable and fluid sex roles, campaigns to promote equality between the sexes were 
more salient than ever. Economic woes caused by the policies of deregulation and 
privatisation and the second wave of feminism emerged as concurrent and interrelated 
movements.  
Possessing an economic orthodoxy that championed a ‘lean, mean state’, the Christian Right 
and its New Right allies had good reason to sound the alarm over the corrosive effects of 
pornography on marriages. Within intact marriages, it is the husband who is expected to 
support his wife and children with income earned in the workforce. Once a marriage is 
dissolved, the husband is in some cases supplanted by the state, who must financially support 
the woman in cases where she cannot participate in the workforce due to caring 
responsibilities. This vast transition of responsibility from the private to the public sphere 
represents a threat to a conservative worldview chiefly concerned with maintaining the 
patriarchal family and diminishing the role of the state in guaranteeing minimum standards of 
living. It is the family that ought to determine the health, welfare, and education of 
individuals, not the state.  
Eisenstein (1982) identifies the patriarchal loss of authority brought about by the participation 
of women in the workforce as the main catalyst for the emergence of the Christian Right’s 
close ally in the New Right: 
In this fundamental sense the sexual politics of the New Right is implicitly 
antifeminist and racist: it desires to establish the model of the traditional white 
patriarchal family by dismantling the welfare state and by removing wage-earning 
married women from the labor force and returning them back to the home (p. 568). 
Identified by the Christian Right as one of the key factors in the demise of a marriage, 
pornography became a focal point for the movement in the decline of the American family, 
and the economic troubles that followed.  
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The conservative outfit Morality in Media made this connection clear by drawing attention to 
a study published in 2014 which concluded that young men are choosing to postpone 
marriage in favour of “low-cost sexual gratification” found in pornography. The report, 
published by Germany’s Institute for the Study of Labor and co-authored by a West Chester 
University of Pennsylvania professor, made the claim that traditionally one of the reasons to 
enter into a marriage was to gain “sexual gratification.” But as options for sexual gratification 
outside of marriage have grown, the need for a marriage to serve this function has 
diminished. The researchers’ analysed 1,512 surveys from the General Social Survey 
completed by American men aged 18-35 between 2000 and 2004. They looked at whether 
regular consumption of internet pornography correlated with marriage formation. Despite a 
problematic method which relied on conflating respondents’ self-reported Internet use with 
self-reported pornography use, the researchers concluded that easy access to sexual 
gratification in the form of pornography has eliminated many of the incentives for entering a 
marriage (Malcolm and Naufal, 2014).  
The researchers in the Institute for the Study of Labor study reasoned that the threat 
pornography posed to marriage had grave implications for the country’s economic future, for 
marriage is the ideal environment in which to produce “high-quality children” who grow up 
to become reliable economic contributors (Malcolm and Naufal, 2014: 22). Again, a 
concerted effort to tether social problems to economic woes helps to convey the message that 
pornography is more than simply a moral issue for which religiously-inclined Americans 
should take notice, but also portend a fiscal downturn as the consequences of divorce and 
fatherless children place further pressure on government revenue. This new messaging has 
the potential to appeal to a far wider spectrum of Americans previously unmoved by moral 
arguments. 
The merging of social and economic issues in the 1990s precipitated a strong period of 
political influence for the Christian Right who managed to penetrate the corridors of power in 
the late 1990s and during the Bush era in the early 2000s. The influence of the Christian 
Right was felt particularly strongly in the area of welfare reform. Ralph Reed Jr.’s vision in 
1993 for a movement that spent as much of its time and resources on policy formulation as it 
did on values rhetoric was realised through the 1995-1996 welfare reform debates. Christian 
fundamentalists and right-wing think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation formed effective 
coalitions, meeting informally to develop common policy positions and to coordinate phone 
calls, letters, and visits to Congress (Reese, 2008: 175).  
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These efforts proved astoundingly effective. The opening paragraph of the 1996 welfare 
reform act, titled The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996, proclaimed the promotion of heterosexual, married households to 
be a major goal of the new law because this kind of family structure was crucial to both a 
“successful society” and in the “interests of children.” A key component of the law was an 
annual $100 million ‘illegitimacy bonus’ which rewarded states for reducing their out-of-
wedlock births. A further $50 million was reserved annually for abstinence-only and 
marriage promotion programs in schools. Despite the implementation of such measures 
reaffirming the Christian Right’s patriarchal family agenda, Congress had not approved all 
the proposals put forward by the Right. For example, the proposal to deny benefits to unwed 
teenage mothers and to instead force them to live with their parents was unsuccessful (Reese, 
2008: 175). The policy achievements of the Christian Right under the Democratic leadership 
of Bill Clinton were encouraging to the movement, and their influence only grew following 
the inauguration of George W. Bush. The ability to transform values-based assessments of 
social issues into public policy reforms with wide-reaching implications breathed new life 
into a previously fledgling movement.  
Pornography, framed as being directly responsible for the breakdown of marriage and thus a 
leading cause of economic and societal instability, became a prime candidate for conservative 
reinvention. As Whitney Strub (2010) notes, the Christian Right’s emerging position on 
pornography was shaped by three recent developments: public awareness and panic over 
child pornography, new social science research linking the viewing of pornography with 
violent behaviour, and the feminist analysis of pornography. “All would be misappropriated 
in the service of conservative antiporn ideology” proclaims Strub (2010: 194).   
Connecting an issue like pornography with broader economic problems also helps the 
movement to avoid the pitfalls of single issue politics. As Reed (1993) admits, “building a 
political agenda around a single issue is a risky proposition.” When progress lags on the 
issue, the viability of the entire movement is threatened. To avoid this fate, Reed stated that 
the ongoing strategy of the movement would be to “discuss a broader issues agenda in the 
language of the target audience” (p. 35). A language that ought to embody principles that will 
respect the rights-based, pluralist, individualist ethos of American society, while also paying 
homage to Protestant traditions.   
37 
 
Since 1993 when Ralph Reed Jr. first outlined the Christian Right’s new strategy, the impact 
of pornography on people’s lives has changed dramatically. Once a difficult pastime to 
conceal, pornography is now ubiquitous, accessible to anyone with an internet connection, 
and on multiple devices. A 2008 study of 813 university students in the United States found 
that sixty-seven percent of young men and forty-nine percent of young women agree that 
viewing pornography is acceptable. Whereas eighty-seven percent of the young men reported 
using pornography, compared to thirty-one percent of the young women (Carroll et al. 2008). 
Other studies on young people’s use of pornography in western countries have uncovered 
similar rates of consumption among men and women (Traeen et al. 2006; Romito & 
Beltramini, 2011). The rapid increase in the availability and consumption of pornography has 
resulted in a recentreing of the pornography problem in the discourse of Christian Right 
groups. The focus on pornography has never completely disappeared, but it has been 
reenergised in part by the intersecting influences of the internet and increasingly affordable 
and accessible digital devices. 
Despite the fact that today’s Christian Right are aligning themselves with the rhetoric of 
antiporn feminists, one of the defining characteristics of the movement has been its vehement 
opposition to feminism. Figurehead of the Christian Right, Paul Weyrich explained that 
feminism contradicted “the biblically ordained nature of the family, with the father as the 
head of the household and the mother subject to his ultimate authority” (in Durham, 2000: 
36). Deeply worrying for conservatives is the prospect that a reordering of biblically ordained 
roles for men and women ultimately emasculates men. As feminism succeeds in valorising 
women’s contributions, masculine attributes come to be regarded as primitive and 
destructive, and in turn men are encouraged to renounce masculinity and adopt behaviours 
only deemed appropriate for women. One pastor described this as “the feminization of the 
American male” and warmed that men were becoming “sissified” and voluntarily abdicating 
their natural role as leader (Durham, 2000: 36).  
The logic goes that when the innate and complementary differences between men and women 
are distorted by feminism and men are expected to behave ‘like women’, they are deprived of 
purpose which for some time has been to protect and provide for the economically dependent 
wife and children. Without purpose, men’s sexual appeal to women is weakened. The 
inevitable consequence of this is a widespread conversion to lesbianism among women. 
Robert Knight of the conservative Family Research Council confirmed this fear in a 1995 
interview, stating that “lesbianism is the animating principle of feminism. Because feminism, 
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at its core, is at war with motherhood, femininity, family, and God. And lesbians are at war 
with all these things” (Durham, 2000: 54).  
The core principles underpinning feminist politics in the United States are virtually 
impossible to reconcile with aspects of the conservative Protestant worldview, particularly 
the denominations that insist on a more inerrant interpretation of the Bible, such as 
fundamentalist and evangelical “born-again” Christians. Reproductive freedom, sexual 
autonomy, and the toppling of the male as the authoritative head of the household and sole 
income earner are all central to feminist theory and practice but are met with deep unease by 
traditional family values proponents.  
The question then is, how do those on the Christian Right reframe patriarchal values as 
beneficial to women? And have the inevitable limits of this necessitated a transition toward 
aping feminist discourse in order to augment the movement’s appeal to women? Making the 
case that traditional gender roles are a source of happiness and contentedness for women is 
one way leaders in the movement have tried to sell their ideological vision to women. For 
example, theology professor Maxine Hancock (1976) reasoned in Love, Honor, and Be Free 
that the freedom made possible by being a housewife could lead to considerable happiness 
because it was only in the feminine space of the home that wives had an unparalleled ability 
to exercise influence, especially with regard to the children. In contrast to the happy 
housewife is the wife who decides to enter the world of paid work. “There is no solid 
satisfaction is any career for a woman like myself,” mused author Taylor Caldwell in Family 
Weekly. “I would rather cook a meal for a man and bring him his slippers […] than have all 
the citations and awards and honors I have received worldwide” Caldwell adds (in Nigro, 
2011: 411). Far from being a source of liberation, many on the Christian Right have 
traditionally regarded women’s participation in paid work as the catalyst for increasing 
dissatisfaction among American women10 and frames their advocacy for the traditional 
housewife and stay-at-home mother as promising women a more fulfilling life than the 
drudgery and stress of paid work delivered by the feminist movement. “Maybe the home is a 
pleasanter and more fulfilling work environment than the office, after all” Phyllis Schlafly 
(2003a) contends.  
                                                          
10 Conservatives often cite the National Bureau of Economic Research survey which has shown a measurable 
decline in women’s happiness since 1970. The feminist movement’s push for women to enter paid work is used 
to explain this decline, despite the numerous other social and economic transformations since the 1970s, namely 
economic deregulation, wage stagnation, and markedly increasing health insurance premiums and tuition fees.  
39 
 
The condemnation of the feminist movement has always been central to the reactionary 
antipornography politics of the Christian Right. CWA’s Rosalie Bush (1997) argues that in 
granting women opportunities to work outside the home, the women’s movement has 
produced a generation of women who “resent” their husbands and family (1997: 8). To those 
on the Christian Right, women’s economic freedom and sexual freedom are commensurate 
outcomes, and it is only in tethering women to their husband’s for financial security that 
women’s sexual obedience can be assured.  
The supposed interchangeability of the sexes advocated by feminists has resulted in a more 
relaxed sexual climate where women are no longer expected to preserve their virginity for 
their husbands, but those on the Christian Right argue that the burden of sexual consequence 
are still felt most heavily by women. It is women who are primarily left with the 
responsibility to raise a child in custody arrangements. It is women who must undergo 
abortion procedures. It is women whose bodies are put through the hormonal experiment of 
contraceptive pills. CWA’s Janice Shaw Crouse believes feminists have absolved men of 
their responsibility to women by promoting the benefits of ‘no strings attached’ sex, driving 
men away from marriage and monogamy, which according to Crouse has been devastating 
for women who still desire faithful companionship and motherhood.11 One CWA writer 
chronicles how feminism has led to a shift in cultural norms which has produced an appetite 
for pornography: 
Feminists convinced many women they could have it all – and Super Mom was born. 
She cleaned, cooked, cuddled babies, coddled her husband – and commuted to the 
office. The result? Exhausted women who resented their husband and family; 
unfulfilled women leaving home to “find themselves”; and men who had been 
stripped of their role as head of the family. No-fault divorce laws made it easy for 
couples to “start over” – again and again. A “do your own thing” mentality left 
children low on the list of parental priorities […] And the ongoing battle between the 
sexes forced all sorts of perversions out of the closet and into the mainstream (Bush, 
1997: 8). 
The narrative goes that women’s personal and professional pursuits outside the home, which 
have been largely facilitated by feminism, as well as economic necessity, have left men 
                                                          
11 Concerned Women for America 2012, Are we better off after the pill? Concerned Women for America, 
viewed February 2013, <http://concernedwomen.org/are-we-better-off-after-the-pill/>. 
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emotionally and physically neglected, causing them to seek gratification elsewhere, in 
adulterous behaviour and in pornography. Moreover, without adequate supervision of the 
children due to maternal employment, young boys can easily slip into moral laxity (Marshall, 
1991: 56).  
The competitive, cutthroat corporate environment suits the male temperament, but it is not in 
woman’s gentler, more selfless nature to engage in such tactics, and it is bad for her to 
attempt to mimic her male colleagues. Connaught C. Marshner (1982), who became the 
highest-level woman in the conservative Heritage Foundation by the 1980s and spent a 
compelling career in the public sphere, described woman’s nature as “other-oriented”, who 
are “ordained by their nature to spend themselves in meeting the needs of others” (p. 12). On 
all policy fronts, essentialist ideas about the “true nature” of women dictate what the 
Christian Right regard as sensible reform.  
The movement has also recast abortion and hormonal contraception as damaging to women’s 
health in an attempt to frame abortion providers as the real exemplars of patriarchy. For 
example, CWA declared that “any campaign that pushes abortion promotes the pain abortion 
inflicts on women.”12 Rather than working within the rhetorical parameters constructed by 
the feminist movement which sought to connect the constitutionally protected right to 
abortion with women’s agency, the Christian Right has uncharacteristically pursued a kind of 
political inversion which sees them questioning the true extent of women’s agency and free 
will within broader systems of structural oppression. By limiting the accessibility of abortion 
drugs and procedures, encouraging fathers to take more responsibility for their children, and 
offering more charitable assistance to young pregnant women, women might be spared the 
brutality of the abortionist. 
The Christian Right may disagree with many of the central policies of mainstream feminist 
organisations, particularly its support of abortion as underscored by CWA’s assertion that 
abortion is akin to the promotion of violence against women, but it has taken note of the 
successes feminism has had in terms of reshaping cultural values and moral attitudes, and 
adopted the progressive frame of “rights” and “equality” in their pursuit of pornographers.  
                                                          
12 Concerned Women for America 2001, CWA Declares NARAL’s Campaign a Fight against Women, press 
release, Washington D.C. 
41 
 
In the early days of the new Christian Right there was considerable resistance to this notion 
that feminist ideals had any place in the movement, and any evidence that women’s liberation 
was infiltrating the movement was swiftly subverted. When the 1977 International Women’s 
Year conference in Houston endorsed a feminist platform it provoked the more conservative 
attendees to mobilise and form New Right women’s groups who could thwart some of the 
progress being made by the feminist movement (Faludi, 1991). 
Susan Faludi notes in Backlash (1991) that the immense success of the feminist movement in 
the 1970s, particularly with Congress’s tentative approval of the Equal Rights Amendment in 
1972 and then the US Supreme Court’s legalisation of abortion in 1973, meant it was 
feminism, rather than communism or racial politics that became the centre of the Christian 
Right’s fury. Perhaps most worryingly for the Christian Right was the force of the feminist 
movement in terms of threatening the professional status of religious preachers, who 
depended on a mostly female flock of worshippers. These women were susceptible to the 
powerful messaging of the women’s movement to such an extent that the flock was “not only 
diminishing but becoming increasingly disobedient” (p. 263). In an attempt to sequester the 
growing acceptance of feminist ideas, evangelical ministers clung to Ephesians 5:22-24: 
“Wives, submit yourselves to your own husbands as you do to the Lord. For the husband is 
the head of the wife as Christ is the head of the church.” The insistence that women submit to 
their husbands became more critical than ever in the face of widespread female disobedience 
to traditionally prescribed roles.  
Imbued with a renewed sense of cultural and political dominance following Ronald Reagan’s 
election in 1980, conservatives began actively subverting the feminist position as a means of 
reasserting cultural dominance. But their newfound political dominance also occasioned a 
growing confidence among leaders to seize arguments from feminists to use in the service of 
conservative political ends. Under Reagan, the movement leaders felt a sense of invincibility. 
Jerry Falwell, the televangelist minister who founded the Moral Majority and galvanised the 
Christian Right into a political force, described the electoral victory as “the greatest day for 
the cause of conservatism and morality in my adult life.”13 Leaders on the Christian Right 
realised that Reagan’s ascent would be politically advantageous for them given his priorities 
while Governor of California from 1967-1975. As a newly elected Governor in 1967, Reagan 
                                                          
13 Sehat, D 2011, ‘Do evangelical Christian politicians help evangelicals?’ The Washington Post, 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com>. 
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assured pastors at a prayer breakfast that “trusting in God for guidance will be an integral part 
of my administration” (in Williams, 2010: 188). Reagan followed this sentiment by endorsing 
the teaching of creationism in schools, and supporting a return to prayer in public schools. He 
pushed hard for the passage of an antiabortion constitutional amendment which would have 
seen a ban on abortions nation-wide had it not been rejected by the Senate (p. 203), and 
oversaw the establishment of the Meese Commission Report, a comprehensive investigation 
into the effects of pornography, which came a decade and a half after the Longford Report in 
Britain. Both investigations borrowed heavily from feminist rhetoric in their final evaluations 
of the harms of pornography. 
     The Meese Commission Report, 1986 
 
The Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography, most often referred to as the Meese 
Commission, was prompted by agitation on the part of the Christian Right for greater control 
from progressive-left and anticensorship movements over sexual expression and public 
morality (Strub, 2010). The inquiry included some powerful commissioners, namely 
chairman Henry Hudson, vice-chairman Tex Lezar, executive director Alan Sears, and 
Edward J. Garcia, all of which are law-enforcement professionals. The founder of Focus on 
the Family, Dr. James Dobson, was also among the commissioners.  
Deemed objective, the Commission was given half a million dollars to come up with a 
solution to pornography. Commission critic Pat Califia (1986) described the report, published 
in July 1986, as a “quick and dirty piece of work” which risks being the “harbinger of a new 
wave of sexual McCarthyism.” Indeed, the Commission’s definition of pornography was 
vague and wide-ranging, existing when one’s sexual feelings and desires are aroused. The 
Commission did, however, emphasise the link between pornography and sexually aggressive 
attitudes toward women (Day, 1986). It is on this point that the commissioners sought 
feminist antipornography rhetoric to accentuate their claims. Initially, members of New York 
Women Against Pornography (WAP), which included Andrea Dworkin and Catharine 
MacKinnon, aided Commission staff in locating individuals to testify who had experienced 
harm from pornography. Despite pulling back from their endorsement of the inquiry, 
Dworkin and MacKinnon were pleased that the final report of the Commission supported 
their ordinance which defined pornography as a violation of women’s civil rights. Califia 
(1986) describes WAP as being “hoodwinked, coopted, and used” by the Commission, who 
never genuinely intended to reframe pornography as a civil rights violation, but merely to 
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reaffirm the legally contentious position that pornography is obscenity. This goes to the 
underlying conservatism of many of the commissioners, whose beliefs about the function of 
sex means issues of aggression are incidental to the core issue – that is to say, pornography 
depicts sex as divorced from marriage. Whether or not pornography depicts aggression and 
subjugation is not particularly relevant, as it nonetheless represents sex as a primal and 
mechanistic physiological need, akin to scratching an itch. Any material that depersonalises 
sex, or detaches it from its original biblical purpose, is pornographic.  
     Pornography: The Longford Report, 1972 
 
Well before the establishment of the Meese Commission, the Longford Study Group in 
Britain endeavoured to define and offer remedies for pornography.  The group was set up in 
1971 by Francis Pakenham, known as Lord Longford, in order to “capture the definition of 
pornography for a semi-religious, right-wing position” (Lehman, 2006: 28). Longford 
summoned the assistance of notable political figures such as Sir Frederick Catherwood, 
prominent academics, representatives of the Church, the Law, medical experts, as well as 
distinguished individuals in the Arts, Industry, Social and Youth workers. In all, 53 
committee members were summoned for a total of sixteen months, of whom only 47 stayed 
the course.  
The impetus for the inquiry, Longford claims, was the growing public anxiety about the ever-
expanding availability of pornography. The commission’s inquiry was significant as it was 
the first of its kind and garnered considerable interest from the press in Britain. The report 
was released in 1972, providing, what it termed, “a Christian view” on the harms of 
pornography. The report offered a rationale as to why the Christian finds pornography 
fundamentally disagreeable. For one, “the Christian believes that man is not another order of 
animal, that we are an altogether different […] No one should, therefore, treat another human 
being like an animal” (p. 138). The report goes on to ask:  “Is a pornographic picture of a 
woman – or man – a picture aimed to arouse sexual passion, likely to produce a feeling of 
respect for the human dignity of the person in the picture, or is it likely to degrade them?” (p. 
139). The belief that people must always appeal to the better angels of our nature was the 
report’s prevailing narrative.  “Civilisation,” the committee argued “is a thin crust,” and 
sexual depravity had dangerously eroded this crust, releasing the dark amoralities which lurk 
in every human being, and which require persistent restraint (Sutherland, 1982: 129).  
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A focus on how pornography sexually objectifies women only features briefly in the report.  
At times, the report uses strong feminist rights-based language: “The effect of pornography is 
to turn women […] from human beings into objects of lust. It has a strong dehumanising 
trend” (p. 141). At other times the report reverts back to its religious roots, critiquing 
pornography from a marriage-oriented perspective: “a woman does not have to share a 
husband’s love with three or four others” (p. 140). The ideological tug of war in the Longford 
Report represents an internal struggle within the Christian conservative movement that still 
pervades it today. Should pornography be shunned on the basis that it depicts and incites 
sexual violence, or because it represents unbridled and illicit sexual excitement outside the 
confines of a marriage? Conservative leaders are constructing pornography as the bridge 
between illicit sexual behaviour and sexualised violence, and this is where decades of 
antiporn feminist scholarship come in very handy. Among the recommendations of the 
Longford Report was the proposal to draft a new obscenity law which would extend more 
widely than the area of pornography to cover violence and drugs (p. 408). However, the 
report makes clear that it is enjoined “to see how pornography can be tackled […] in a many 
that is felt to be compatible with essential liberties” (p. 415). This assurance was dismissed 
by George Gale (1972) at The Spectator who asserted “what is being proposed is an 
extension of censorship. Lord Longford and his crew are trying to tell you and me what we 
may and may not read and publish.” Gale adds that introducing a new test dependent on 
popular ideas of decency would be a step backwards into the dark and closed societies where 
censors and moral watchdogs prowl. 
The Meese Commission report and the Longford Report represent two early examples of pro-
woman, rights-conscious arguments being drawn into an otherwise biblical, morally-driven 
case against pornography and portend the modern phenomenon of rhetorical co-option on the 
Christian Right.  
     Framing the emerging problem of pornography, 1960s-1980s 
 
Traditionally the religious right has regarded pornography as solely or primarily a problem of 
moral recalcitrance. How pornography is defined in this context depends largely on the 
decade in question. From the 1950s but prior to the advent of the internet, pornographic 
imagery could be found in magazines, books, in theatres, and later on VHS tapes. What 
precisely constitutes pornography is contested terrain. The MacKinnon-Dworkin model 
statute defines pornography as requiring three elements: graphic sexual explicitness, the 
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subordination of women, and depictions of any one of a long list of sexual acts. Other 
definitions have attempted to further narrow the definitional criteria. Cass Sunstein’s (1986) 
seminal piece in a Duke Law Journal argues for a simpler definition focused more explicitly 
on the abuse of women.  
However, for those on the Christian Right the definition of pornography can be much more 
wide reaching. For example, evangelical minister Tim LaHaye (1993) classifies biology 
textbooks and sex education manuals as pornographic. To support this assertion he states that 
“sex education is a family matter” and should not be addressed in public schools. Public 
schools, LaHaye charges, have used sex education to instruct young people on “the art of 
intercourse,” the result of which has been a “moral holocaust” in the United States (LaHaye 
in Lienesch, 1993: 83). For those on the Christian Right like LaHaye, mere allusions to 
sexual activity outside of the wedded bond are enough to warrant the pornographic label. 
Whereas for antiporn feminists, evidence of abuse is a more reliable benchmark on which the 
material can be judged.  
Despite the lack of universality on the definitional front, antipornography campaigners on the 
Christian Right have, in recent times, demonstrated their proclivity for supplementing moral 
arguments with civil rights claims which materialised from the feminist tradition. This is in 
stark contrast to the early days of the new Christian Right in the 1960s and early 1970s, 
where there is little evidence that the movement was interested in appealing to women 
constituents by framing their stance on particular social issues as beneficial to women’s 
autonomy and to a goal of equitable treatment of the sexes. This is significant as it points to 
an emerging consensus within the ranks of the Christian Right that moral arguments were no 
longer sufficiently persuasive on their own, and that a more explicit connection needed to be 
articulated between the policy proposals of the movement and the advancement of women in 
all realms of life. This tendency is manifest in a range of policy areas, as demonstrated by a 
congressional testimony in 1981 by Vincent Rue, founder of Women Exploited by Abortion 
on the devastating psychological harms a pregnancy termination can cause to women. Rue’s 
testimony proved to be a pivotal turning point in the rhetoric of the movement, which had 
previously cast women who have abortions as evil, but now sought to acknowledge their 
victimised status alongside that of the foetus. The softer, pro-woman tone embraced by 
antiabortion activists after this point proved so successful that it has since been applied to 
other core issues, including pornography.  
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By the 1990s, leaders of the Christian Right were boastfully disclosing their tactical shift to 
more secularised, rights-based rhetoric. Prominent evangelical Jerry Falwell addressed the 
movement’s evolving strategy with specific reference to pornography:  
On most issues, whether pornography or abortion, I try to do more than just quote the 
Bible. You can’t win a national debate from simply a scriptural perspective. So I try 
to come at these issues from a secular [angle] (in Tamney, 1992: 130). 
In the same vein, a lobbyist for the Moral Majority asserted: 
We are not a religious organization, and we have some non-religious people who 
support us because of our stand for a strong national defense. We don’t try to use 
scripture or words of Christ to convince people. If we started to use scripture we 
would bleed ourselves to death. We want to influence government (in Hertzke, 1988: 
89). 
According to Hunter (1991) the adoption of a more secular tone by religious conservatives 
amounts to an admission of the superiorly positioned status of liberal discourse: 
Every time an evangelical pastor makes an appeal to “medical and psychological 
proof” to establish that homosexuality is harmful and makes no other appeal; the 
[evangelical pastor] tacitly submits to the linguistic domination of its more 
progressive opposition (p. 306). 
The broader foundations of this rhetorical shift can be traced to the concurrent emergence of 
both antiporn feminism and the Christian Right in the same era. By the end of the 1970s, 
institutionalised opposition to pornography from within the women’s movement had 
coalesced in the political dominance of the feminist Women Against Pornography (WAP). 
This group was led by some of the feminist movement’s most notable figures, including 
Susan Brownmiller, Gloria Steinem, Adrienne Rich, Andrea Dworkin, and Robin Morgan. 
“Every feminist in the New York metropolitan area has heard of Women Against 
Pornography” proclaimed author Paula Webster (1981: 48). In Battling Pornography, 
Carolyn Bronstein (2011) explains how WAP tried to differentiate itself from the very vocal 
religious opposition to pornography at the time: 
WAP actively sought media attention and tried to communicate a specifically feminist 
(as opposed to conservative-moralist) objection to pornography, namely that it was a 
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point on the continuum of male violence and functioned as a key mechanism in the 
subordination of women (p. 238). 
Although it would be a few more years before Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon 
presented their definition of pornography as a violation of women’s civil rights to the courts 
in a number of American cities, an emerging milieu saw WAP campaigners already 
reframing pornography as an affront to women’s rights, as opposed to the obscenity 
precedent favoured by conservatives which focused more on whether or not the material in 
question inspired prurient curiosity. Just as WAP was ascending politically and generating 
debate on pornography and civil rights, the prospects for success in terms of the broader 
American feminist movement was diminishing as the political climate in the United States 
drifted rightward (Bronstein, 2011: 238).  
Beyond demands for the nation’s economic program to conform to the requirements of a 
rationalised market society, the rightward shift concentrated heavily on social issues, all of 
which contradicted the vision for a reconfiguration of sex-specific roles promoted by 
feminists. In Rightward Bound, Schulman and Zelizer (2008) document the American 
conservative transformation in the 1970s and cite two key issues as catalysts for the 
mobilisation of conservatives. The first was Congress’ approval of the Equal Rights 
Amendment in 1972, and the second was the Supreme Court’s Roe v. Wade ruling legalising 
abortion in 1973 (p. 77). Still incensed by decisions made by Congress and the Supreme 
Court in the 1950s and 1960s on race and religion, religious conservatives “were ripe to be 
drawn into a social movement against federal ‘intrusions’ into the sensitive and intensely 
personal arena of relations between the sexes” (p. 79).  
Pornography became a central concern for the newly politicised religious right because it 
represented the decay of modern society by glorifying nonmarital, nonprocreative relations. 
The subtext being that pornography endorsed homosexual or otherwise transgressive sexual 
practices. This fear had been articulated a decade earlier in the 1965 documentary film 
Perversion for Profit. In the documentary, television news reporter George Putnam claims 
that mere exposure to the nude male physique in pornography can “pervert” a normal male, 
causing him to become homosexual. Putnam alleges that such perversions are henceforth 
fixed in the viewer’s psyche: “we know that once a person is perverted, it is practically 
impossible for that person to adjust to normal attitudes in regard to sex.”  
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It is not just the boys who are enticed by the sight of nude men into homosexuality; girls too 
are “lured into lesbianism.” Putnam points to a rear shot of a nude woman and makes the 
logical connection that it “appeals to the sodomist.” A picture of another nude woman on a 
farm with a goat in the distant background is said to contain “overtones of bestiality.” The 
power of pornography to entice people toward transgressive sexual practices has underpinned 
much of the political backlash since the emergence of the new Christian Right. One of the 
leaders of this reactionary sexual politics of the 1960s, Senator Jesse Helms, made sure his 
criticisms of pornography and homosexuality were always closely aligned. Rather than a 
legitimate sexual orientation, Helms regarded homosexuality as little more than a ruse to 
conceal a true desire for sexual promiscuity and perversion. To Helms, homosexuality itself 
was pornographic (Dean, 2000: 11).  
By 1980 there was a strong public appetite for the condemnation of pornography, but less 
zest for a mainstream feminist politics. To accommodate this political contradiction, the 
leaders of WAP shifted their focus from issues like sexism in advertising and violence against 
women, which earlier feminist groups like Women Against Violence Against Women 
(WAVAW) and Women Against Violence in Pornography and Media (WAVPM) had sought 
to address, to a more narrow analysis of pornography. Dolores Alexander, one of the 
founders of WAP, explained the narrow focus in a letter to a friend written in August 1979: 
“[P]ornography is of such interest to men and the male press that it will make it an important 
issue for us. If we were against say, violence, – by that I mean wife beating, sexual 
harassment, etc. – we would have a hard time being heard” (in Bronstein, 2011: 204).  
The singular focus on pornography allowed WAP to become the most powerful and 
influential force in the feminist movement against pornography, but it also meant the group 
failed at times to sensitively address intersecting issues such as race and class. This oversight 
brought WAP perilously close to affiliating itself with right-wing interests in the 1980s. For 
example, the group set up an office in a space that New York’s Office of Midtown 
Enforcement had cleared out by arresting prostituted people. WAP also accepted donations 
from the Theatre League who had supported stronger police action against those working in 
the sex trade (Bronstein, 2011: 211). Some regarded these affiliations as proof of WAP’s lack 
of regard for those dependent on the sex trade for survival, many of whom were women of 
colour.  
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At the same time as sex industry-critical feminists were narrowing their political purview, the 
Christian Right was widening theirs and by the 1980s represented the most influential and 
significant social movement on the American political scene. With political allies like Jesse 
Helms and Orrin Hatch in Congress, and an equally amenable Ronald Reagan in the White 
House, the Christian Right was able to extend its reform agenda beyond social issues to 
encompass foreign policy matters, advocating American militarism and intervention abroad 
(Diamond, 1995: 228). 
But as the Christian Right ascended politically in the 1980s, broadening their agenda to 
encompass foreign policy aims as well as traditional social issues, antiporn feminism took a 
dramatic hit from within that would permanently realign the movement’s alliances and 
ultimately weaken the feminist case against pornography, setting the stage for an emboldened 
Christian Right to fill the empty space left by a diminished antiporn feminist movement.  
     Splintered sisterhood: the sex wars divide feminism  
 
Since the 1980s when pornography was catapulted to the forefront of the feminist agenda, the 
movement has undergone a marked political transformation which has seen it almost entirely 
abandon its critique of pornography as a source of oppression on the one hand, and liberation 
on the other. The downfall of antiporn feminism intersects with the rise of the Christian Right 
and the election of Ronald Reagan. The fear that hard fought for rights in the arena of 
women’s sexuality would be lost worried some pro-sex feminist activists such as B. Ruby 
Rich, Pat Califia, Ellen Willis, and Dierdre English14 who cautioned that antipornography 
arguments were resonating with those on the Right and could be used to further limit 
women’s sexual autonomy.  
In her historical account of the American feminist antipornography movement, Carolyn 
Bronstein (2011) writes that certain narratives used by antiporn feminists which relied on old 
tropes of men as insatiable creatures unable to control their lust, and women as more oriented 
to emotional and nurturing sexual practices, were perceived by some to serve essentialist, 
right-wing interests more than they had the potential to liberate women (p. 280). 
                                                          
14 For a fuller appraisal of the relationship between antiporn feminists and the Right, see English, D 1980 ‘The 
Politics of Porn’ Mother Jones; Willis, E 1983, ‘Feminism, Moralism, and Pornography,’ in A Snitow, A 
Stansell & S Thompson (eds), Powers of Desire: the politics of sexuality, Monthly Review Press, New York; 
Califia, P 1980 ‘Among Us, Against Us— The New Puritans,’ The Advocate. 
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The broader political context in the 1980s saw women’s reproductive rights under increasing 
threat from a politicised religious base who understood that limiting women’s sexual life to 
heterosexual, marital, procreative activity would preserve the patriarchal family model and 
the strength of its concomitant institutions. This sexual and reproductive agenda had by the 
1980s firmly penetrated the institutionalised Republican Party, allowing right-wing 
politicians to ascend politically in the 1970s and 1980s in a way that would not have been 
possible on economic policies alone.  
Perhaps unanticipated by social conservatives at the time, this economic model would 
ultimately undermine the patriarchal family model they idealised, as the stagnating wages and 
increasingly insecure work occasioned by neoliberalism would necessitate a second income-
earner in the home. A scenario in which a wife is able to stay home, care for the children and 
keep a tidy, homely abode for her husband became less economically viable. Nevertheless, 
the appearance of deep concern for the family, and an emphasis on sexual and reproductive 
politics gave right-wing politicians a point of ideological convergence with predominantly 
rural, working class Americans whose economic interests were not necessarily served by 
fiscal conservatism, but whose concerns about the decline of the traditional American family 
made them see eye-to-eye with Republican lawmakers.  
As Rosalind Pollack Petchesky (1981) writes, it was through sexual and reproductive issues 
that the Right imposed conservative thinking on many areas of social and economic 
policymaking, namely the reprivatisation of welfare benefits from a public to an individual 
responsibility. The meanings resonating from, for example, antiabortion politics have more to 
do with women’s potential as sexual beings and the ability to control their level of 
engagement with the workforce than they do with the foetus (p. 210). At the heart of the 
reactionary politics against abortion was a desire to maintain the supremacy of the patriarchal 
figure in family, business, and political life.  
Recognising the power of the pro-choice movement to fundamentally reshape the family – an 
institution conservatives regard as the very foundation of society – right-wing politicians set 
about defeating abortion through the courts and legislatures in an unprecedented attack on the 
core precepts of the feminist movement. At the same time, the antipornography subset of the 
feminist movement was articulating its own version of human sexuality that seemed to some 
progressive observers to mirror the rigid set of sexual practices approved of by the church 
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(Vance, 1993). Given the politics of the time, feminists identifying themselves as ‘pro-sex’ 
had an apposite response: 
This situation motivated pro-sex feminists to argue that a feminist campaign against 
pornography was a risky proposition, being undertaken at a politically inopportune 
moment. The state had turned sharply away from promoting women’s rights and 
women’s equality, and it was a dangerous time for women to cede sexual territory (p. 
280). 
Fearing that an extension of power to regulate sexual expression would inevitably lead to the 
repression of gay and lesbian material by a government hostile to such communities was 
enough for many feminists to turn away from antipornography activism. While the 
conservatives were coalescing, the Left was fragmenting – making the ideological ground 
easy pickings for conservative ideologues. What ensued was a deep rift within the feminist 
movement between antipornography activists and an emerging pro-sex countermovement, a 
debate referred to as the “feminist sex wars” (Duggan and Hunter, 1995). 
Tensions came to a head between the two conflicting schools of thought at the 1982 Barnard 
College Feminist IX Conference “Towards a Politics of Sexuality”. The initial intent of the 
conference was to have a broad discussion about various aspects of women’s sexuality along 
the lines of “pleasure and danger” (Sands, 2000). The conference was coordinated by a well-
known scholar on gender and sexuality, Carol S. Vance, who invited about one hundred 
women to work collaboratively with her in deciding how the conference should be organised. 
Vance was motivated by an unease with the wider feminist conversation about sexuality 
which had been funnelled into the single issue of pornography. She hoped the conference 
would revive considerations of how women could attain their own pleasure from sex, rather 
than being persistently framed as passive victims of male sexuality. Vance acknowledged that 
women had to contend with dangerous barriers to total sexual autonomy, but wanted to 
imagine “the textures and contours [of sexual practice] that would unfurl and proliferate in a 
safer space” (in Bronstein, 2011: 298).  
In the two years leading up to the conference and for the first time, the Republican Party 
adopted a formal position of opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment and abortion, 
pressured by groups like Phyllis Schlafly’s Eagle Forum and Jerry Falwell’s Moral Majority. 
Bronstein writes that these erosions of feminist gains only underscored the poor timing of the 
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antipornography fight, asserting that it was “too much in concert with a right-wing 
government that quickly proved itself no friend of feminism” (Bronstein, 2011: 300).  
Amid the meteoric rise of the Right in American politics at the time, a more nuanced 
discussion of women and sexuality seemed pertinent to many in the movement. However, it 
soon became known that Vance and the organisers had not invited any members of the 
antiporn feminist community to participate in the planning committee.  
Rather than representing all corners of the feminist discussion on sexuality, antipornography 
activists accused the conference of bias in favour of pro-sex advocates. Once the antipathy 
many of the conference organisers felt towards antipornography politics became apparent, 
WAP members and supporters resolved to retaliate by picketing the event and distributing 
leaflets to the 800 attendees which condemned the conference for recognising organisations 
that supported and produced pornography and promoted sadomasochistic sexual practices 
(Off Our Backs, 1982: 5). One of the conference organisers was pro-sex feminist Gayle Rubin 
(2011), who summarised the conflict over attitudes to sex and pornography within the 
feminist movement by drawing parallels between the Right and antiporn feminists: 
[…] There have been two strains of thought on the subject. One tendency has 
criticized the restrictions on women’s sexual behaviour and denounced the high costs 
imposed on women for being sexually active. This tradition of feminist sexual thought 
has called for a sexual liberation that would work for women as well as men. The 
second tendency has considered sexual liberalization to be inherently a mere 
extension of male privilege. This tradition resonates with conservative, anti-sexual 
discourse (p. 172). 
The events at Barnard College on April 24 are widely recognised as the first site of the 
feminist sex wars, which would continue for the next decade and which would eventually 
degrade the antipornography position to such an extent that a strong, unified feminist 
message against pornography became scarcely evident from the 1990s onwards, laying the 
groundwork for the contemporary Christian Right to effortlessly occupy the vacuum of 
progressive-left antipornography politics.   
Antiporn feminism has not been able to recover from the damaging effects of being 
associated with the Right. As a result, contemporary Christian Right leaders have little 
rhetorical and strategic competition from progressive opponents who have assimilated into a 
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more liberal stance on this issue which valorises free speech concerns above civil rights. A 
critique of capitalist institutions applied to other forms of exploitative labour is swiftly 
dismissed by such progressives as inapplicable to pornography. Janice G. Raymond (1995) 
emphasised the hypocrisy on pornography displayed by some progressive men in Women as 
Wombs: 
Many so-called enlightened men promote reproductive rights for women, especially 
in areas such as contraception and abortion, whereas there is little male support for 
antipornography politics. Rather, the liberal establishment tries to malign women as 
prudes and puritans when they attack the sexual politics of a male-dominant culture. 
Liberals have also sought to discredit antipornography feminists by allying them with 
the politics of the right-wing (p. 96). 
With few friends within their own political ranks, antiporn feminists have suffered the effects 
of isolation and marginalisation.  
The decline of antiporn feminism was not merely a result of the panic within liberal circles 
that a right-wing government would happily co-opt antipornography arguments in the service 
of further eroding women’s rights. Perhaps ironically, given his social reform agenda, the 
decline of antiporn feminism was also prompted by the consequences of Reagan’s economic 
program. While free market economist Milton Friedman once assumed that the market 
“enforced its own morality” the dramatic popularisation and mainstreaming of pornography 
that has accompanied the marketisation of public life in the last forty years suggests 
otherwise (in Styhre, 2014: 12). As High (2009) writes “if capitalism sells pornography, 
discourages thrift, and cashes in on counterculture, it cannot produce ‘virtue’ as well” (p. 
480).  
In allying government with big business, Reagan liberated corporate producers of 
pornography from the burdens of regulation and oversight and effectively made his own 
vision of a smut-free society untenable. Rather than the market, with its own morality, 
encouraging efficiency, it has seen the fall of virtue. Cultural historian Christopher Lasch 
(1979) believes sexual decadence is the ultimate expression of bourgeois individualism and 
its economic vehicle, capitalism. In a culture of constant consumption and immediate 
gratification, human beings are inevitably reduced to their sexual organs, rendering them 
anonymous and interchangeable – affirming the capitalist principle that human beings can be 
reduced to substitutable objects. In Lasch’s view, the development of social life under 
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capitalism has evolved into a widespread acceptance that all social relations should be 
subordinate to the market, and thus pleasure becomes life’s only business. However, under 
capitalism the pursuit of immediate gratification is tolerated no matter how perverse, insane, 
criminal, or immoral it is (p. 69). Reagan’s personal religious ethos which assumed that 
people are prone to do evil unless suitably restrained was not applied to the will of the 
market, which too has no intrinsic ability to self-regulate, and thus pornography was 
permitted to flourish. 
Despite its sometimes paradoxical aims, the Christian Right enjoyed a rapid political 
ascendancy in the 1980s which ingrained in the movement a self-assurance that emboldened 
movement leaders to reach beyond traditional rhetorical boundaries. Pornography, once a 
clear-cut moral problem, became a matter of rights to conservative leaders, a perspective 
which originated in the feminist opposition to pornography. Over the subsequent decades, the 
Christian Right sought about repackaging their core beliefs, reframing pornography and other 
areas of social reform as civil rights issues in which the primary recipients of harm and 
injustice are not women of colour, or incarcerated populations, or same-sex oriented people, 
but conservative Christians.  
     Embracing the secular language of rights 
 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the Christian Right had successfully established itself as a 
solid political force, but in doing so had constructed an image of itself as politically 
aggressive, pursuing a militant effort to return faith and morality to American homes. This 
image was aided by leaders in the movement who used militaristic language to describe their 
efforts. Focus on the Family founder James Dobson was particularly fond of using wartime 
metaphors: 
Nothing short of a great Civil War of values rages throughout North America. […] 
Two sides with vastly differing and incompatible worldviews are locked in a bitter 
conflict that permeates every level of society (Dobson and Bauer, 1992: 19). 
To Dobson and his allies, this battle was a war against forces with lethal goals, whether that 
be ending life through abortion and euthanasia, or legalising drugs. The drawback of using 
such inflammatory rhetoric is running the risk of alienating potential adherents who might not 
relate to social issues within strict religious and moral terms, but who respond more 
favourably to rights-based arguments. In the pornography debate, moral arguments have 
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dissipated as a new concept of ‘pornography-as-power’, introduced by feminists, have 
replaced concerns from the 1960s and 1970s that pornography was primarily a threat to 
America’s moral decency. Linda Williams (1989) explains how the feminist injection of 
“power” into the debate in the 1980s led to a crucial paradigm shift:  
[t]heir alliance [feminists and the Christian Right] has definitively shifted the debate 
about pornography from a discussion of aesthetics and morals by academic literary 
critics and intellectuals in consultation with the judiciary, to another, equally 
unresolved discussion about abusive forms of power and the threatened civil rights of 
women. (p. 16) 
The shift in focus from morality to rights in the pornography debate has occurred within a 
broader secularisation of American political discourse which characterises religious rhetoric 
as narrow, outdated, and exclusionary. As Vernon Bates (1995) asserts, “to win in the 
American political arena one must espouse inclusion” and the problem for the Christian Right 
is that the strict moral codes it has traditionally relied on “appear to require another language, 
the language of exclusion” (p. 51). Indeed, the Christian Right’s political platform is one 
based on ritual exclusion of individuals and groups incompatible with its notion of a Godly 
nation – namely proponents of the ‘homosexual agenda’ and feminists. Rights have been 
profoundly important to the development of the United States as a nation, and as such 
organisations on the Christian Right have molded their activism to a classically American 
pattern (Hoover and den Dulk, 2004: 10).  
To assuage the perception of exclusion and strengthen the movements’ mainstream political 
appeal, leaders on the Christian Right have reimagined moral issues as chiefly a matter of 
rights, and as this thesis will uncover, pornography has been a central component of the 
political experiment to present the family values agenda as a natural ally of the civil rights 
project.  
This strategy has been applied across a range of moral issues. In Aaron Louis Haberman’s 
(2006) doctoral thesis on civil rights in the Christian Right, he notes a similar trend by tracing 
the transformation of the movements’ rhetoric on prayer in public schools. To prohibit an 
individual’s right to engage in religious practices in a public space, including schools, 
amounted to a violation of that individual’s rights. A denial of this right was further proof 
that religious expression, specifically Christian religious expression, was under attack by the 
state.   
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Leaders on the Christian Right have, since the 1980s “recognized the secularization of the 
political system and advanced a new set of arguments framed in terms of constitutional and 
minority or civil rights” (Haberman, 2006: 6). Some on the Right have questioned the 
wisdom of expanding judicial accommodation of religion. In the cases where Christian Right 
lawyers have attempted to elevate religious expression to a protected level enjoyed by other 
forms of speech, critics have responded by asserting that such moves actually degrade 
religious expression by appealing to the secular to protect the sacred. In framing religious 
practice as a mere viewpoint, like other forms of speech, “it is dislodged from its lofty 
dwelling with the divine and placed squarely within the baser realm of politics” where it is 
subject to legislative wrangling and adjudication by mortal judges (Brown, 2002: 143). 
Ironically, in seeking refuge in the free speech clause, Christian Right lawyers are linking 
religious expression with other types of protected speech, including pornography, thereby 
using the language of rights to protect conservative religious causes.   
The Christian Right’s inversion of rights-based rhetoric has appeared again more recently in 
debates concerning same-sex marriage in anticipation of the long-awaited decision by the 
Supreme Court of the United States on June 26, 2015 to recognise a federal constitutional 
right for same-sex couples to marry. The Christian Right rallied enthusiastically behind the 
March 2015 passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) passed by Governor 
Mike Pence in Indiana which gives individuals and businesses the right to the free exercise of 
religion. The text says that the state cannot “substantially burden a person's exercise of 
religion” unless it is furthering a “compelling government interest” and acting in the least 
restrictive way possible. This includes preventing the government from compelling people to 
do things they object to on religious grounds, such as providing floral arrangements for a 
same-sex wedding.  
There is evidence that Indiana’s RFRA was impelled by a panic over New Mexico’s Elane 
Photography v. Wilcock decision. In that case, a same-sex couple sued a photography 
business for refusing to photograph their wedding. New Mexico law bars discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation and ultimately ruled in favour of the same-sex couple (Epps, 
2015). In addition, same-sex marriage has been legal in Indiana since October 2014, a 
campaign which has been gaining momentum across numerous states over the last decade, 
and this bill gave opponents some assurance that equal rights for gay and lesbian individuals 
was not necessarily inevitable. Within just one week of the bill being signed into law, a small 
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pizza business in Walkerton, Memories Pizza, became the first business to publicly announce 
it would refuse to cater same-sex weddings as a result of the law (Wong, 2015).  
The opposition to same-sex marriage and RFRA were deeply entangled from the beginning, 
but by undermining the rights of the LGBT community under the guise of protecting the 
competing right to religious exercise, the Christian Right could shift the public’s focus from 
the exclusionary religious realm of moral indignation to the inclusive secular realm of rights. 
With similar tact, Christian Right leaders seek to avoid the perception that their opposition to 
pornography is motivated more by fearful suspicion of female sexuality than the goal of 
championing the rights of women by reframing their arguments in inclusive, accommodating 
pro-woman terms. This is an inherently risky direction for the movement to take. Imbibing 
the secular language of rights and equality into their discourse conflicts with the movement’s 
enduring defiance against the state’s supposed imposition of a “secular humanist” ideology, 
characterised by godlessness and moral relativism, through channels such as the courts and 
public schools (Liebman and Wuthnow, 1983). The construction of the secular humanist 
bogeyman has been a central element of the Christian Right’s successful efforts to mobilise 
adherents in a diverse and pluralistic population. Organisations at the forefront of the feminist 
movement have been diagnosed as key culprits in the secular humanist conspiracy. Right-
wing leaders developed “an elaborate theory” writes Sara Diamond (1990), which linked the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP), the National Organization for Women (NOW), and Hollywood 
movie producers to the impending downfall of modern civilisation (p. 85).  
Pursuing a visceral war against the cultural spectre of secular humanism, in which the 
feminist movement is identified as a key component, while simultaneously appropriating 
antiporn feminist arguments for their own political ends reveals the way in which the 
movement is constantly repositioning its enemies for the sake of political expediency in a 
dynamic political climate where the politics of inclusion and exclusion appeal to different 
constituencies at varying points in time.  
A cornerstone of this politics of inclusion involves extending an olive branch to groups of 
women who might have become disenchanted by perceptions that the Christian Right takes 
an overly judgemental and excessively moralistic stance on pornography. As the next chapter 
will explore, pressure to adapt to a more inclusive, pro-woman style of politics is not only 
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driven by the expectations of prospective adherents, but also a burgeoning gender 
consciousness from women within the movement.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Feminist consciousness on the Christian Right 
 
     Existing literature on gender consciousness and religious women 
 
Not to be overlooked in an analysis of the involuted relationship between the Christian Right 
and feminism is the extent to which feminist theory has been imbibed by the movement, 
particularly its women adherents, as part of the larger cultural adoption of certain elements of 
feminist theory and practice.  
Scholars refer to the process of politicising one’s sex as ‘gender consciousness’ and have 
typically conflated it with feminist activism (Conover, 1988; Gurin, 1985; Hildreth and Dran, 
1994; Klein 1984; Rhodebeck, 1996; Tolleson-Rinehart, 1992). Put simply, when one is 
“gender conscious” one feels a sense of connectedness with others perceived to be similar, 
and have a level of concern about the wellbeing of that group. Rather than being applicable 
only to feminist-identified women, the politicisation of sex crosses ideological boundaries, as 
demonstrated by the rich history of religious conservative women who have mobilised 
together in the service of preserving traditional gender roles and ensuring the supremacy of 
the family in American life.  
There is considerable evidence that the influence of feminist ideology has extended as far as 
the ranks of the Christian Right. Stacey and Gerard’s (1990) study on the influence of the 
feminist movement on religious conservatives’ draws upon a broad scope of literature, media 
material, and fieldwork conducted in a small evangelical Christian ministry in California’s 
Silicon Valley to explore this possibility. The authors acknowledge the view held by many 
secular feminists that feminism and fundamentalist Christianity represent incompatible world 
views. In addition, many secular feminists interpret the hierarchal gender ideology of 
evangelicalism as a reactionary response to the egalitarian model of gender proposed by 
feminism (p. 99). Today, prominent male theologians are absorbing feminist rhetoric into 
their teachings in an effort to promote an egalitarian perception of heterosexual marriage. For 
example, pastors who advocate a marital doctrine of male headship and wifely submission are 
now amenable to offering female constituents support for creative adaptations of Christian 
gender ideology towards more egalitarian family reform projects. For more progressive 
constituents, this flexibility on gender ideology can be sufficiently revisionist to temper 
residual feminist objections (p. 105-106). Proponents of the revisionist position claim that 
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encouraging men to prideful domination and women to subordinate passivity is a 
misunderstanding of biblical teachings. Rather, both men and women ought to be in mutual 
submission to God (Scanzoni and Hardesty, 1974). Other scholars have examined the 
reinterpretation of biblical gender ideology towards more egalitarian principles (Gallagher, 
2004; Dayton, 1976; Grenz and Kjesbo, 1995; Groothuis, 1997; Storkey, 2001; Tucker and 
Liefeld, 1987). If feminist ideology has permeated even the biblically inerrant, rigid 
structures of born-again Christian ranks, it suggests the magnitude of feminist influence upon 
American culture. 
Gender consciousness is instinctively linked with feminism and its attendant arguments about 
women’s unequal access to power because implicit in the formation of most kinds of 
collective action is a recognition by the group that they are being oppressed, excluded, and 
marginalised by forces with greater access to power. This has tended not to be the basis of 
right-wing Christian women’s activism. In fact, their engagement with the political process 
has been more concerned with maintaining the unequal distribution of power between men 
and women that lies at the heart of family values politics. Hogeland’s (1994) analysis of 
gender consciousness engages with the assumption that it must be accompanied by the 
politicisation and problematisation of power difference: “Feminism politicizes gender 
consciousness, inserts it into a systematic analysis of histories and structures of domination 
and privilege” (p. 19). Reid and Purcell (2004) give a similar appraisal of gender 
consciousness, arguing that for it to be considered feminist it must recognise “women’s 
relatively low status and power compared to men” (p. 760) and attribute power differentials 
to illegitimate sources, such as institutionalised sexism.  
These definitions of gender consciousness call attention to the radical feminist understanding 
of gender as a caste system, or a “cultural category that gives social and cultural meaning to 
sexed bodies” (Soothill, 2007: 13). This cultural category socialises women from birth to 
conform to a feminine ideal and submit and surrender to men who are constructed as 
naturally dominant. The social construction of gender fetishises women’s compliance to 
prepubescent beauty standards and requires of them a docile and passive acceptance of 
supposedly innate feminine traits. In The Second Sex, first published in 1949, Simone de 
Beauvoir famously asserted “one is not born, but rather becomes, woman”, adding “it is 
civilisation as a whole that elaborates this intermediary product between the male and the 
eunuch that is called feminine” (p. 293). Kate Millett’s Sexual Politics (1970) was one of the 
first works to articulate the belief that women’s oppression is buried in the sex/gender 
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system. Since then, radical feminists have continued to emphasise the material difference 
between ‘sex’ and ‘gender’, the first as fixed and biological, the second as a patriarchal 
construct, merely reflecting a formulaic version of femininity and masculinity which 
exaggerates the biological differences between men and women for the purpose of 
institutionalising and maintaining male power.  
For the Christian Right, gender and sex are interchangeable and synonymous. Women are 
believed to have certain essential feminine characteristics that are natural and stable. God 
made women to be nurturing and submissive and this therefore makes them more vulnerable 
and needy, and men were made to be more emotionally rigid and independent because they 
were created for positions of leadership (Storkey, 1985: 26). Within this conceptualisation of 
the sexes, patriarchy is not a perversion of the potentially equitable relationship between men 
and women, but instead rooted in the natural and biblically sanctioned order of things. 
Practiced perfectly, patriarchy is believed to civilise men, protect women, foster the rearing 
of obedient children, and facilitate a thriving free market system. The feminist 
problematisation of gender essentialism is therefore the true distortion, with everything from 
the breakdown of the nuclear family to rising income inequality attributed to the feminist 
refusal to reconcile their feminine essence with their biological sex.  
The ongoing nature versus nurture debate underpinning conflicts over the sex and gender 
question complicates discussions of gender consciousness as a framework for examining the 
extent to which conservative women actively participate in the development of a gendered 
collective identity while at the same time reinforcing the supposed naturalness of masculine 
dominance and feminie subordination. In an attempt to resolve this, Rebecca E. Klatch (2001) 
developed a definition which distinguishes gender consciousness from the distinctly more 
politicised feminist consciousness. Klatch contends that there are three stages in the 
formation of a feminist consciousness: (1) identification of inequality or mistreatment, (2) 
discovering a language of framing by which to interpret these experiences, and (3) the social 
construction of a collective identity. The impetus for Klatch’s study was the need for a more 
thorough examination of the processes that precede the formation of social movement 
organisations, as well as the “social-psychological and discursive processes involved before a 
movement is consolidated” (p. 792). Klatch makes the distinction between gender 
consciousness and feminist consciousness by asserting that gender conscious women believe 
in gender equality but do not identify with the term feminist. However, this definition does 
not fully comprehend alternative avenues to gendered collective identity that are not premised 
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on a belief that women’s subordinate status is necessarily wrong. Reverting back to 
Hogeland’s (1994) view that gender consciousness develops into feminism when political 
considerations of power, agency, and oppression are recognised, if a group purports to 
support equality between the sexes, then one can assume they acknowledge that women are 
unequal to men, and not because of intrinsic weaknesses on the part of women that belie any 
efforts to address these inequalities. Therefore, while Klatch’s three stages of feminist 
consciousness formation are sound indicators of feminist consciousness, they fall short of 
fully articulating the more complex formation of a gendered collective identity among 
religious conservative women.  
For these women, a sense of fictive kinship with other likeminded women arises out of their 
mutual experiences embodying certain roles formulated within a patriarchal system; that of 
the wife, mother, community volunteer, churchgoer. Within these networks, religious 
conservative women interact with family members and the broader community in a way that 
is qualitatively different to their male counterparts. Through these recursive social 
arrangements, they reaffirm gendered relations with the world and necessitate the separate 
spheres of male and female on which gendered collective identities thrive. West and 
Zimmerman (1987) call this process “doing gender”. It is fundamental to the maintenance of 
proper status, and because it is an active process, doing gender can produce constantly 
changing discourses on gender roles.  
This active process is manifest in the pornography debate. The adoption of pro-woman, 
rights-based rhetoric by the Christian Right signals the establishment of new normative 
boundaries of gender relations within the movement. While the movement’s antiporn 
discourse once framed the harmful effects of obscene material primarily in terms of the threat 
it posed to the dignity of the woman in her role as wife and mother, the arguments now 
reflect a changing perception of women as more atomised, self-determining individuals with 
an intrinsic value that is not solely incumbent on her role as wife and mother.  
     Gender consciousness and identity politics 
 
Another perspective sees the identity politics at the heart of gender consciousness as less of a 
challenge to the status quo, and more an inevitable outgrowth of neoliberalism and its 
attendant elimination of class-based analyses from contemporary political discourse. 
Crucially, identifying with other members of one’s own sex and organising collectively 
around this one unifying feature does not predict or precede a critique of capitalist market 
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forces; it is essentially apolitical in terms of a class analysis. Therefore, gendered collective 
identities can thrive within almost any political organisation regardless of its ideological 
leanings. As Adolph Reed Jr. (2015) articulately states, as capitalist power more aggressively 
and assertively destroys and marketises every shred of social protection for people of all 
sexes, races, and sexual identities, capitalism has assumed an unassailable position, and in its 
place a politics of identity has arisen as the new alternative to class politics, which arranges 
and organises people based on what we are rather than what we do. Reed proposes that within 
this moral economy, it might be deemed just that 1% of the population controls 90% of the 
resources, provided that “roughly 12% of the 1% were black, 12% were Latino, 50% were 
women, and whatever the appropriate proportions were LGBT people.” It is Reed’s 
contention that rather than presenting a challenge to neoliberal economic doctrine, identity 
politics actually justifies it, because in insisting on the political priority of fictive, naturalised 
group categories within populations “identitarianism meshes well with neoliberal 
naturalization of the structures that reproduce inequality.”  
Wendy Brown’s (1995) powerful critique of liberalism in States of Injury makes this point 
persuasively: 
Drawing upon the historically eclipsed meaning of disrupted and fragmented 
narratives of ethnicity, race, gender, sexuality, region, continent, or nation, identity 
politics permits a sense of situation-and often a sense of filiation or community—
without requiring profound comprehension of the world in which one is situated. 
Identity politics permits positioning without temporal or spatial mapping, a feature 
that sharply distinguishes it from (Marxian) class analysis and reveals its proximity to 
(liberal) interest group politics. In this respect, identity politics, with its fierce 
assertion and production of subjects, appears less as a radical political response to 
postmodernity than a symptom of its ruptures and disorienting effects (p. 35). 
From the demise of class politics, a politics of identity has emerged which has typified 
progressive discourse since the 1970s. In A Brief History of Neoliberalism (2005), David 
Harvey explains that throughout the 1960s the left had tremendous difficulty reconciling 
organised labour espousing social solidarities with the student movement desirous of 
individual liberties. These differences generated a wedge between disparate groups on the left 
and were easily exploited by neoliberal advocates. Rather than enhancing the progressive-left 
critique of capitalism, a politics of identity concerned chiefly with race, gender, and sexuality 
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replaced such critique, fostering resentment between these various categories of identity. As a 
consequence, the symptoms of capitalism – including commodification, alienation, 
exploitation, and displacement – become depoliticised and normalised. As Herbert Marcuse 
(1964) asserts, individuals unable to imagine a qualitatively different universe of discourse 
and action come to identify themselves with the neoliberal existence which is imposed on 
them and this becomes central to their development and satisfaction. Under such an 
arrangement, class becomes a vague concept, both invisible and incapable of being 
articulated. If a worker and his boss are able to enjoy the same television shows or visit the 
same resort places, or the typist is as attractively dressed as the employer’s daughter, then the 
institutions which uphold the system can claim society has reached a so-called equalisation of 
classes (p. 8). With class suppressed as a point of focus, discourses of race, gender, and 
sexuality take on renewed significance, leaving class politics rarely theorised or developed 
(Brown, 1995: 61). Identity politics presents little real challenge or resistance to the existence 
of capitalism. It is therefore flexible and mobile in terms of ideological adjustments and 
appropriation, and is easily accessible by groups wedded to free market orthodoxy such as 
those on the Christian Right who want to compete with progressive organisations for 
representation of women’s interests.  
     Gendered differences in policy perspectives on the Christian Right  
 
Within the identarian framework of gender consciousness, questions still remain about how a 
gender conscious discourse is formulated and employed by right-wing adherents who have 
traditionally rejected the politicisation of womanhood by progressive women’s groups, 
favouring a view that men and women have innately complementary, not competing interests. 
One view posits that feminism is an essential predictor of an emerging ‘women’s perspective’ 
on policy issues (Conover, 1988). But as Cook and Wilcox’s (1991) study, which 
incorporated the perspectives of fundamentalist Christians reveals, feminist consciousness 
merely results in explicitly feminist values and policy preferences, and not on the formulation 
of women’s policy preferences alone (p. 1115). The implication being that women’s 
organisations on the Right need not subscribe to feminist politics in order to formulate pro-
woman policy positions. 
In considering what is driving the Christian Right’s pro-woman shift on pornography, it is 
worth noting research that has engaged with the question of whether devout women on the 
Right politicise their experiences differently to their male counterparts, and how this 
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manifests in both conservative women’s stance on key policy issues and on the policy agenda 
of Christian Right groups seeking to appeal to female constituents.  Feminist scholar Sara 
Ruddick (1980) theorised that all women, conservative or otherwise, share a latent bond 
through the experience of lived or potential motherhood. The prospect of motherhood gives 
all women access to a heightened ability to experience empathy and act with humility, 
allowing women to develop what Ruddick terms a ‘maternal perspective’ in response to their 
desire to foster the growth and preservation of their children. This allows women to accept 
human fallibility and prompts the emergence of a more compassionate worldview (p. 355). 
Criticised for its latent ethnocentrism, Ruddick’s work has been accused of universalising 
women’s experiences with motherhood, removing them from their racial, economic, and 
political contexts (Keller, 2010).  
While Ruddick’s work concludes that women in a broad sense possess a maternal perspective 
which lends itself to greater political empathy, Kaufman (2004) has looked more specifically 
at men and women on the Christian Right in his endeavour to discover whether gendered 
political differences were pronounced even within a group that is historically represented as 
culturally homogeneous by its leaders.15 He wondered, given that women tend to be more 
religiously devout than men, why women are more likely to identify with the Democratic 
Party. After conducting a study on the growing gender gap in American politics, he 
discovered that although religious commitment affects partisan political choices to an extent, 
it does not override the powerful effects of male and female socialisation. Earlier studies have 
also observed a stronger link between religious devotion and political conservatism among 
men than women (Layman, 2001; Tolleson-Rinehart & Perkins, 1989). Kaufman suggests 
this might be because “for women, religious consciousness may compete with gender 
consciousness, eroding the level of political solidarity among devout women” (p. 494). The 
competing interests may result in devout women making meaningful connections between 
their sex and their social position in a way that manifests itself politically, despite subscribing 
to the same set of biblical principles as their male counterparts.  
Kaufman (2004) also looked at whether there was any variance in political attitudes between 
religiously devout men and women on women’s rights issues (p. 496). It must be noted, 
                                                          
15 Michael Lienesch’s book Redeeming America: Piety and Politics in the New Christian Right (1993) 
makes the case that the cultural homogeneity of the movement means the political differences 
between those who write the movement’s most popular books (such as figures like Jerry Falwell and 
Pat Robertson) and those who read them are considerably smaller than in other comparable 
movements. 
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however, that the study only includes attitudes to abortion and the belief about “the 
appropriate role of women in society” as indicators of the participants’ stances on women’s 
rights issues. Attitudes to pornography were not included in the study, but the results still 
reveal a divergence in gendered perspectives that fall across distinct policy lines. Devout 
women are more progressive on social issues than devout men. For example, on the question 
of women’s role in society, participants were asked whether they believed women deserved 
to have equal roles to men in business, government, and industry, or whether they agreed 
with the traditional view that a woman best fulfils her responsibilities in the home. Kaufman 
found a significant difference (p <.05) in the attitudes of evangelical Christian men and 
women when asked about both abortion and women’s role in society (p. 499), revealing that 
even for the most religiously observant demographic in the United States, a more liberal, 
gender conscious stance on women’s rights issues prevailed among women.   
As feminism entrenches itself further into the political mainstream of the United States, 
conservative women are not insulated from its influence and this has implications on the 
Christian Right’s position on pornography. Given that women, conservative or otherwise, are 
more likely to possess social justice-minded perspectives on political issues, the movement is 
responding adaptively by embracing the paradigm of women’s rights in a self-preserving 
move that holds the potential to attract new adherents and reinvigorate existing ones. 
     Representing women’s interests 
 
Conventional wisdom on the subject of gender consciousness within western, liberal social 
movements posits that political activism on issues directly linked to the social conditions of 
women is synonymous with feminism. Scholars have consistently conflated the active role of 
women in the political sphere with the feminist movement (Conover, 1988; Gurin, 1985; 
Hildreth and Dran, 1994; Klein, 1984; Miller, Hildreth and Simmons, 1988; Rhodebeck, 
1996; Tolleson-Rinehart, 1992). This assumption has often failed to recognise the substantive 
possibilities of a fundamentalist Christian perspective on women’s interests that, while not 
explicitly feminist or politically progressive, is also not universally antithetical to women’s 
rights. In other words, there is a third way that is neither explicitly feminist nor outright 
hostile to women, but maintains a delicate balance of traditional gender politics and a rights-
based dimension.  
While existing as a broad church with many varying perspectives, feminism is a movement 
that has been associated with progressive reform agendas and perceived as a threat to social 
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conservative values centred on the preservation of the patriarchal nuclear family (Calhoun, 
2000). This has consigned conservative women who interpret women’s interests through a 
rights-based framework to the political periphery. Typically, the role conservative women 
have played in developing women’s policy has been regarded as a sign of their being misled 
by patriarchal forces in a wave of false consciousness (Schreiber, 2008). Supposedly trotted 
out as political pawns for their male counterparts, conservative women have fought to present 
themselves as credible arbiters of women’s interests (p. 39). When conservative women first 
began successfully mobilising against the feminist movement in the 1970s they were wryly 
dismissed as “pod feminists”, suggesting they were fake or robotic women, similar to the fake 
humans or pod people in 1970s science fiction thriller, Invasion of the Body Snatchers 
(Norton, 2009). For many, the paradox that a group opposed to gender-based identity politics 
could actively advocate for the interests of women was difficult to comprehend. But 
excluding them on this basis may be a false distinction, as it fails to account for a genuine 
sense of a gendered collective identity among women on the Christian Right. 
For many women of conservative inclination, to be conscious of the collective 
responsibilities of one’s sex is to assume it’s more natural association with the politics of 
social conservatism. Emanating from the cult of domesticity in the nineteenth century, and 
gaining considerable momentum in the 1950s, women came to be regarded as the 
“conservative sex.” It was woman’s intimate attachment to the ‘hard realities’ of life, wrote 
Professor Russell Kirk (1957), that gave her a superior ability to understand the practical 
worth of the family and community and to reject the supposed characterisation of society by 
the Left as a ‘machine for living’.  
Through her role as overseer of the children and domestic affairs, it was in the woman’s 
interests to preserve the stability of the home and protect it against the great experiment of 
communism which would entirely reconfigure the private life that women had been confined 
to, and had in some cases come to identify affectionately with. As Republican Party political 
consultant F. Clifton White (1967) declared, “men have sight, women have insight.” For 
those involved in America’s growing Christian Right movement in the second half of the 
twentieth century, gender consciousness had entirely different societal implications than 
those imagined by adherents of the Left. Rather than a disruption of traditional gender roles, 
it meant the affirmation and valorisation of women’s conventional place in the domestic 
sphere. Michelle Nickerson (2012) described the conservative movement’s articulation and 
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eventual politicisation of women as the conservative sex as a ‘new awareness’ that inspired 
the expansion of gender consciousness on the Right (p. 137).  
One of the more comprehensive studies of the position of women in the contemporary 
Christian Right movement has been undertaken by Ronnee Schreiber (2002a; 2002b; 2008). 
Schreiber has examined conservative women’s organisations in the United States and their 
struggle against feminist groups to gain recognition as the group most representative of 
women. Like any viable social movement organisation, movement organisations on the right 
have been mindful of speaking to their existing constituents on issues of most importance to 
them, such as abortion, reassuring them that the movement’s fundamental ‘pro-life’ 
credentials are secure. However, Schreiber (2008) correctly asserts that for organisations on 
the Christian Right to remain relevant in a constantly evolving political climate, they must be 
open to both adapting to changing contours of public opinion, and accepting that potential 
adherents may have benefited from and support the feminist movement (p. 6). 
Schreiber’s work is particularly relevant to this study because it looks at how issues such as 
violence against women, and women’s health – both significant priorities for the feminist 
movement – have been adopted by women’s organisations on the right and reframed to retain 
their social conservative appeal. Schreiber is careful to demonstrate, however, that right-wing 
women’s organisations have been openly hostile towards feminism and feminist policy 
prescriptions, noting “since the term feminism itself gets mixed reactions from the public, 
these organizations invoke the phrase in criticizing public policies and liberal ideologies” (p. 
10). Instead, these organisations seek to offer solutions from a conservative women’s 
perspective, not a feminist perspective, and wholly reject the notion that their discourse is 
sympathetic to feminism.  
Schreiber (2002a; 2002b; 2008) has carefully examined how two conservative women’s 
organisations in particular have made full use of the notion of gender consciousness to offer 
alternative policy positions to their feminist counterparts. Concerned Women for America 
(CWA), and the Independent Women’s Forum (IWF) have reframed key women’s policy 
debates to make the case that a conservative stance on issues such as reproductive rights can 
be as coherently tied to women’s interests by the right as it has been by the left. The role of 
CWA and IWF is “to offer women’s, but not feminist, voices in debates on a range of public 
policies” (p. 336). 
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Crucially, Schreiber believes that when right-wing groups like CWA and IWF frame their 
arguments using language that is inclusive of women, it has the effect of broadening what we 
understand to constitute a typically conservative issue (2007: 10). 
These groups have also been very adept at exploiting the tension surrounding the term 
‘feminist’. Data pertaining to the trends in support for the women’s movement reveal that 
increasing groups of people perceive ‘feminist’ to be an insult (Huddy et al. 2000). The 
ongoing stigma attached to the term, despite increasing public support for equality between 
the sexes, invites conservative groups to offer policy prescriptions that are perceived by 
women to be liberatory, whilst at the same time mocking and dismissing similar solutions put 
forward under the aegis of feminism.  
In Rethinking Feminist Identification, Patricia Misciagno (1997) argues that the 
depoliticisation of the term ‘feminist’, wherein anyone can adopt the identity regardless of 
what its speaker and listener choose to make of it, occasioned debate and confusion about 
what constitutes feminism. Feminist politics has suffered both the expectation that it ought to 
be a uniform movement, and the reality that it is, of course, as diverse and divergent as any 
sizeable political movement naturally is. However, the variety and range of explicit and 
implied issues associated with feminism has made it difficult, Misciagno argues, for many 
women to politicise their discontent in any kind of meaningful, organised fashion, given that 
identification with the feminist label is fraught with deep emotional conflict (p. 2). Groups on 
the Christian Right have seized on this ambivalence, which underscores the potential for 
antifeminist organisations to successfully make competing propositions for women’s support, 
discarding previously held assumptions that pro-woman policy positions and feminism are 
synonymous.  
Where there is evidence that feminist arguments are being adopted by conservative women’s 
organisations, it is not intended to promote a feminist policy prescription, asserts Schreiber 
(2002). Rather, the intent is to offer a conservative solution imbued with a subtle appeal to 
women’s rights, and carefully framed in terms that are inclusive of groups central to the 
politics of family values, such as men and children (p. 337). While feminist organisations 
make no obvious distinctions between women in terms of what ‘types’ of women are more 
deserving of sympathy, conservative women’s organisations have been explicit in their push 
for special recognition of harm with respect to certain categories of women. In 1998 the then-
president of CWA, Carmen Pate, made this position clear: 
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With every issue, we can bring in why it should be of concern to women, and that is 
what we try to do: why mom should be concerned, why wives should be concerned, 
why you should be concerned about your daughters. That is the connection that we try 
to make. How will this impact women long term? (in Schreiber, 2008: 50) 
Positioning the wife, mother, and child at the forefront of the movement’s concern is part of a 
broader conservative strategy to conceptualise problems in terms of how they affect families.  
The second-wave of the feminist movement beginning in the 1960s and lasting through the 
1980s had gone to great lengths to deconstruct the assumption that a woman was tethered to 
her husband and children and deserved little right to exercise free will (Abbott and Wallace, 
1997). Husbands who battered their wives were protected by a legal system and widespread 
cultural attitudes which regarded such abuse as a private matter between a man and his 
subordinate. On abortion, the debate over whether the adult woman or the developing foetus 
had greater rights under the law persisted. The patriarchal nuclear family was constructed by 
the feminist movement as an impediment to women’s self-actualisation (Carr and Van 
Leeuwen, 1996). For conservative women who regarded the family as one of the only safe 
spaces left in a society ravaged by the immoral impulses of the sexual revolution, the feminist 
attack on the family was an attack on the only righteous institution left in the United States.  
The fear on the Christian Right and conservativism more broadly was that once the protective 
structure of the family was eroded, the government would be required to step in to provide 
the resources a working husband ought to. Long-time leader of the Christian Right, Phyllis 
Schlafly, explains this succinctly: “We used to have a social structure in the United States 
where husbands and fathers provided the financial support of wife and children.” Schlafly 
also cites a statistic revealing that almost half of all babies born in the United States in 2011 
were born to unwed parents, “it is obvious that when the mother of these children has no 
husband to support her and her babies, she calls on Big Brother Government.”16 This 
fundamental disagreement over the importance of the patriarchal nuclear family in 
maintaining a civilised society has been, in many respects, the key point of divergence 
between religious conservatives and feminists.  
                                                          
16 Schlafly, P 2012, Phony divide between fiscal and social issues, Eagle Forum, viewed May 2014, < 
http://www.eagleforum.org/psr/2012/mar12/psrmar12.html>. 
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The anthropological concept of ‘fictive kinship’ has some meaningful parallels with gender 
consciousness. Fictive kinship differs from Claude Lévi-Strauss’s (1969) structural theory of 
kinship as arising when a woman from one group marries a man from another, forming 
interdependence between families and lineages in what is termed ‘alliance theory’. In Lévi-
Strauss’s notion of kinship, women are offered and exchanged for marriage between tribes as 
a way of ensuring inter-group alliances and maintaining the political dominance of male tribe 
members. A better analogy can be found in the work of Melissa Harris-Perry. Harris-Perry’s 
(2011) book on shame, stereotypes and African American women’s collective identity 
explores the concept of fictive kinship, which refers to “connections between members of a 
group who are unrelated by blood or marriage, but who nonetheless share reciprocal social or 
economic relationships” (p. 102). Fictive kinship, Harris-Perry suggests, underscores a 
voluntary sense of shared identity. This is not to say that a vastly diverse group such as 
women will always feel a collective sense of identity based on their sex alone. However, 
when a woman develops a sense of connectedness with other women who are of no relation 
to her, and sees the connections between her sex and categorical treatment, she is 
demonstrating the politics of identity. 
While gender consciousness overlaps with the women’s movement at many points, the two 
are not dependent on the other. Although identification with feminism implies a gender 
consciousness, the same is not always true of the opposite. In other words, women’s groups 
can form on the basis of analogous goals but harbour no identification with the feminist 
cause. This is arguably the case with many groups on the Christian Right, particularly those 
deemed “women’s groups” such as two groups examined in this study, CWA and EF, who 
were formed in the 1970s in direct response to the rise of second-wave feminism.17 They 
embrace elements that are woman-centred but understand that there is political virtue in 
maintaining a healthy distance from the feminist movement. 
Wilcox (1989) conducted a study on the prevalence of feminist and anti-feminist attitudes 
amongst evangelicals on a range of women’s issues: the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), 
abortion, government funding for abortions for the poor, and birth control information in 
schools. Wilcox found that among fundamentalist evangelicals – that is, evangelicals who 
                                                          
17 In I Am Woman By God’s Design (1980) Beverly LaHaye states that she founded Concerned Women for 
America in response to Betty Friedan’s assertion that her views were representative of the majority of American 
women. Eagle Forum was first named ‘Stop ERA’ until 1975 when it took on the name it still holds today. As 
later chapters will touch on, Eagle Forum was originally formed with the sole purpose of defeating the Equal 
Rights Amendment.  
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have a strict interpretation of the Bible and tend to adhere to conservative policies, were 
opposed to all of the abovementioned positions with the exception of the ERA (p. 151). 
However, Wilcox’s study, as with other studies addressing a similar question, does not 
include a stance on pornography as a variable and thus cannot examine the extent to which 
those on the Christian Right converge with antiporn feminists on this issue.  
Situating conservative women’s gender consciousness within Christian Right gender   
ideology 
 
Where examples of politicised gender consciousness among those on the Christian Right can 
be observed, scholars have questioned whether this is the result of religious accommodation 
to a larger culture, or whether feminist sympathies are part of a longstanding tradition within 
Christian fundamentalism (Ingersoll, 2003: 100). Although the adoption of women’s rights 
language by the Christian Right on the pornography issue is a relatively recent phenomenon, 
it has roots that extend back to the first wave of feminism, eventually taking shape in post-
war America. 
Two proponents of the accommodationist standpoint, Stacey and Gerard (1990) argue that 
evangelicalism in particular “selectively incorporates and adapts many feminist family 
reforms.” (p. 111). Adding that there have been extraordinary diffusions of feminist influence 
on “even this most unlikely of constituents.” The authors confess they were surprised at the 
level of “feminist consciousness” among many evangelicals, and observed that: “evangelical 
theology and institutions are serving as remarkably flexible resources for renegotiating 
gender and family relationships, and not exclusively in reactionary or masculinist directions” 
(p. 99). The authors concede that evangelicals are the vanguard of the antifeminist backlash, 
and, therefore, evidence of gender or feminist consciousness among individuals in this 
movement is a testament to the magnitude of feminist influence upon American culture. 
Bramadat (2000) wonders if evangelical groups can perhaps function as bridges between 
evangelicalism, which is traditionally antifeminist, and feminism, which is traditionally 
antievangelical (p. 39). 
Evangelical publications from the 1960s and 1970s contain protofeminist articles written by 
adherents, revealing the extent to which the rise of evangelical feminism paralleled secular 
feminism (Stacey & Gerard, 1990: 101). Daughters of Sarah was the first evangelical 
feminist newsletter published from November 1974 to winter 1996, and at its height was 
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circulated in larger numbers than any other biblical feminist publication to follow.18 
Daughters of Sarah described themselves in their first few issues by stating: “We are 
Christians; we are also feminists. Some of us say we cannot be both, but Christianity and 
feminism for us are inseparable.” (Cochran, 2005: 33). Priscilla Papers, which began 
publication in 1987, stated that its objective was to provide “interdisciplinary evangelical 
scholarship on topics related to a biblical view of gender equality and justice in the home, 
church, and world.”19 Priscilla Papers is published by Christians for Biblical Equality (CBE). 
CBE also began publishing the journal Mutuality in the 1990s, which espouses the same view 
of promoting gender equality within the Church. The key difference between the publications 
being that Mutuality is marketed as the “popular voice”20 on these matters. Many of the 
evangelical feminist publications were taking shape during the battle over the ERA in the 
1970s. Although not an evangelical Christian herself, Schlafly’s enormously successful 
efforts to mobilise conservatives of all stripes in support of the Stop ERA campaign put her at 
odds with the Evangelical Women’s Caucus (EWC) who endorsed the ERA in 1974 at a 
conference attended by 360 adherents (Stacey & Gerard, 1990: 101). In addition to thwarting 
secular feminists on the prospect of an ERA, Schlafly had to contend with dissenting factions 
from within. 
The EWC later became the Evangelical and Ecumenical Women’s Caucus (EEWC) and now 
call themselves Christian Feminism Today (CFT). 21 Initially gathering as a cohort of 
“socially concerned Christians” in Chicago in 1973, and soon growing into an organised 
caucus of feminist evangelicals who, in addition to supporting the ERA, also encouraged 
fellow evangelicals to seek inclusive language in Bible translation and Christian publications, 
campaigned for affirmation of the ordination of women, and criticised discriminatory hiring 
policies in Christian institutions. Cochran (2005) writes that one of the founding members of 
CFT, Anne Eggebroten, became a Christian in 1962 and a feminist later on that decade. 
Eggebroten admits that as a young woman she struggled to integrate marriage and 
motherhood with her feminist ideals while pursuing a scholarly career at California State 
                                                          
18 Within two years of Daughters of Sarah first being published, the journal had a mailing list of approximately 
one thousand. See Quebedeaux, “We’re On Our Way, Lord”, p. 138. 
19 Christians for Biblical Equality 2016, Priscilla Papers, Christians for Biblical Equality, viewed February 
2016, <http://www.cbeinternational.org/resource/journal/priscilla-papers?category=59>. 
20 Christians for Biblical Equality 2016, Mutuality magazine: men and women serving and leading as equals, 
Christians for Biblical Equality, viewed February 2016, <http://www.cbeinternational.org/content/mutuality-
magazine.> 
21 Christian Feminism Today 2016, About Christian feminism today, Christian Feminism Today, viewed August 
2016, <https://eewc.com/about/>. 
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University in San Bernardino. Eggebroten eventually opted to leave her nontenure track 
position in San Bernardino to focus primarily on motherhood. She remained active within 
CFT, organised a picketing of the anti-feminist Fascinating Womanhood event advertised by 
her pastor with signs reading “Jesus Was a Feminist” and “Worship God, Not Your 
Husband”, and wore a pro-choice button during her pregnancy (p. 36). Cochran’s thesis 
posits that evangelicalism, like all religion in America, has seen a radical transformation 
through the second part of the twentieth century from biblical inerrancy to a hermeneutic 
approach which favours a subjective textual interpretation of the Bible, and hence a 
weakening of scriptural authority.  
As women have gained greater social, legal, and economic rights, they have secured more 
power to assess Scripture themselves (Harrison, 2007: 1). Scholars have examined how the 
advent of the women’s movement has paralleled the trend towards hermeneutic 
interpretations of the Bible (Bineham, 1993; Felix, 1998; Harrison, 2007; Scholer, 1987).  
Bineham asserts that Christian feminists have utilised interpretive codes which yield feminist 
readings of biblical texts, adding: 
One example of such a code is the location of authority in female experience […] this 
code counters the dominant code, which locates authority solely in specific scriptural 
texts, and it has specific implications for biblical interpretation, as it leads to an 
emphasis on female role models and images within Scripture (p. 30). 
A particularly thorny area for egalitarian-minded evangelicals is the issue of biblical 
submission. James Davison Hunter’s 1987 study on the influence of feminism within the 
evangelical movement interviewed students in evangelical colleges and seminaries and found 
that although a majority of the students agreed that a husband should have the final say on 
family matters, there was also much debate between the students on how to appropriately 
interpret the concept of submission. Hunter incipiently remarks that many evangelicals 
express sympathy with the feminist critique of submission: “by thoroughly rejecting any 
suggestion that submission implies inferiority or that headship implies superiority” (p. 104). 
He follows by stating that this opinion was reflected in the evangelical students’ response to a 
question pertaining to a woman’s right to refuse to have children despite her husband’s desire 
to have children. A majority of the students, especially the younger cohort, agreed that a 
woman should be able to decide whether or not to have children, rather than submitting to her 
husband’s wishes (p. 103). Notably, seventy percent of the students disagreed that gentle and 
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sensitive men are less appealing than men with traditionally male characteristics (p. 94), 
suggesting that hegemonic masculinity was not necessarily favoured by the evangelical 
students.  
In addition to hermeneutical interpretive approaches inspiring new perspectives on the role of 
women, Sweet (1997) argues that the evangelical movement has a long tradition of enhancing 
women’s role in public life by extending the values of the home into the political sphere. 
“Evangelicalism gave women’s lives social and psychological enlargement as well as public 
usefulness by stretching the scope of their mission” she writes (p. 57). Nancy F. Cott (1977) 
argues that evangelical women derived self-identity, collective consciousness and solidarity 
from the notion of “true womanhood”, and found that the idealisation of femininity implicit 
in true womanhood produced largely positive results for middle-class women, given that 
“evangelical activity fostered women’s emergence as social actors” (p. 156). The nineteenth-
century women’s rights activist Lydia Maria Child similarly asserted, “The sects called 
evangelical, were the first agitators of the woman question” as they eloquently urged upon 
women their prodigious influence, and consequent responsibility, in the great work of 
regenerating a world lying in wickedness (Child and Karcher, 1997: 356).  
Christian Right women have not, however, responded with equal interest to all the policy 
proposals put forth by the feminist movement. There are certain issues on which Christian 
Right women are more likely to feel comfortable subscribing to certain tenets of the feminist 
movement, such as efforts to see women on par with men in the workplace, and support for 
legislation to combat violence against women as it appeals to conservative law and order 
themes (Kelly, 1987). Conservatives are also not averse to the notion of a strong woman in 
the role of entrepreneur, in accordance with their support for the neoliberal principle of risk-
taking (Sawer, 2006: 114). Where feminist principles encourage less support among 
conservatives is in areas requiring wealth redistribution, or perceived ‘positive 
discrimination,’ such as paid maternity leave and government funding of child care.  
A figurehead of the conservative movement, Sarah Palin, has demonstrated her ease with 
adopting the feminist label. Palin embraced the term with alacrity at a May 14th Susan B. 
Anthony List gathering in 2010, using her opposition to abortion as a platform to discuss what 
she described as an “emerging, conservative, feminist identity” (Gardner, 2010). Palin 
appropriated the feminist notion that women can balance motherhood and a career to support 
her antiabortion position: “[women] can give their child life, in addition to pursuing career 
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and education and avocations. Society wants to tell these young women otherwise. These 
feminist groups want to tell these women that, ‘No, you're not capable of doing both.’” Daum 
(2010) points out that Palin’s logic could be perceived as somewhat contorted, but suggests 
that subscribing to one set of principles outlined by a progressive faction of the women’s 
rights movement does not necessarily negate one’s identification as a feminist.  
An article in the Christian Post draws attention to this ‘fresh approach’ to feminism being 
taken by prominent born-again Christian women. In the article, author Sarah Hamaker (2011) 
attempts to redefine the term ‘feminist,’ and exalts Christian women who are taking a stand 
against conventional notions of feminism, quoting from author Betsy Hart:  
The term ‘feminism’ has been hijacked by the secular feminist movement,” says 
Betsy Hart, […] “Many people – including Christians and a lot of young, secular 
women – associate traditional feminism with very angry, men-hating, strident, 
unattractive and unhappy women . 
Christians are attempting to reconceptualise feminism, by framing feminists as women who 
are “conservative and pro-life, who [have] a calling in the workplace” Hamaker writes. Janice 
Shaw Crouse, director and senior fellow for The Beverly LaHaye Institute at CWA also 
seemed to promote a return to early feminist principles, when claiming that the earliest 
feminists were, in fact, women of faith. Crouse asserts that religion “demanded that women 
be treated with the same equalities as men and have the same opportunities” (Hamaker, 
2011).  
The article goes on to quote Betsy Hart, who makes the observation that secular and religious 
women found considerable common ground during the campaign for women’s suffrage, but 
that over the last thirty years Christian women have shied away from feminism due to the 
movement’s “politicization of women.” Such politicisation, according to Gurin (1985), is an 
essential component of feminist consciousness. The relationship Christian women have with 
the term ‘feminism’ is made complicated by the perceived philosophical incongruity of 
feminism and Christian fundamentalism. Crouse states that when a Christian woman uses the 
term ‘feminism,’ she is not using it in the political sense that the term has come to mean in 
contemporary progressive-left formats. Which begs the question then, how does she mean it? 
Can feminism ever not be political? And if this is the case, is the decision to adopt the term 
an inherently political choice?  
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Undermining the extent to which Christian Right rhetoric can realistically intersect with 
feminist theory on antipornography terrain is the conservative predilection for framing 
women in terms of their usefulness to men. Schreiber (2008) examined this, and found that 
Christian Right groups deliberately highlight women’s responsibility to others, namely her 
husband and children (p. 14). This is a perspective undergirded by Genesis 2:18 and 2:20, in 
which women are defined as a man’s helper.  
Two prominent antifeminists on the Christian Right, Nancy Leigh DeMoss and Mary Kassian 
(2012), echo this in their eight week study guide “True Woman 101” stating that God created 
woman as the man’s helper so she could assist him in fulfilling his ultimate purpose. This 
appraisal of women’s roles conflicts with feminist thinking, which has sought to recenter 
women within a patriarchal framework from marginalised positions in the family unit and 
public sphere. Moreover, feminist theory has focused on the creative and intellectual potential 
that awaits women who break free from what radical feminist Mary Daly (1973) described as 
“the experience of nothingness” that is being a housewife (p. 23). From outward appearances, 
the two perspectives seem almost irreconcilable.   
But defining women in terms of their relationship to men is not restricted to conservative 
discourse. It is a perspective deeply entrenched in the cultural milieu of mainstream America. 
During President Obama’s State of the Union address in February of 2013, he declared: “We 
know our economy is stronger when our wives, mothers, and daughters can live their lives 
free from discrimination in the workplace and free from the fear of domestic violence.” 
Although the themes of President Obama’s were coloured with feminist references to 
workplace discrimination and domestic violence, the more subtle, instinctive decision to refer 
to women by their familial role betrayed the dominant message in his statement and drew 
considerable backlash from feminist critics. A petition was formed by feminist blogger 
Melissa McEwan and submitted to the White House, stating: 
Defining women by their relationships to other people is reductive, misogynist, and 
alienating to women who do not define ourselves exclusively by our relationships to 
others. Further, by referring to ‘our’ wives et al, the President appears to be talking to 
The Men of America about Their Women, rather than talking to men AND women. 
(Clark-Flory, 2013) 
The President’s rhetoric on women is consonant with CWA, FOF, and EF’s framing of 
women in a relational sense as mothers, wives, and daughters. These groups routinely link 
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women’s identity to their relationship with men. Denmark and Paludi (2008) note that 
adolescent youth are more likely to define themselves based on their relation and connection 
to others. Gender-role socialisation intensifies during this developmental phase, leading girls 
and women to connect their identity to their relationship with others more strongly than boys 
and men (p. 259). One way in particular that CWA demonstrates this with respect to 
pornography is by voicing concerns that pornography leads men to mistreat their wives, 
whether that means forcing unrealistic and degrading sexual demands on their wives, having 
affairs, or abandoning their marriages (Schreiber, 2008: 62).  
This is not an argument you would expect to see from antiporn feminists, as it elevates the 
position of married women above other women, accentuating and giving priority to the 
perceived harms pornography causes in their lives. The gendered subtext being that a woman 
tethered in a marital bond has greater intrinsic worth than her non-married counterparts. The 
Christian Right’s worldview sees marriage as a kind of ‘cure’ for the sexual immorality 
intrinsic to pornography. In Every Man’s Battle (2009), an evangelical manual on “winning 
the war against sexual temptation,” the authors give countless examples of men steered away 
from their marriage by sexual sin, but who are finally healed by “releasing” themselves to 
their wives, forsaking their right to a private sexual realm in the mind, and starving their eyes 
of all other sexual imagery. The wife plays a crucial role in the sexual redemption of her 
husband to such an extent that it becomes a marital duty in which her own rights are 
subsidiary. 
Invoking imagery of the mother and wife in political debate has long been an effective 
rhetorical tool in politics. Lopata (1994) asserts in her book on women’s social roles since the 
advent of industrialisation that for women, the most culturally significant social roles 
continue to be that of the wife and mother. Subsequently, society justifies the neglect of work 
in the public sphere if it interferes with the obligations of wife and mother. Douglas and 
Michaels (2004) argue that a reinvigorated idealisation of motherhood has emerged in the 
United States which they attribute in part to the media’s construction of the ‘perfect mother’ 
whose parenting is intensive, patient, professional, and selfless (p. 5). The symbolic 
significance of invoking motherhood is crucial to the conservative framing of pornography 
given that notions of gender and the roles associated with womanhood and manhood are 
imagined to be predetermined.  
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Conversely, radical feminists and many antiporn feminists see gender as socially constructed, 
and the roles men and women adopt as fluid and arbitrary. They contend that sex is 
immutable, but the roles we assign to them are not. When gender roles are thought of as 
predetermined, the consequences for women and men who appear to be actively rejecting 
them is perhaps more significant than it is when these roles are viewed as socially 
constructed. That is to say, a woman in pornography whose actions go against the biblical 
teachings of modesty and chastity will not provoke the same reverence and empathy as a 
woman who is married and made to participate in similar acts by her husband.  Antiporn 
feminists may recognise the parallels between both women in terms of issues of consent and 
power asymmetry, but markers of identity which are not a necessary precursor for feminist 
sympathies are nevertheless crucial to the Christian Right’s narrative on sexuality. What a 
wife and mother does, or is made to endure sexually, elicits a compassionate response, but the 
actions of a woman whose identity cannot be so manifestly tied to a man, except in acts of 
sex alone, does not warrant comparable sympathies.  
     Gendered collective identity and American individualism at odds 
 
The possibility of a more “gender conscious”, group-oriented, and inclusive Christian Right 
fits somewhat awkwardly into the conservative American belief system this study in situated 
in. Indeed, an expression of a pro-woman position by those on the Christian Right requires 
some philosophical contortions insofar as it clashes with the movement’s neo-Calvinist 
doctrine of unabashed individualism. The Calvinist tradition glorifies the individual’s right to 
uninhibited pursuits of material gain and selfish passion above the social and economic good 
of the community (Weber, 1958).  
It is this tradition that has come to shape American cultural life. The recognition of group 
disparities and an awareness of the structural forces that impede achievements for some 
social categories is not a narrative that has assimilated into post-colonial American society in 
any sort of profound way (Gurin, 1985: 144). However, within this frame, notions of 
“community” are not entirely dispelled and it is the church that has played a central role in 
tempering selfish impulses for fear that such an ethos might corrupt or even compromise the 
existence of the church (Markofski, 2015: 91). 
There is still a shared belief in the United States that seeking community or communing in a 
particular place is meaningful (Putnam, 2000). One need not look further than the 
significance of the church in the lives of so many Americans to realise that some level of 
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collective consciousness is seen as worthwhile. In this sense, community is the salve which 
heals the darker elements of individualism, or what Charles Taylor (1991) saw as the kind of 
society where individuals end up ‘enclosed in their own hearts’ (p. 9).  
Nevertheless, Americans struggle to connect their own experiences with others of a similar 
status, and believe in a world where individuals largely receive what they deserve (Crosby, 
1982; Lerner in Gurin, 1985). This view that individuals receive what they deserve can be 
traced back to Scripture, specifically Proverbs 12:14, which reads: “From the fruit of their 
lips people are filled with good things, and the work of their hands brings them reward.”22 
Applied to pornography, such a perspective would have brutal consequences for the rights of 
the women in the industry. Any social and economic forces which drove them into the 
industry would go largely unacknowledged, eclipsed by a stubborn ethic that believes 
people’s circumstances are of their own making and thus little sympathy is deserved.   
But with respect to pornography, groups on the Christian Right are actually suppressing 
inclinations toward individualism. Applied to the market, economic individualism permits the 
existence of a thriving, profitable pornography industry, regardless of the social 
consequences. Aware of this contradiction, the movement prioritises the integrity of the 
community above the unfettered pursuit of wealth in their antiporn agenda. “The only 
‘community standards’ where this stuff might be acceptable is Hell,” declared CWA 
following the prosecution of two pornographers from West Virginia in 2003 (Strub, 2010). In 
this view, undisciplined individualism constitutes in itself a certain immorality.  
Carl W. Wilson, who describes himself as a Christian sociologist, described the 
characteristics of a decadent, excessively individualist culture like the United States and how 
they actively work against the nuclear family: 
Men reject spiritual and moral development as leaders of families; men begin to 
neglect their families in search of material gain; men begin to engage in adulterous 
relationships or homosexual sex; women begin to devalue the role of motherhood and 
homemaker; husbands and wives begin to compete with each other and families 
disintegrate; selfish individualism fragments society into warring factions; and men 
and women lose faith in God and reject all authority over their lives (in Smith, 2008: 
1).  
                                                          
22 New International Version of the Holy Bible, available at: <http://www.biblegateway.com/>. 
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Allowing the corrosive influence of unbridled individualism to flourish leads to moral 
anarchy. This perspective has put the Christian Right at odds with more libertarian fiscal 
conservative members of the Republican Party who regard limited government and economic 
growth as much more pressing priorities than tackling sexual promiscuity, same-sex marriage 
or abortion. Indeed, during his time as president, Ronald Reagan ridiculed forms of group 
consciousness, seeing them as much the enemy as government action. Whether as women, 
African-Americans, or gay and lesbian groups, Reagan regarded their collective organisation 
as an impediment to individual enterprise (Leege et al. 2002: 212). Women on the Christian 
Right, increasingly aware of the benefits of collective identity in forging a case for moral 
order, pressed on despite wider scepticism of the merits of such strategies in the Republican 
Party. 
By highlighting themes of inequality and power in pornography that have traditionally been 
argued by feminists, and by promoting collective action as a means of correcting this 
discontent, women on the Christian Right are tapping into a method of resistance that exposes 
ideological nuances underpinning the movement’s rhetoric. 
Further proof of the malleable nature of the movement’s gender conscious, pro-woman 
rhetorical strategy can be found in the way movement leaders have extended this frame to a 
number of issues other than pornography. The discussion in the following chapter focuses on 
this phenomenon and the way in which the Christian Right are recasting women as victims 
and positioning themselves as advocates of women’s rights on multiple fronts, from abortion 
to foreign policy. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The appropriation of women’s rights language on other conservative policy 
issues 
 
The Christian Right’s willingness to incorporate pro-woman, rights-conscious rhetoric 
traverses a range of fields in addition to pornography. The adoption of women’s rights 
language has become normalised in Christian Right woman-oriented discourse on issues such 
as abortion, contraception, gun control and foreign policy, pointing to a wide-ranging shift in 
the movement’s strategy to attract women adherents.  
     Abortion 
 
The extent to which women’s groups on the Christian Right have reconciled their status as 
pro-woman groups and their opposition to abortion has received heightened scholarly 
attention in recent years (Schreiber, 2002a; 2002b; 2008; Rose, 2011; Luker, 1985). 
Conservative women’s groups have not eased their objection to abortion, because they do not 
see their stance as inconsistent with the rights culture of the United States. On the contrary, 
they see the triumph over abortion through the prism of rights – as fundamental in affirming 
it. The abortion issue remains a powerful drawcard for conservative women’s groups and is 
increasingly proving to be legislatively successful with individual states passing laws 
restricting abortion procedures to early in the gestational life of the foetus, and requiring 
‘abortion-minded’ women to undergo a sonogram and have the image displayed and 
described to them.23 Instead, these groups have chosen to reframe their opposition to abortion 
using language evocative of the women’s rights framework adopted on pornography, in an 
attempt to undermine feminist claims that antiabortionists harbour hostility towards women.  
The issue of abortion shares some common characteristics with pornography insofar as both 
are deemed “women’s issues”. Although the definition of what constitutes a women’s issue is 
complex, Alison M. Jaggar’s (1983) assertion that it is a practice or institution that affects the 
livelihoods of women is imprecise but sufficiently expositive. However, crucial differences 
do exist between abortion and pornography activism. There is an understanding, a consensus 
of sorts, that the feminist movement is pro-choice on the issue of abortion. Those in the 
                                                          
23 Perhaps the most prominent example of such a law is Texas Senate Bill 5, passed by the state’s legislature in 
July 2013. The bill banned abortions later than 20 weeks fertilisation, except in cases where the woman’s life is 
at risk. As of December 2014 states requiring abortion-minded women to undergo a sonogram and to have the 
image displayed and described to them are Texas, Wisconsin, Louisiana, Nebraska, and Oklahoma. 
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feminist movement who publicly adopt an antiabortion position do so at the risk of being 
dismissed as a dissident feminist. For example, Australian antiporn feminist Melinda 
Tankard-Reist’s admission that she describes herself as pro-life, since “abortion is often an 
excuse not to deal with the structural conditions that compel women to have abortions” and 
constitutes a form of “violence against women” was met with contempt by prominent 
feminists Leslie Cannold and Eva Cox. Cox saw Tankard-Reist’s redefinition of feminist 
reproductive politics as a sign of a conservative co-option of the movement (Hills, 2012). 
While a pro-life stance does not necessarily negate one’s identification as a feminist, it is not 
representative of the broader goals of the movement. On the other hand, pornography has 
been a divisive and contentious issue within the feminist movement with no clear consensus 
or dominant view having emerged. With a few notable exceptions, the issue has been largely 
subverted. Indeed, Susan Gubar and Joan Hoff (1989) noted in their book on the dilemma of 
violent pornography among women that “pornography may be potentially the most divisive 
and debilitating [problem facing the women’s movement] since the fifty-year debate over 
protective legislation and the ERA, begun in the 1920s” (p. 10). Feminist opposition to 
pornography has been labelled by other feminists more sceptical of the harms of pornography 
as no less of a moral crusade than what is being waged by their conservative counterparts 
(Bulbeck, 2009; Rubin, 1992; Vance, 1993). The weaker presence of the feminist movement 
on the issue of pornography, as opposed to abortion, mean the women’s rights frame is ripe 
for the taking. When opposition is divided, this provides a range of options for appropriation. 
When it comes to the abortion debate, conservatives have tactfully co-opted a frame from 
their feminist counterparts: women’s health care. Conservative groups are competing with 
feminist groups in an effort to represent women’s health interests, a move that Aberbach and 
Peele (2011) describe as “a consciously articulated strategy” (p. 138) showing a pattern that 
is consistent across issues, including pornography. There is a very specific purpose to this, 
and that is to draw attention to how opposition to abortion ensures the protection of women’s 
physical and emotional wellbeing, an area of concern traditionally addressed by feminist 
activists (Schreiber, 2008: 98). CWA characterises women as “abortion’s second victims” 
(Wadkins, 1999), invoking an injustice frame by identifying a victim. Gamson states that 
“injustice frames’ are effective rhetorical tools because they amplify an alleged injustice in 
order to generate support for a group and their proposed remedy (in Benford and Snow, 2000: 
615).  
84 
 
Within the Christian Right’s health frame, women’s varied emotional responses to abortion 
are pathologised and given medical names such as ‘Post-Abortive Syndrome’, positioning 
women as passive victims within the broader construction of abortion as a war waged by 
opposing sides. Dubious studies linking abortion with breast cancer are frequently cited,24 
and the increased risk of miscarriage and preterm labour for women who have undergone 
multiple abortive procedures are heavily emphasised.  
Crucial to the legitimacy of the Christian Right’s pro-woman health frame is the insinuation 
that abortion is a self-indulgent, medically unnecessary procedure that has no physical or 
psychological health benefits to women. They refer to these as ‘elective abortions’ and point 
to data revealing that the most commonly reported reason women cite for having an abortion 
is to postpone or stop childbearing, primarily for socioeconomic reasons (Klusendorf, 2009). 
Couched in language sympathetic to women, some pro-life activists have used this data to 
argue that women ought to receive more financial and emotional support from the community 
in order to reduce abortion rates. But rather than the government providing the support, it 
should come from the church and the boyfriends or husbands of abortion-minded women.  
There is some disagreement within the movement over whether women should be permitted 
to access an abortion if they have been a victim of rape or incest, with opponents claiming 
that aborting a foetus conceived in rape merely punishes the victim for the perpetrator’s 
crime, and that abortion does not “undo the rape”25 (Harrison, 2013). However, abortion for 
the purpose of saving the pregnant woman’s life is generally regarded as morally permissible 
by antiabortionists. In other words, the threshold determining a medically necessary abortion 
is not reached until the woman is at risk of death, anything less and the woman is implored to 
show the foetus mercy, and warned of the potentially negative health consequences of failing 
to do so. Aberbach and Peele (2011) note that the decision made by various conservative 
groups to frame abortion as a threat to women’s health neither overrides nor overshadows 
their concerns about foetal rights, “nor are these narratives antithetical to its religious 
mission” but rather “they co-exist with and expand the boundaries of conservative arguments 
                                                          
24 The conservative American news website ‘Cybercast News Service’ collates articles from around the web 
supporting the pro-life cause, including claims that abortion increases women’s chances of developing breast 
cancer. For an example, see: Goodenough, P 2013, New study puts abortion-breast cancer link back in the 
spotlight, CNS News, <http://cnsnews.com/news/article/patrick-goodenough/new-study-puts-abortion-breast-
cancer-link-back-spotlight>. 
25 Donna Harrison, M.D. is a member of the American Association of Pro Life Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
and takes the stance that seeking an abortion in the aftermath of a sexual assault does not “undo the rape”, but 
rather deepens the psychological trauma of the assault. 
85 
 
about abortion and thus help CWA fill an important gap in conservative movement politics” 
(p. 138). Therefore, appropriating the language of women’s health allows groups on the 
Christian Right to appeal to greater numbers of potential adherents.  
Much of the Christian Right’s antipathy to abortion stems from its belief in the intrinsic 
maternity of all women, and that motherhood is the single most important identity claim 
women can make. Kintz (1994) argues that fundamentalism insists on the sacredness of 
motherhood, because “fundamentalism needs children to provide a gender for identity-less 
women who, for complicated and often astute reasons, have a deep fear that without an 
identifiable and sacred notion of gender, they will be judged against men and found lacking” 
(p. 55).  
The unease with abortion is tied to a wider panic in social conservatism about the dismantling 
and outsourcing of mothering. Abortion relieves the woman of her duties as a mother, just as 
public institutions ensuring every child receives certain medical, dental, and psychological 
care are handing these responsibilities to the state, and not to the family. Groups on the 
Christian Right are beginning to express concern and sympathy for women in the abortion 
debate, as they regard an abortion-minded woman as the would-be mother who is presumed 
to share a reciprocal bond with her unborn child. Abortion also violates the essentialised 
belief that a woman never exalts herself, she responds to the needs of others, given that the 
essence of femininity is the impulse to respond. As conservative political activist Connie 
Marshner (1990) stated “[women’s] bodies respond to the first hint of pregnancy; our 
emotions and minds continue to respond” (p. 158). Given that abortion involves a woman’s 
assertion of independence from the responsibilities of child-rearing, it represents a subversion 
to the authority of God. To those on the Christian Right, abortion does not only victimise the 
foetus whose life has been envisioned by God and then denied to them, but also ends the 
process whereby a woman’s most sacred identity is being formed. Christian Right opposition 
to pornography is similarly tied up in anxiety about the severing of motherhood from 
women’s essential identity. Sexual impurity is implicated in the epidemic of single 
motherhood, seen as a culprit in the increasing existence of fatherless homes wherein men 
have become alienated from their God-given role due in part by the distractions of external 
temptations.   
Valuable to this study because it unearths the recent inclination within Christian Right 
organisations to manipulate pro-woman arguments to suit conservative ends, Melody Rose’s 
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(2011) examination of the co-option of a pro-woman frame by those on the Christian Right 
uses the methods of frame analysis and descriptive analysis to examine the most cited 
writings of American antiabortion groups from 1973 through 2007. Her research uncovers the 
recent and widespread appropriation of women’s rights language by these groups. In the 
earlier years antiabortion groups were framing abortion primarily as a tension between foetus 
and mother. Movement leaders would construct foetuses as victims, and women who had 
sought an abortion as perpetrators of an immoral act (p. 6). In the later years and to the 
present day, a new framing technique emerged, where women are constructed as having the 
“right to know” the deleterious effects of abortion to them (p. 7).  Rose argues that using the 
language of rights to recast women who have accessed abortion as victims, rather than 
perpetrators, was a shrewd move allowing the movement to open its doors to women who 
have experienced abortion. Indeed this framing technique is a favourite of antipornography 
conservatives. Christian Right leader Phyllis Schlafly’s 1987 book Pornography’s Victims 
put a spotlight on the individual women affected by pornography whose cries had been 
silenced, centreing the perspectives of women, and marginalising some of the traditional 
concerns of the Right, such as the health of the family and the Church. 
Pro-life activists have also artfully used the issue of sex-selective abortion to present 
themselves as advocates for women’s rights while chipping away at abortion rights. Lynne 
Marie Kohm (1997) referred to the issue as the ‘boomerang effect of a woman’s right to 
choose’ underlining the paradox of the mainstream feminist position on abortion which views 
choice as an absolute, even in cases where a certain choice is motivated by a preference for a 
male child. The Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act (2013) was the pro-life movement’s first 
legislative attempt at using sex-selection to plant into law the notion of the foetus as human 
(Hvistendahl, 2011: 242).  
The conservative focus on sex-selective abortion belies the data on its actual prevalence, 
which indicates that the procedure is a minimal problem in the United States. When it occurs 
it tends to be confined to Korean, Chinese, and Indian populations with a cultural preference 
for males. Nevertheless, the issue puts feminist reproductive rights activists on the defensive, 
characterising them as cruelly unaffected by a misogynistic practice. In a podcast titled 
‘Women’s Rights: Protecting life at every stage’ on Dr James Dobson’s Family Talk podcast, 
CWA’s president Penny Young Nance referred to sex-selective abortion to make the case that 
abortion hurts women. “How does someone who calls themselves a feminist oppose sex-
selection abortion ban?” asks the interviewer, to which Nance gives a telling reply, “It’s 
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almost a religion for them. It’s not really about protecting women. It’s about this right. That 
is this penultimate right that trumps everything else. […] They won’t admit that their 
philosophy is damaging to women, because to them it’s a religion. This is what they 
believe.”26 Through the emphasis on sex-selective abortion, and framing women as the true 
victims of abortion and pornography, conservatives are building a narrative that traverses 
multiple issues and makes the case that they are in fact the true advocates of women’s rights. 
The Christian Right organisation Women Exploited by Abortion (WEBA), founded in 1982 
and made up of women who regret having undergone an abortion procedure, has capitalised 
on the widespread concern for women’s well-being that was generated by the feminist 
movement and is now being seized upon by the Christian Right (Berlet and Lyons, 2000: 
232). In a meeting of WEBA members in Washington, D.C. in 1985 abortion was described 
as the “ultimate exploitation of a woman and her dead child” and “a violent betrayal of 
everything [a woman] is.” Language that has many parallels with Christian Right claims that 
pornography represents the ritualistic degradation and exploitation of women, and is little 
more than sexualised violence. The WEBA members claimed that they had felt betrayed by 
the feminist movement which had refused to see them as genuine victims of abortion because 
it undermined their principled support for a woman’s right to choose.  
The similarly named Women Victimized by Abortion and Women Exploited also emphasise 
the harm abortion does to women. These groups co-opt the feminist narrative of the 
subordinate woman and the oppressive man by characterising abortionists and the boyfriends 
or husbands of post-abortive women as abusive, uncaring or neglectful men. Pro-life groups 
aping feminist arguments are contesting the scope of feminism as it influences younger 
women (Oaks, 2009). Reframing anti-abortion politics as the more purely woman-centred 
and historically accurate feminist position means anti-abortion groups can claim to truly 
represent women’s interests.  
Best exemplifying this position is the anti-abortion feminist outfit Feminists for Life (FFL). 
FFL draw on the work of first-wave feminists such as Susan B. Anthony, Mary 
Wollstonecraft, and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, who were among many early feminists who 
opposed abortion on the grounds that it was both morally troubling and would give women 
                                                          
26 Women’s rights: protecting life at every stage 2013, podcast, Family Talk, July 31, < 
http://www.oneplace.com/ministries/family-talk/listen/womens-rights-protecting-life-at-every-stage-
355140.html> 
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fewer excuses to refuse sex from men. In the introduction to FFL’s published book Pro-Life 
Feminism (1985), Paulette Joyer writes of her regret that the mainstream feminist movement 
and the pro-life movement are perceived as in opposition to each other. “The pro-life tenet is 
that each and every human being, pre-born or born, deserves the opportunity to develop into 
the best she or he is capable of” writes Joyer, linking this with the feminist precept that “each 
and every human being, woman or man, […] be respected, however minimal or great their 
development may be” (p. 1). Moreover, pro-choice feminism is believed to deepen societal 
contempt for motherhood, limiting the collective respect society has for mothers and children. 
Pregnancy comes to be seen as more an obstacle to success and happiness than a welcome 
and integral part of a woman’s life, which has the ripple effect of workplaces and universities 
stubbornly resisting adequate accommodation to the needs of pregnant women and mothers. 
Because feminism was built on the tenets of nonviolence, non-discrimination, and justice for 
all, abortion is regarded as hostile to such principles. It bears repeating that the framing of 
abortion as pernicious to women’s rights in the Right to Life movement is a framing 
technique that is being employed within the antipornography wing of the Christian Right 
movement. Just as activists reason that abortion is not harmless or liberating to women, 
pornography similarly promises only to exploit and violate young women, and inspires men 
to enact the degrading behaviour on women as well.  
The formation of pro-life crisis pregnancy centres (CPC), which have expanded rapidly since 
the 1980s, gave the movement a fighting chance against the largest abortion provider in the 
United States, Planned Parenthood. Activists allege that Planned Parenthood encourages 
women to have an abortion, thereby limiting their choices. Through counselling, discipleship, 
adoption referrals, and the provision of nappies and infant formula, activists can argue that 
CPCs broaden women’s choices in the cases where a pregnant woman desires to go through 
with the pregnancy, but lacks the resources to do so. There are about 2,500 CPCs in the 
United States, compared with 1,800 abortion clinics (Belluck, 2013). They often present 
themselves using vague, inconspicuous language that can make it difficult to discern between 
a CPC and an impartial women’s health clinic. Nevertheless, activists insist that they are 
merely offering pregnant girls and women resources and advice that they would not be able 
to get elsewhere.  
FOF’s ‘Option Ultrasound’ initiative employs the rhetoric of choice while advocating a 
controversial procedure that encourages abortion-minded women to first see their embryo or 
foetus on a sonogram before making the final decision on whether or not to undergo an 
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abortion. For a decade, the group has equipped CPCs with ultrasound machines, contending 
that once a woman sees her embryo of foetus she will be less likely to go through with the 
abortion.27 Writing on the problems with the pro-life/pro-choice dichotomy, Tanya Saroj 
Bakhru (2010) highlights that the Christian Right’s choice rhetoric fails to acknowledge that 
decisions about reproduction exist within a complex web of factors in which power and 
privilege play significant roles (p. 26). The conflict over which side genuinely exemplifies 
choice speaks to the success of feminist campaigners in terms of defining the meaningful 
categories in the debate. By co-opting the feminist language of choice, the Christian Right are 
effectively conceding that they have failed to sufficiently persuade constituents using their 
traditional arguments about the sanctity of human life. But as cognitive linguist George 
Lakoff (2004) makes clear “when you are arguing against the other side: do not use their 
language” (p. 3). Doing so simply reinforces the opposing side. 
In Brian E. Fisher’s (2014) book which makes the impassioned case that abortion is in fact 
the ultimate exploitation of women, Fisher does what Lakoff cautions against, and employs 
quotes by radical feminists Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon to legitimise his 
antiabortion arguments. Fisher’s book approaches the issue of abortion from the perspective 
of women’s rights and is emblematic of the trend toward using feminist rhetoric to bolster 
conservative political ends. He is the co-founder and president of the antiabortion group 
Online for Life who claims to be “revolutionizing” antiabortion activism by pushing for 
‘abortion-determined’ women to undergo ultrasounds. Quoting MacKinnon from her 1987 
essay ‘Privacy vs. Equality,’ Fisher argues that abortion “does not liberate women; it frees 
male sexual aggression. The availability of abortion removes the one remaining legitimized 
reason that women have had for refusing sex besides the headache” (p. 65). MacKinnon’s 
argument was a striking departure from the conventional feminist position on abortion, 
concentrating on male aggression rather than women’s reproductive choice. Fisher points to 
other feminists who agree with his position, such as New Zealand feminist writer and 
founding member of FFL Daphne Clair de Jong who believes that “if women must submit to 
abortion to preserve their lifestyle or career, their economic or social status, they are 
pandering to a system devised and run by men for male convenience” (p. 65). These quotes, 
taken out of their broader feminist context, serve to reinforce Fisher’s stance that various 
                                                          
27 Focus on the Family 2014, Focus’ option ultrasound program celebrates 10 years and more than 230,000 
babies saved, retrieved January 2015, < http://www.focusonthefamily.com/about_us/news_room/news-
releases/2014/20140106-focus-option-ultrasound-program-celebrates-ten-years.aspx>. 
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interventions ought to be made to prevent abortions from occurring. It is the failure of men to 
hold up their end of the bargain that is most central to Fisher’s thesis, and in doing so he 
employs a kind of pseudo-feminist tactic that relocates the blame and burden ordinarily 
imposed on abortion-minded women onto the men who had an equal part in conceiving the 
foetus but who carry just a fraction of the societal responsibility: 
If we are concerned about women’s equality and rights, we should not only be 
concerned about women being properly informed about abortion, we should also be 
concerned about their ability to make an abortion decision independent of male 
coercion (p. 69-70). 
We do not have “true gender equality” Fisher argues, until women can make abortion 
decisions without male interference. An audacious reconceptualisation of the feminist pro-
choice position which proclaims “no uterus, no opinion.” But Fisher stands by the claim, 
alleging that a majority of abortion-minded women report feeling pressured to abort by the 
father of the baby, or by their own father. “Pressure to abort can escalate to violence” which 
is reflected in figures which show that the leading killer of pregnant women is homicide (p. 
70). It is the woman’s natural desire to nurture and protect her child, asserts Fisher, but this 
intrinsic urge is repeatedly violated and undermined through coercive intimidation from 
powerful male figures in her life. The recent publication date of Fisher’s book reflects the 
culmination of years of quasi-feminist Christian Right political posturing on this issue, 
wherein the movement has been increasingly engaged in efforts to reclaim ownership of 
“women’s rights” from feminist groups. 
Attempts in early 2015 to pass the Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act in Arizona, 
which would prohibit an abortion from being performed if the probable “post-fertilisation 
age” of the unborn child is twenty weeks or greater highlighted the great lengths conservative 
activists are going to compare abortion with other human rights travesties typically 
condemned by the Left. The bill’s sponsor, Representative Trent Franks has described 
abortion as worse than slavery for African Americans. “Far more of the African American 
community is being devastated by the policies of today than were being devastated by the 
policies of slavery,” exclaimed Franks to liberal blogger Mike Stark in 2010 (Madden, 2010). 
Although not reflected in the data on abortion statistics by the The Centers for Disease 
Control, Franks justified his remarks by claiming that “half of all black children are aborted.” 
Franks’ co-option of anti-slavery rhetoric is tactically equivalent to the Christian Right’s 
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appropriation of pro-woman, anti-abuse rhetoric on pornography. Indicative of the level of 
pressure to appeal to a wider spectrum of constituents, the Republican Party has endured 
dissent from within its own ranks in response to the ambitious bill. Republican women have 
specifically balked over a provision in the bill which would require victims of rape to report 
their attack to police in order to be eligible for an abortion after twenty weeks. Republican 
women expressed concern that the legislation’s “restrictive language” would once again spoil 
the party’s chances of broadening its appeal to women and younger voters (O’Keefe, 2015). 
Trent Franks’ female colleagues are concerned that his bill would deepen the already salient 
narrative that the GOP is waging a ‘war on women’. The war on women is a political 
expression frequently employed by Democratic congresswomen and feminist activists to 
describe the Republican Party’s restrictive policies on matters concerning women in the 
United States, particularly on reproductive rights issues.  
The legalisation of abortion in the decision of Roe v. Wade occurred at a time of intense 
political transformation for the GOP. The party was embracing a more explicitly social 
conservative agenda following the ascendance of so-called ‘Rockefeller Republicans’ in the 
1960s, the more moderate wing of the Republican Party who subscribed to the politics of 
social liberalism. Since the Roe decision, the party’s relationship with women voters has been 
largely defined by their position on reproductive issues. A series of recent political decisions 
made by the party have intensified the perception that Republicans are seeking to restrict 
women’s rights. These include such efforts in multiple states to pass personhood 
amendments, along with the implementation in 2012 of a law requiring women in Texas 
seeking an abortion to first undergo a sonogram at least twenty-four hours before the 
procedure from the doctor who will perform the abortion (National Public Radio, 2013). The 
backlash from women within the party, and Trent Franks’ clever recasting of abortion as a 
genocidal tool of black oppression, speaks to the degree of cultural cognisance within the 
party, as lawmakers confront the challenges of reconciling restrictive policies on abortion 
with a female electorate wary of politicians’ attempting to deprive them of hard-won rights. 
In counterbalancing the damage, Franks’ is reacting to the rights-based rhetoric of pro-choice 
groups by employing his own civil rights case. Just as conservatives have done in the 
pornography debate, Franks’ and his supporters are using the tools of their opponents to win 
the war. 
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     Gun control 
 
In recent times a key ally of the Christian Right, the gun lobby, have also recognised the 
importance of emphasising the role of women in the movement. Traditionally the gun lobby 
have framed gun ownership as an expression of a healthy, robust form of masculinity. Gun 
manufacturers have exploited the notion that men are the dominant, combative, protecting sex 
to advertise the “awesome power beyond belief” of firearms, and have occasionally relied on 
hypersexualised female models to promote the product (Cukier and Sidel, 2006: 130). Cukier 
and Sidel (2006) assert that the goal herein is to “invoke [a] rugged individualism overlain 
with American nationalism” (p. 130). Realising the political and monetary benefits of 
appealing to women, a large portion of the industry has set its sights in recent years on 
increasing the number of women purchasing firearms and enrolling in the National Rifle 
Association (NRA). The group launched a campaign targeted at women called ‘Armed and 
Fabulous’ which revives latent stereotypes about women as vulnerable and defenceless to 
make the case for fewer restrictions on firearms. The group employs empowering language to 
appeal to women who can “refuse to be a victim” by arming themselves.28 The Armed and 
Fabulous webpage features a video of a rape survivor named Amanda recalling her ordeal 
and stating her belief that had she been allowed to carry a firearm for protection while on 
campus, she would have been able to fight off her attacker.  
The NRA’s campaign urging women to arm themselves in the hope they will be better 
equipped to resist their aggressor has some parallels with feminist efforts to train women in 
the art of self-defence. The feminist rationale for teaching self-defence training to women has 
been careful to situate the training within the context of rape culture, with a holistic focus on 
the many facets involved in defending bodily autonomy. As Susan Schorn (2014) who has 
taught empowerment self-defence for decades states, it should address the “physical, mental, 
emotional, spiritual, and social/cultural components of self-defense.” Feminist programs 
designed to teach women to defend themselves against random or repeated acts of physical 
violence are meant to equalise the power imbalance between men and women. However, 
critics argue that it simply validates the use of violence – a male concept – and takes the onus 
off men to change violent behaviours (Ziegler, 2008: 106).  
                                                          
28 National Rifle Association 2013, Refuse to be a victim, National Rifle Association Women, viewed April 
2014, <http://www.nrawomen.tv/refuse-to-be-a-victim>. 
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In January 2013 Gayle Trotter, a senior fellow of the conservative women’s group the 
Independent Women’s Forum (IWF) and Wayne LaPierre, the CEO of the NRA appeared 
together on Capitol Hill to urge the Senate Judiciary Committee to further liberalise gun laws. 
During Trotter’s speech, several references to women’s empowerment and the notion of 
‘choice’ were made. According to Trotter “guns reverse the balance of power” in violent 
confrontations, and neutralise the natural disadvantage women have due to their typically 
smaller stature. Guns will also apparently help women “protect loved ones”, a task suitable 
for them as the nurturing overseers of family matters. Trotter goes on to assert that curbing 
access to guns would create an “undue burden” for women who would “choose” to defend 
themselves from violence.29 The appropriation of the feminist language of choice is an 
attempt by IWF and the NRA to frame gun restrictions as antithetical to women’s autonomy, 
just as feminists claim that restrictions to abortion access constrain a woman’s right to choose 
whether or not to continue her pregnancy. There are empirical flaws in Trotter’s argument. 
The emphasis in her statement on ‘stranger danger’ belies the fact that most violence against 
women is committed in the home, and as a study by the Violence Policy Center demonstrates, 
for every woman who kills a partner with a gun in self-defence, 83 women are critically or 
fatally injured by an intimate partner.30 Putting aside the factual inaccuracies, Trotter’s 
argument is important because it represents a growing ‘feministing’ of conservative debates.  
     Foreign policy 
 
Although sitting outside the domestic social issues which usually occupy the Christian 
Right’s attention, foreign policy has been an area of considerable interest to social 
conservative leaders in recent decades. Lee Marsden (2008) notes that since the early years of 
the Bush administration the military have become increasingly influenced by conservative 
evangelical Christianity. Buoyed by the Bush presidency, born again Christians actively 
evangelise within the Pentagon and occupy senior positions. During his commencement 
address at West Point, Secretary of the Army Pete Green portrayed the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq as ‘a clash between American and radical Islamic approaches to religious liberty’ 
(Banerjee, 2008). According to Marsden, this spiritual battle narrative has led to a United 
                                                          
29 Coley, V 2013, Gayle Trotter’s full senate hearing testimony “what should America do about gun violence,” 
Independent Women’s Forum, viewed December 2014, 
<http://www.iwf.org/media/2790433/Gayle_Trotter_Testimony_Gun_Violence>. 
30 Violence Policy Center 2001, A deadly myth: women, handguns and self-defense, viewed January 2015, 
<http://www.vpc.org/studies/myth.htm>. 
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States military made up disproportionately of evangelicals many of whom see themselves as 
being members of a Christian army.  
Frequently cited as a compelling justification for the removal of the Taliban in Afghanistan 
and Saddam Hussein in Iraq has been the liberation of women in those countries. For George 
W. Bush and his religious allies, this rhetoric limited women’s freedom to western practices, 
and situated liberation within a colonial discourse (Ferguson and Marso, 2007: 222). The 
image of the fully veiled Muslim woman emerged as a powerful symbolic justification for the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, despite the devastation and loss that such military action would 
visit upon those women. As Hirschkind and Mahmood (2002) assert: “the twin figures of the 
Islamic fundamentalist and his female victim helped consolidate and popularize the view that 
such hardship and sacrifice were for Afghanistan’s own good.” The subordinated Muslim 
woman became a central figure on which American military action was rationalised and 
marketed to the American people. A fixation on the myopic goal of lifting the burqa and 
consequently freeing Afghan women exemplified the superficial short-termism of the broader 
United States military campaign.  
Prominent American feminists were often complicit in this narrative, colluding with 
imperialist efforts by the United States State Department to end “gender apartheid” in 
Afghanistan. The most prominent example can be found in the Feminist Majority 
Foundation’s (FMF) controversial support of the Bush administration’s rhetoric on 
subjugated women in Afghanistan. The feminist group’s president, Eleanor Smeal, urged 
President Bush in 2002 to expand security forces or risk witnessing the region “descend into 
chaos”, adding that full equality for women “is an essential part of the war on terrorism.” 
Smeal also spoke gleefully about the inclusion of women in every level of the Air Force and 
Navy, stating optimistically that women’s participation made Afghanistan “a different kind of 
war” (in Ferguson and Marso, 2007: 134). Ann Russo’s (2006) piece on the intersections of 
feminism and imperialism in the United States is scathing in its critique of Smeal’s brand of 
militarised feminism. Russo asserts that FMF’s support of military action as a means of 
establishing equality between the sexes simply reified the West’s terms of gender equality 
and its own superiority, seriously implicating the FMF campaign in the rhetoric legitimising 
the expansion of the United States empire (p. 576).  
When feminists in the West fail to acknowledge that an exclusively sex-based interpretation 
of oppression is inadequate, and that in fact incorporating considerations of how white 
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supremacy, capitalism and imperialism interlace is crucial to overcoming the oppression of 
women across borders, they unwittingly become appealing targets of appropriation for pro-
war conservatives seeking to justify an offensive in the Middle East using whatever 
persuasive material is on offer. Indeed, CWA relies heavily on feminist rhetoric to reinforce 
their campaign against Islamic ideology, which they call “the real war on women”, in contrast 
to the American feminist movement’s framing of the erosion of reproductive freedoms as a 
war on women (Nance, 2015). Nevertheless, when mainstream feminist groups such as the 
FMF begin to endorse the rationale and practices underlying the world’s most powerful 
military waging war in the Middle East, they cannot avoid entering a tacit rhetorical coalition 
with those in the Republican Party and on the Christian Right who see a holy war in the futile 
pursuit of dismantling terrorist ideology. 
     Contraception 
 
A further colonisation of feminist rhetoric by the Christian Right has centred in recent years 
on the contentious issue of contraception, especially emergency contraception, commonly 
referred to as ‘Plan B’ or ‘the morning-after pill’. In April 2013 a federal judge ruled in 
Tummino v. Hamburg that all females, regardless of age, should have direct access to 
emergency contraception without a prescription. While laden with a number of moral 
ramifications, from the facilitation of casual sex to the abortifacient effect of such a drug, the 
response instead from women’s groups on the Right was to frame the debate using language 
that conveyed an ethos of care for women, by highlighting the potentially negative health 
implications emergency contraception might have on their bodies.  
Using science and concern for women’s health, conservative women’s groups emphasised the 
ineffectiveness of the drug for women who weigh over 79 kilograms, and stressed that a drug 
forty times as powerful as the combined oral contraceptive pill – which requires a 
prescription from a doctor – should not be accessible over-the-counter. CWA warned that 
simplified access to the drug would mean it winds up in the hands of “predators who exploit 
young girls”, in sum, “a pimp, predator, and pedophile’s dream – unlimited access to Plan 
B.”31 Rather than expanding women’s freedom and choice, as advocates of the drug argued, 
conservative women’s groups constructed an alternative feminist narrative that framed 
                                                          
31 Concerned Women for America 2013, Concerned Women for America responds to justice department 
dropping age restrictions on plan B, retrieved July 2014, <http://www.cwfa.org/concerned-women-for-america-
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emergency contraception as a tool of oppression, causing potentially harmful effects on the 
bodies of girls and erasing some of the evidence of abuse when it has occurred.  
Wynn and Trussell (2006) argue that in American politics women’s bodies are frequently 
used as ‘sites of control’ where the politics of sexuality, public health, and medical 
constructions of biological processes intersect. They argue that while the Christian Right has 
chosen to couch their arguments concerning emergency contraception in terms that revolve 
around biomedical definitions of reproductive processes, as well as concern for women’s 
health, these science-based arguments “deviously [mask] an underlying moral stance” chiefly 
concerned with policing women’s bodies and zygotic bodies (p. 314).  
The recent conservative co-option of feminist arguments on the issue of emergency 
contraception runs parallel with an emerging feminist critique of hormonal contraception that 
challenges the long-running and prevailing feminist orthodoxy which has regarded the 
invention of the contraceptive pill as a defining moment in the evolution of women’s rights. 
Feminists such as Holly Grigg-Spall, author of Sweetening the Pill (2013) argue that the 
contraceptive pill has been able to escape fair critique from the feminist movement, and 
because of this, the side effects of hormonal contraception produced by pharmaceutical 
companies are not being adequately scrutinised. “We’ve come to see the pill as synonymous 
with women’s liberation” claims Grigg-Spall, “but it’s actually very much a part of the 
capitalist patriarchal social structure, and an extension of the misogyny that’s been present in 
the medical industry for a long time.”32 In many respects Grigg-Spall’s argument is 
indistinguishable from the Christian Right’s emerging pro-woman perspective on 
contraception, despite Grigg-Spall’s stance being grounded in a feminist analysis. 
In other feminist quarters a critical analysis of the abortion drug RU-486 has emerged, with 
the publication of a book by radical feminists Renate Klein, Janice G. Raymond and Lynette 
Dumble (2013) which argues that the drug ‘privatises and de-medicalises’ the abortion 
process, and poses risks to the woman’s body that have been largely overlooked by feminist 
proponents of the drug. This feminist critique shares with the conservative opposition to the 
contraceptive pill a distrust of mainstream science and the medical establishment.  
                                                          
32 Sweetening the pill: have we failed to be sufficiently critical of birth control? 2013, podcast, November 6, 
Feminist Current, <http://www.feministcurrent.com/2013/11/06/podcast-sweetening-the-pill-have-we-failed-to-
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Within feminism there is a history of epistemological debates surrounding established 
scientific canons, with a number of key feminist researchers questioning scientific inquiry in 
the male-centred sciences with respect to women, and also focusing on the need to 
emancipate women from the kinds of scientific practices which continue to oppress them 
(Kitzinger, 1990; Lerner, 1976; Reinharz, 1984; Star, 1979). One of the key challenges for 
feminist scholars has been interrupting the ongoing use of the universal ‘man’ who represents 
the object of study in most scientific inquiry in both the hard and soft sciences.  
Feminist scholars have attempted to introduce a new politics of ‘woman’ that examines areas 
such as kinship, psychology, work, and politics from a female perspective (Ross, 1996: 70). 
In achieving this, they have had to counter the othering of women in the sciences, and 
reconceptualise the notion of the male as the default sex, or the “template for normative 
humanity” (Bolich, 2007: 183) through which all scientific analysis should be principally 
concerned.  
New feminist approaches sought to make women the foremost object of study, women’s 
personal experiences the source of data, and the body rather than the mind the subject of 
analysis (Ross, 1976). The feminist critique of hormonal contraception draws on this woman-
centred epistemological approach and has appealed to conservative opponents who are 
demonstrating an increasing willingness to frame their arguments in the language of science 
and women’s rights, as long as the argument aligns with their pre-existing ideological 
position. Similarly, with respect to pornography, new approaches to scientific inquiry which 
decentre the traditionally masculinist characteristics of scientific culture are underpinning 
both feminist and Christian Right antipornography discourses.  
Rather than examining the harms of pornography from a masculinist perspective concerned 
with preserving the patriarchal family by, say, examining the relationship between 
pornography and marital breakdown, new feminist methods reproduced by those on the 
Christian Right instead aim to demonstrate substantial proof of the various harms done to 
women in pornography through the use of empirical data to lend scientific weight to their 
claims.  
The examples above demonstrate how the Christian Right and other elements of the Right 
have developed their own strain of pro-woman politics that repositions notions of equality, 
subjugation, dominance, and choice to fit conservative policy prescriptions. These interest 
groups have not had to decelerate or cease campaigning on these core issues, which are as 
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vociferous today as at any other point in the last fifty years. To the contrary, the groups are 
moving towards broadening the legitimacy and mainstream acceptance of a right-wing social 
agenda by adopting themes from their ideological opposites in order to appeal to those in the 
political centre.   
In addition to parallels with other areas of conservative activism, the current landscape of 
conservative and feminist positions on pornography has historical parallels with an earlier 
moral crusade which united feminists and the religiously devout: the movement against the 
drink. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Strategic and rhetorical parallels: antipornography campaign and the 
temperance movement  
 
As with the rhetorical parallels on abortion, contraception, gun control, and foreign policy, 
the temperance movement offers a crucial insight into how rhetoric and strategies from 
progressive causes can be seized upon by moral reformists on a range of policy fronts. The 
temperance movement began in the early nineteenth century in response to concerns about 
the harmful effects of alcohol on individuals, families, and the broader community (Gusfield, 
1986). The movement was significant and worth noting in this study for five key reasons. 
Firstly, temperance was led primarily by women and formed a foundation upon which future 
movements for moral reform could transpire. Secondly, temperance saw the convergence of 
first-wave feminists and Christian conservative activists whose ideological underpinnings 
differed, but whose goals were analogous, in similar fashion to the modern-day 
antipornography movement. Thirdly, alcoholism was framed in distinctly sexed terms, as a 
vehicle for vice that hypersexualised the women who consumed it, and caused men to act 
more impetuously on their sexual impulses. Fourthly, there was a strong status element to the 
activities of temperance campaigners, constituting a power play by “old middle class” powers 
in the face of urbanisation, immigration, and industrial capitalism that has parallels with 
contemporary perceptions of antipornography campaigners as predominantly white, middle 
class, well-educated women desperately clinging on to heteronormative traditions. Lastly, 
and highly pertinent to this study, the temperance movement saw the Christian Right 
adopting many ideas promoted by feminist activists within the movement, including 
recognition of the vulnerable position women were put in, in terms of their safety, when men 
drink to excess.  
The fate of the temperance movement has enduring implications for today’s activists on both 
the Left and Right engaged in antipornography politics and is a legacy worth appreciating. 
Temperance offers deeper insights into the way a defence of “moral values” and the 
preservation of the domestic sphere interact with a progressive, women’s rights agenda when 
both schools of thought have an eye to the same overarching goal. 
Other writers have drawn their own comparisons between early temperance reform efforts 
and today’s antipornography movement. The two campaigns were both mutually imbued by 
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their adherents’ sense of status discontent, and a perceived threat to the dominance and 
prestige of the lifestyle to which they were committed, posits Zurcher et al. (1971, 1976). 
During the temperance era, this status politics was expressed primarily through pitting rural 
Americans against those in urban centres. Rural America represented the self-control and 
industriousness revered by temperance reformers, whereas the cities inspired people to 
succumb to their baser instincts and valorised such behaviour. It is not Zurcher et al.’s 
contention that modern-day antipornography politics is a simple replication of the earlier 
temperance movement. Rather, antiporn campaigners have engaged in a form of status 
politics that, rather than focusing on rural versus urban demographics as temperance 
crusaders did, is very much preoccupied with the struggle between traditionalism and the 
deviance at the heart of modern life.  
Another perspective, offered by Wagner (1997) argues that antipornography politics 
constitutes a kind of “new temperance” obsessed with once again regulating and repressing 
apparently deviant personal behaviour. The neo-Puritan ideology of modern day social 
conservatives has a heritage that has been remarkably consistent, Wagner contends. Whether 
applied to pornography, alcohol or drugs, what is common to all of these campaigns is the 
enforcement of religious-cultural condemnation and coercion. It is a politics of intolerance.  
In a persuasive essay on nineteenth-century sexual thought, leading historians on women’s 
history Dubois and Gordon (1983) question whether the profound disappointment of what has 
passed for “sexual liberation” has caused some feminists to replicate the sexual politics of 
earlier temperance activists, which focused too exclusively on the dangerous aspects of 
sexuality and risks mirroring the narrow, one-dimensional concept of sex advocated by 
conservatives. Tilly and Gurin (1990) also found the temperance analogy useful, arguing that 
like temperance’s attempt to remove liquor but leave unchanged property and marriage laws, 
pornography legislation attempts to remove a manifestation, but not the underlying cause, of 
women’s pain (p. 524). 
The activities of temperance activists were, for much of the twentieth century, ignored by 
feminist scholars. Their dismissal of temperance women as significant contributors to 
women’s emancipation was supplanted by a focus on women’s involvement in antislavery 
reform, which was framed as the predominant source of women’s activism throughout the 
nineteenth century (Martin, 2008). This is despite the mounting evidence that the temperance 
movement played a significant role in the unfolding struggle for suffrage and women’s rights. 
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Martin (2008) posits that feminist scholars overlooked the significance of the connection 
between temperance and women’s rights due, in part, to many of the most radical elements of 
the temperance movement exiting in the early 1850s before easing off in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century. In addition, the ideological allegiances of many temperance women were 
an uncomfortable reality for feminist historians, who preferred to find their intellectual and 
moral forebear among the ranks of abolitionists, rather than prohibitionists (p. 6).  
Whether the political roots of temperance reform lie in conservatism or a more radical 
prospect have been disputed in two rivalling historical accounts of the movement. For 
Norman H. Clark (1976), prohibition was conservative from start to finish. It disrupted social 
problems with alarm, and always held at its centre the survival of the nuclear family, making 
it an inherently conservative cause. But for Jack S. Blocker (1976), a glimmer of hope in the 
1880s that prohibition might lend itself to addressing more radical social problems which 
beleaguered the lower classes were short-lived but nevertheless significant, with considerable 
evidence that its adherents were sensitised to a wide range of social transformation 
objectives, some of which social conservatives found most objectionable (Blodgett, 1977). 
Disputes over the political essence of antipornography politics have similarly characterised 
much of the debate in the last thirty years. Many on the Left have struggled to reconcile a 
feminist politics which seeks to challenge existing models of sexual expression with the 
assumption underpinning much of the Left’s approach to sexuality – that all forms of sexual 
expression are healthy and that to question this assumption is bigoted and harmful.  
The guiding ethos of the temperance movement is not confined to the nineteenth-century call 
for stricter laws on alcohol. Rather, temperance can be viewed as a broader code of conduct 
that regulates human behaviour and prevents it from going into a world of ‘sin’, and is 
therefore a useful point of comparison for this study. A notion as applicable to pornography 
as it was to alcohol as it deals with man’s need to constantly suppress a temptation to fall into 
sin. Temperance merely means “avoiding ruin,” and is believed by Christians to be a core 
virtue, preventing people from acting on ‘dangerous’ urges. For example, the Catholic News 
Agency’s (CNA) explanation of this virtue reads: “Temperance enables us to keep from 
doing what is wrong, even when we have strong feelings for it. In other words, temperance is 
what keeps us from sinning, even when we want to.”33 Alcohol and lust are two forms of 
                                                          
33 Catholic News Agency 2013, Temperance, Catholic News Agency, viewed June 2013, 
<http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/resources/virtue/cardinal-virtues/temperance/>. 
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intemperance one must be constantly wary of. That is because drunkenness, CNA charges, 
takes “our beautiful nature, a masterpiece of creation” and contorts it into “something ugly.” 
Inebriation is seen as a direct form of self-debasement.  
Using similar prose, CNA cautions against succumbing to lust, adding that “pornography, or 
any visual sexual objectification of a person is [a] widespread form of lust.” Drunkenness and 
the use of pornography are, according to this doctrine, both sinful because they are selfish 
and pleasure-seeking. In Lyman Beecher’s (1833) six sermons on intemperance, often 
believed to be the precipitating event leading to the establishment of the American 
Temperance Society, he refers to alcohol as the “the sin of our land.” Berkeley Fletcher 
(2008) elaborates on Beecher’s point, stating: “it [alcohol] encroached upon the lives of 
individual citizens and turned them into loathsome, irrational, and poverty-stricken drunks, 
alcohol threatened to stunt the political, economic, social, and moral progress of the nation, 
defeating all utopian possibilities” (p. 8).  
Temperance was a perfectionist reform, driven by a belief that the material world is 
perfectible. This idea was especially advocated by the utopian Christian Shaker movement, 
who believed shunning tawdry or frivolous excesses constituted a profound act of worship, 
and lists Temperance and frugality as cardinal virtues of its ‘Society’ (Evans, 1867: 44). With 
God’s grace, people could speed the coming of the millennium by improving their society on 
earth (Blocker, 1988: 22). Temperance emanated from religious trends, and linked individual 
perfectibility to greater societal improvements. The perfectionism and benevolence at the 
heart of temperance was indebted to the legacy of John Wesley and the subsequent spread of 
Methodism in the United States (Yrigoyen and Daugherty, 1996). While some strains of 
Christianity had emphasised spiritual health over the preservation of the body, Wesley 
believed the body was a gift from God and must be cared for. Therefore the toll intoxicating 
beverages took on the body was stressed repeatedly in The Methodist temperance magazine 
(1872) who suggested nothing short of total abstinence for those hoping to recover their 
organs and circulatory system from the ravages of alcohol. Optimistically convinced of the 
ability of each individual to achieve salvation, Methodism differed greatly from the Calvinist 
tradition which believed in the innate depravity of human beings (Opp, 2005: 20). The 
perfectionist impulse underlying temperance enabled the strong involvement by women in 
the movement. Regarded as the more virtuous sex, women seemed like the natural stewards 
of a message encouraging people to appeal to their higher self. 
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The temperance movement allowed for the reconfiguration of traditional gender roles in 
political activism. The movement began as a male-led idea transfixed by the concept of the 
‘self-made man’, but later transformed into a movement dominated by women, a process 
which radically shifted the political influence of women in the United States (Berkeley 
Fletcher, 2008; Epstein, 1981). The legacy of the temperance movement in normalising 
women’s involvement in prominent political campaigns not only set the stage for later 
developments in women’s political activity, but it gave birth to a particular style of women’s 
political engagement that has many parallels with conservative women’s activism on 
pornography today. In both cases, the themes of family and nationalism are the prisms 
through which much of the political rhetoric is filtered. 
But before the significance of temperance activism on women’s status in the United States 
could be realised, middle-class ideologues were expressing concern in the mid-to-late 1840s 
about women’s true intentions and motives in supporting temperance reform. What had 
begun as a respectable, middle-class cause honouring the separate male and female spheres 
now threatened to encourage women to move beyond the domestic sphere to militate for their 
rights (Martin, 2008: 142-143). Soon, women temperance activists began calling for 
protection for married women’s earnings against the profligacy of drunken husbands, as well 
as engaging in other forms of political advocacy on the issue of prohibition seen to be 
overstepping the boundaries of appropriate conduct for women. One Virginian resident 
complained in 1853 that temperance reform had prompted women’s rights societies “to invest 
the frail and modest part of the race with the political power of men” (in Martin, 2008: 143). 
It was thought that the radical instincts of a few women’s rights activists had co-opted the 
entire movement. The “sisterhood” of temperance reform with the abolition of slavery and 
women’s rights caused a decline in women’s participation in temperance in the mid-
nineteenth century because of perceptions that the movement was heading in an all too 
radical direction. It was not until the rise of the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union 
(WCTU) in the 1870s that women re-engaged in organised political action against the drink, 
by which time the women’s rights movement had shifted attitudes – and laws – to such an 
extent that a more politicised temperance was better tolerated.  
Before women started forming their own temperance organisations, their presence in the 
movement was approved of by male leaders who saw temperance work as a natural extension 
of women’s nurturing instincts with respect to home life. Sons carefully reared by godly 
women were falling victim to the scourge of liquor. The recourse proposed involved devout 
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women dispersing into institutions rife with fallen men so they could evangelise to the 
nation’s broken sons. Prisons, police stations and railroad terminals were regularly visited, as 
were vulnerable populations such as sailors, soldiers, and lumbermen (Grenz and Kjesbo, 
1995: 50). Given that temperance aligned itself with religious principles, it possessed 
benevolence sufficient to warrant women’s involvement (Lasser et al, 2010). Its values of 
morality, virtue and self-sacrifice were neatly aligned with those characteristics believed to 
be inherently female, while the masculine traits of greed, selfishness and ambition were 
counterintuitive to abstention from alcohol consumption.  
Men were imagined to be inherently virile and intractable by nature, and women’s crucial 
function, therefore, was in tempering these masculine traits. One can see the parallels 
between this narrative on alcohol and the way pornography is imagined by its opponents. 
Duggan and Hunter (1995) highlighted this in their assessment of an antipornography hearing 
that was held in Suffolk, New York in 1984 in which the Dworkin-MacKinnon 
antipornography ordinance was being proposed. They assert that the hearing included hordes 
of men lined up to discuss the way in which pornography had ‘made them’ brutalise their 
wives and commit acts of sexual assault on their daughters (p. 70). The extent to which 
pornography played a genuine role in these acts of violence is not the question – indeed it 
may have helped revive such impulses in the men – but rather, the authors point to the 
particular similarities between the remedy put forth by the antipornography campaigners and 
those who participated in the earlier temperance movement:  
The remedy for these problems was not more aggressive prosecution of rape and 
sexual assault. Their remedy was antipornography law. They confessed their acts of 
violence, but did not hold themselves accountable. Instead, they displaced 
responsibility for their acts onto pornography in exactly the way that is so familiar to 
people who have looked closely at the temperance campaign (Duggan and Hunter, 
1995: 70) 
If temperance and antipornography movement activists share the assumption that men are 
indeed intractable and aggressive by nature – easily tempted by objects of sin – then the 
abolition remedy makes good sense. It is not enough to tighten laws around the punishment 
of bad behaviour if the objects of intemperance are still so pervasively present in society. 
Greek and Thompson (1992) elaborate on the assumption of innate male aggressiveness, and 
offer a sound explanation on the origins of the Christian Right opposition to pornography and 
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other forms of intemperance. They suggest that St. Augustine’s commentary on the actual 
character of God’s punishment of Adam’s sin reveals a very gender-specific assessment. On 
the subject of lust, the authors posit that St. Augustine believed “only men appear to suffer 
this affliction,” while women are merely the objects of lust, victims of men’s wayward 
inclination towards sin. As men’s use of alcohol underscored women’s vulnerability in the 
nineteenth century, so pornography is seen as underlying female weakness today. The 
catalyst changed, but the narrative is remarkably consistent. In both cases, the inner-worldly 
sinfulness of man consists in the fact that “he is unable to wilfully control his own sexuality” 
and hence “males are potential victims of whatever might arouse their sexual desires” (Greek 
and Thompson, 1992: 604). 
However, masculinity was not wholly shunned into disrepute, it had a crucial function, and 
temperance activists were concerned that drunkenness would undermine this function. 
Masculinity was believed to be linked to independence and femininity to dependence. 
Therefore, the threat alcohol posed was that it could render a man dependent on the substance 
– an emasculating prospect. Berkeley Fletcher adds: “[…] a man’s bibulous demise 
occur[red] through his dependency and failure to provide – his being made feminine” 
(Berkeley Fletcher, 2008: 14). The framing of alcohol as a feminising agent by temperance 
reformers was an attempt to undermine the belief held by working class men that drinking 
was an integral part of their identity. To these men, the unruly, boisterous effects of liquor 
were seen as congruent with the rugged anti-establishment ethos of working class culture: 
On the railroads and in other workplaces drinking figured as part of a “rough” style of 
masculinity that emphasized “manly” confrontations with the rigors and dangers of 
the job, defiance of management, and consumption of alcohol (Taillon, 2002: 320). 
From its earliest inception, temperance had no interest in valorising the culture of the 
working class and its attendant drunkenness, and thus set about conflating alcohol with an 
emasculated state. As Taillon (2002) notes, this strategy was not received particularly well by 
many working men, who regarded the rhetoric of temperance as indistinguishable from 
middle class “bourgeois” expectations of strict bodily control, and an unrealistic strive toward 
financial betterment.  
Within the rigid gender politics of nineteenth-century America, the prospect that adhering to 
temperance principles would somehow bring these men closer to the virtues of women was 
perhaps the most unnerving threat to their masculinity. In a sense, pornography has been 
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traditionally caught up in a similar wave of angst concerning the preservation of hegemonic 
masculinity. Many saw manhood as being corrupted and weakened by feminising forces in 
the permissive, peace-loving 1960s, and worse by the advent of the second-wave of feminism 
in the following two decades. Rather than pinpointing changes to the global economy and the 
industrial manufacturing sector as the catalysts for men’s declining ability to independently 
provide for their families, many men blamed second-wave feminists for taking away their 
social and economic status (Lee, 2014). In response to this sense of emasculinisation, 
masculinity has undergone a cultural resurgence. The excess, impulsivity, recklessness and 
lasciviousness so integral to the hegemonic masculine identity have come to represent a pre-
feminist form of masculinity that must be recovered in the service of maintaining male status 
and dignity.  
Pornography figures centrally in the recovery and maintenance of hegemonic masculinity 
because it is seen as a vehicle for male dominance. Pornography tends to portray men in 
stereotypically dominant heterosexual roles, while simultaneously objectifying and 
subjugating women and non-dominant forms of masculinity (Johansson and Hammaren in 
Kahn, 2009). Therefore, the decline of pornography and of manhood are inextricably linked. 
As the drink came to symbolise a vestige of a threatened working class culture in the 
nineteenth century, pornography and the pornification of western culture is a reassertion of 
male dominance – a form of sexual antagonism, which is occurring within the broader 
context of a reconfiguration of gender roles. 
     The problem of female drunkards 
 
Temperance conceptualised drunkenness and its sinful consequences to be an almost 
exclusively male problem. The harm caused by alcoholism was attributed to men, which 
confused the narrative whenever women were seen to be participating in the act of drinking. 
The concept of a drunkard woman became almost entirely absent from the American 
imagination. Any woman seen in a drunken state publicly was immediately shunned as a 
moral degenerate, and invariably presumed to be working class (Crowley, 1994: 117). 
Crowley argues that this idea of alcoholism as an exclusively male problem engendered 
sexed implications for women who participated in the consumption of alcohol: “the alcoholic 
female was oversexed (a slut)” (p. 118). In an Australian example from 1841, which 
paralleled the views held by many American temperance reformers that alcohol 
hypersexualised women, Governor Gipps of New South Wales sounds the alarm: 
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[…] that woman should renounce the tenderness of her nature, belie the softness of 
her sex, stoop from her high station […] that she should herself be the victim of 
intemperance; that woman should herself be guilty of the bestiality of drunkenness; 
but this indeed could hardly be, for ere it can arrive, the creature is unsexed, the soft 
and endearing name of woman shall no longer be applied to her; call her fiend-fury-
Hecate or invent some new term of insult in the language; to designate a thing so 
fallen, and so vile. There is nothing in the whole catalogue of crime, so thoroughly 
revolting as drunkenness in a woman; there is no object of disgust or horror that 
offends the sight of God or man, so entirely loathsome as a drunken woman. 
(Windschuttle in Leigh, 1995: 1) 
Intemperance and sexual immorality were seen as confederate problems. The Reverend 
Stephen Badger explained: “If one dies, the other will restore it to life. They must both stand 
or fall together” (Martin, 2008: 26). The belief that male lust was inevitable ensured that 
women’s transgressions amounted to a far more serious matter than men’s. Because men’s 
propensity for sexual sin was conceived as natural, women who engaged in lewd behaviour 
were perceived as much more cunning and deliberate in their actions, having stepped outside 
of their natural environment. From both ends of the social spectrum, commentators laid the 
blame for men’s transgressions at the feet of the women who seduced them (p. 29).  
Due to the conflation of alcohol with lewd behaviour, many temperance adherents were also 
actively involved in efforts to stigmatise sex for nonprocreative purposes. Gusfield’s (1986) 
seminal work on the temperance movement as a symbolic crusade brings this to light. He 
notes that the movements against alcohol enlisted many who were also partisans of the 
movements for sexual purity and against prostitution (p. 197). The concern regarding the 
relationship between alcoholism and sexual misconduct was not without reason. As Brosnki 
(2011) reveals, many saloon owners would rent rooms to prostitutes or keep brothels above 
their businesses. Organised prostitution was commonly a family business, with married 
couples running brothels. Historian Beryl Satter notes that even women considered 
progressive “agreed with more conservative women activists that male lust damaged society, 
and that female virtue would improve it” (Satter, 1999: 112). The more conservative 
adherents of the social purity crusade campaigned to censor the press, raise the age of 
consent, and close brothels. Those with more progressive leanings in the movement 
encouraged sex education as a means of improving the public understanding of sexuality. 
Better pay for women was also promoted, in turn attacking the economic necessity which 
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drove many women to prostitution. Although converging on a single issue, ideologically 
diverse adherents pursued an assortment of strategies to curtail the drink.  
But rather than reducing female drunkenness, a backlash against the taboo of drinking 
generated by temperance reformers has actually seen a significant increase in women’s 
drinking habits since prohibition (Gusfield, 1986). Analogously, antipornography activism 
oversaw an exacerbation of the very behaviour it intended to extirpate. Ariel Levy (2005) 
asserts that although the second-wave of feminism intended to transform cultural mores 
dictating that women’s sexuality must function on men’s terms, the movement actually 
witnessed the advent of even more exploitative attitudes towards women’s bodies. This 
outcome was crafted by pornographers who successfully co-opted feminist language and 
reconceptualised sexual performances for men as a source of women’s liberation. Terms like 
‘empowerment’ and ‘liberation’ were initially used by feminists in the context of casting off 
the limitations imposed upon women, but these terms were appropriated by pornographers 
like Playboy’s Hugh Hefner and used to substitute one previously strictly defined role for 
women with another – the “lusty, busty exhibitionist” (p. 200). Andrea Dworkin (1978) 
attributes this unintended outcome to the so-called sexual revolution of the 1960s. Dworkin 
argues that women were attracted to the myths of sexual radicalism for its promises of 
reduced gender polarity: “a dream of being less female in a world less male; an eroticization 
of sibling equality, not the traditional male dominance.” However, while the movement 
claimed dichotomous notions of gender would erode under a single standard of sexual-
liberation practice, sexuality was still defined in classically male terms. Male dominance 
persisted under the guise of liberation, and women continued to be objectified and turned into 
commodities for pornography amidst the triumph of neoliberalism in the 1980s. Dworkin 
(1978) contends, “Its purpose--it turned out--was to free men to use women without 
bourgeois constraints, and in that it was successful” (p. 91). In both instances, it seems, the 
temperance and antipornography movements’ achieved limited long-term success, instead 
seeing their aims subverted by the strength of capitalism. 
     Preserving middle-class respectability 
 
In addition to regulating lustful excess spurred by alcohol, temperance was a vehicle for the 
management of urban social problems and the valorisation of the middle class. The prosperity 
promised by a capitalist market economy and favoured by temperance reformers had also led 
to the rapid industrialisation of urban spaces; the death of small communities through the 
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collapse of small, family-run enterprises; and a subsequent increase in prostitution, 
drunkenness, and mass immigration and migration which had manifested in the emergence of 
poverty-stricken enclaves throughout America’s urban centres. This new urban reality 
frightened people who were accustomed to small-town, agricultural ways of life, and as 
Gusfield (1986) writes: 
It threatened the social position of those who strongly identified their social status 
with dominance in the small-town image of the community. Religion bolstered this 
uneasiness and directed attention toward the ill-effects of industrialism in a context 
which stressed both moral and economic betterment. The maintenance of the old 
norms of Temperance, as ideal or reality, was one way to insure their continued 
prestige (p. 80). 
Intemperance itself became the symbolic impediment to middle class status. A 1889 Union 
Signal article exemplifies the belief at the time that the middle class typified moral 
perfectionism and ought to be emulated: “the class least touched by the evil thus far is that 
which here, as elsewhere in the land, forms its bone and sinew – the self-respecting and self-
supporting class whose chief pleasures in life center in and about the home” (p. 3).  
Despite a proud identification with middle-class values, temperance reformers were also 
aware that the middle-class was plagued by inner-conflict over the implications of an 
increasingly unrestrained capitalist economy, which on the one hand embodied the 
entrepreneurial spirit which drives ordinary men to work hard and succeed, and on the other 
hand inspires a narrow pursuit of profit, requiring the abandonment of familial 
responsibilities. It was in the rum selling profession that the unease felt by temperance 
reformers concerning the contradictions of capitalism and temperance were perhaps best 
encapsulated. Temperance reformers scolded rum sellers for engaging in a profession whose 
sole purpose was to make money without a care for the betterment of mankind, exposing the 
nuances of middle-class culture and its relationship to the market revolution (Berkley 
Fletcher, 2008: 11).  
Today, those on the Christian Right are embroiled in a similar tension, on the one hand 
favouring laissez-faire capitalism, and on the other detesting the pornography-saturated 
culture it produces. Speaking on the supposed complementarity of Christianity and the Bible, 
Jerry Falwell (1981) has stated “The free enterprise system is clearly outlined in the Book of 
Proverbs in the Bible. […] Ownership of property is Biblical. Competition in business is 
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Biblical. Ambitious and successful business management is clearly outlined as part of God’s 
Plan for His people” (p. 13).  
This belief that capitalism is religiously ordained has been the cornerstone of Christian Right 
orthodoxy (Himmelstein, 1983: 23). And yet the pursuit of profit clearly has its limits where 
moral suasion is concerned. An inclination to support righteous causes before profitability is 
evident in the antipornography discourse of many Christian Right groups. For example, in 
2011 FOF praised Texas billionaire and Christian Robert Rowling for his decisions to 
withdraw pornographic films from his chain of hotels, “his decisions was made on moral, not 
financial grounds” the group claims.34 Despite assured hits to its bottom line, CWA has 
pleaded with Target stores to end their sales of “Fifty Shades of Grey” themed sex toy items, 
citing ‘social responsibility’ as the central consideration.35 In an excerpt from her book, The 
Supremacists, Christian Right legend Phyllis Schlafly (2004b) lambasts the Supreme Court 
for “guarantee[ing] the profits of pornographers” through a series of decisions which have 
upheld the First Amendment rights of pornographers to continue production of their material 
(p. 83). In each example, leaders at the forefront of the contemporary Christian Right 
movement, as with the temperance reformers of old, reveal their discomfort with the prospect 
of living under an economic system which thrives at the expense of their most sacred moral 
values.  
Temperance reformers were quite happy to champion the cause of the middle-class, as are 
Christian Right opponents of pornography today, who use the symbolic power of the white, 
suburban, heteronormative, patriarchal family to promote the image of a romanticised, 
simpler era, before feminism, gay rights, and racial desegregation complicated the destiny of 
the middle-class. Remaining loyal to their economic philosophy, the Christian Right do not 
attribute the disappearing middle-class to the forces of the market, such as free trade 
agreements, automation, the outsourcing of jobs, and the redistribution of wealth from the 
middle-class to the billionaire class. Instead, it is a deviation from narrowly prescribed family 
models, toward out-of-wedlock births, premarital sex, homosexual relationships, and a 
decline in Church attendance and adherence that is chiefly responsible for the erosion of the 
                                                          
34 DeMoss, B 2011, A sinister and growing business model, Focus on the Family’s Citizen Magazine, viewed 
March 2013, < http://www.focusonthefamily.com/socialissues/citizen-magazine/life-issues/sinister-and-
growing-business-model-apr-2011>.  
35 Concerned Women for America 2015, Target is now in the business of selling sex toys? Seriously?!, 
Concerned Women for America, viewed April 2015, < http://www.cwfa.org/target-is-now-in-the-business-of-
selling-sex-toys-seriously/>. 
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middle-class. Poverty is imagined as a self-inflicted wound, more the result of an individual’s 
poor moral judgement than larger structural factors.  
Feminist antipornography campaigners have had a more complicated relationship with the 
middle-class identity, as left-wing opponents have sought to frame a belonging to the middle-
class as a point of weakness which undermines feminist claims to speak for poor and 
exploited women in the pornography industry. Sexual liberationists accused antiporn 
feminists of appropriating middle-class respectability politics through their valorisation of a 
new sexual politesse. To sexual liberationists, the moralisation of pornography was about 
more than just pornography, it was about asserting the nobility of self-control, a virtue 
reserved for the respectable classes.  
In Bound and Gagged (1996) Laura Kipnis traces the connection between antipornography 
politics and middle-class respectability: 
Pornography […] dedicates itself to offending all the bodily and sexual proprieties 
intrinsic to upholding class distinctions: good manners, privacy, the absence of 
vulgarity, the suppression of bodily instincts into polite behaviour (p. 174). 
In addition, pornography’s consistent downward focus sees it veering far from the cultural 
past times of the elite classes, such as the opera, the symphony, and gallery art – “it is the 
lowest of the cultural low” asserts Kipnis, serving only to appeal to humanity’s baser 
instincts.  
The associations with middle-class respectability might prove politically useful for those on 
the Christian Right, where an ethos of aspirational capitalism, a striving toward the 
“American dream”, underpins the philosophy of its adherents. But for antiporn feminists who 
emanate from a broader left-wing tradition which has its roots in identification with a 
disenfranchised class of women, the conflation of antipornography politics with middle-class 
respectability threatens to further erode the public image of the antipornography position 
within left-wing circles, a fate it has already suffered considerably in recent decades. The 
appropriation of antiporn feminist arguments by the Christian Right only deepens this 
perception of an intrinsic alliance between these two schools of thought. 
 
112 
 
Parallels in conflict and strategies of appropriation: temperance, woman’s suffrage, 
and pornography 
 
In addition to both temperance and the antipornography movement inciting groups of 
ideologically adversarial adherents to organise around a single issue of human weakness, the 
nineteenth-century battle against intoxicating beverages and the present-day backlash against 
pornography have both seen the conservative wing of the movement appropriating the tactics 
and language of feminism. 
This phenomenon was exemplified by WCTU, the first major organisation formed to combat 
alcohol’s effects on families. WCTU was formed in 1874 in Cleveland, Ohio, but had gained 
international influence by the 1880s.36 At the risk of unsettling relations between men and 
women, WCTU framed temperance as a means of protecting women in the home against the 
threat of violence posed by an alcohol-fuelled husband. This represented a marked shift away 
from the movement’s earlier rhetoric, which had focused on the moral, religious motive for 
temperance, and was reflective of the earlier movement’s more mixed gender composition 
(Banaszak, 2006: 5). As Martin (2008) notes, temperance women appeared to be contending 
for organisational influence, power, and pride of place, rather than solely for the cause of 
total abstinence (p. 144). These changes contributed to the impression that women’s support 
of liquor reform masked a campaign for women’s rights and a greater role in public life. 
By 1874 the temperance movement was dominated by women, and with this came a new 
discourse focusing on the power of alcohol to enflame the male temper. Frances Willard, the 
second and most enduringly influential president of WCTU revealed that her parents had a 
steel engraving hanging on their dining room wall depicting the contrast between a happy 
home which embraces temperance, and has a woman at the centre, against a “dismal, squalid 
house with a drunken man staggering in, bottle in hand” at the centre (Willard, 1889: 331). 
The newspaper Lily, founded in 1851, conflated temperance and the women’s movement on 
the basis that men commit violence against women. Lily fostered the idea that prohibition was 
a basic component of women’s rights. The newspaper cited intemperance as a “great foe to 
women’s peace and happiness,” adding that no wife should endure a husband’s “blows and 
curses, and submit to his brutish passions and lusts” (Bloomer in Alonso, 1993: 48). In this 
view, alcohol rouses a man’s violent temper, much like pornography is thought to stimulate a 
                                                          
36 National Woman’s Christian Temperance Union 2015, Early history, National Woman’s Christian 
Temperance Union, viewed April 2015, <https://www.wctu.org/history.html>. 
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man’s latent desire to sexually dominate. In addition to a focus on men’s violence against 
women, temperance reformers spoke of the need to extend feminine influence beyond its 
traditional boundaries. Frances Willard described the mission of the ideal woman as “to make 
the whole world homelike” (Willard in LeGates, 2001: 218). Mary Livermore, another 
temperance leader, called on reformers to create a “republic of women” who would “train 
women for the next great step in the evolution of humanity, when women shall sit side by 
side in government, and the nations shall learn war no more” (p. 218). These statements 
reflect a desire to transform women’s social and political standing beyond prohibition. 
At the turn of the century, WCTU had some 176,000 members, whereas the suffrage 
organisation, National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA), had just 13,000 
members (Mezvinsky, 1959: 68). The roots of WCTU’s success began to culminate just over 
two decades earlier from the fervent but brief period of activity against the drink between 
1873 and 1875, referred to as the Woman’s Crusade. Through the direct action tactics of the 
Woman’s Crusade, temperance women used the very few means of political action at their 
disposal against saloons and liquor sellers, these included prayer vigils, petition campaigns, 
demonstrations, and hymn-singing. Formed following the crusades, WCTU was able to 
capitalise on the charisma of the crusades and appropriate many of its more confrontational 
tactics for its own political ends.  
WCTU benefited from having a democratic national organisation that the more loosely 
organised crusaders did not, but it was able to broaden its appeal further by making the 
connection between temperance and larger social issues impacting women’s lives, which the 
crusaders had begun to articulate. As Epstein (1981) notes, “within the WCTU, the values 
and attitudes that had informed female evangelism and the Woman’s Crusade were carried 
forward, sharpened, and made the basis for social and political action” (p. 115). Frances 
Willard was central to this new mission. Being careful not to make overt feminist references, 
Willard nevertheless benefited from inheriting the protofeminist elements of the earlier 
crusaders, and initiated a conversation within the group about women’s equality inside and 
outside the home (p. 116).  
Willard had to tread carefully, as many within the movement remained sceptical of women’s 
rights. Progressive activist Richard T. Ely, for instance, advocated for labour reforms and 
supported labour unions, believing alcohol to be a significant part of the problem of 
inequality between the sexes. He did not, however, regard women’s exit from the home into 
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the political sphere as the remedy for such an injustice. Rather, Ely saw women walking 
away from the home as a further erosion of the family, on par with alcohol. Both fed 
inequality (Noel, 2013: 86). Willard’s strategy of appropriating feminist reform tactics while 
avoiding explicit identification with the more radical elements of early feminism defined 
much of Willard’s tenure as WCTU president. Like today’s Christian Right, WCTU’s 
political action had to be rooted in a Protestant framework. To the extent that WCTU’s 
political action intertwined with feminist politics, it was practiced as a conservative 
alternative to feminism, rather than an incarnation of it. 
As with the tension shared between feminist and social conservative activists over 
pornography in recent decades, the relationship between members of suffrage organisations 
and temperance activists was not uncomplicated. Suffragettes often looked down on the 
Crusaders whose activists they felt degraded women and whose movement caused men to 
equate suffrage with temperance (McLeod, 1986: 160). The perception that temperance and 
suffrage were intertwined had serious political consequences and for this reason was 
exploited by the liquor industry who poured vast resources into the antisuffrage campaign, 
convincing the overwhelmingly male liquor consumers that granting women the vote would 
eventually lead to a prohibition on the sale of alcoholic beverages. Indeed, this was precisely 
the temperance activists’ plan. Referring to the influence of the liquor industry in Oregon’s 
1906 suffrage election, Carrie Chapman Catt asserted that “had there been no prohibition 
movement in the United States, the women would have been enfranchised two generations 
before they were.” For women’s rights advocate Abigail Scott Duniway, the threat 
temperance posed to woman’s suffrage was so severe that she opposed any cooperation 
between the two movements (Bradley, 2005: 151). The intrinsic conservatism at the heart of 
temperance risked tainting the more radical impulse implicit in woman’s suffrage, a tension 
mirrored in contemporary liberal criticism of the supposed anti-sex sentiments underlying 
feminist opposition to pornography, which are judged as being indistinguishable from the 
religious right’s discomfort with transgressive sex (Duggan and Hunter, 1995). The 
mésalliance, so to speak, between Christian Right and antiporn feminist campaigners 
resembles what one officer of NAWSA described as an “involuntary entanglement” between 
suffragettes and temperance reformers (Benjamin, 2014: 205). In both cases, the public has 
been led to believe the movements are practically identical, creating the perception that a 
radical, progressive agenda is being subverted and weakened by its conservative counterpart. 
But it is worth considering that the opposite is just as valid a prospect – that the campaign to 
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curtail pornography exposes the Christian Right to penetration by more radical antiporn ideas 
instituted by the feminist movement. 
Temperance reformers pivoted back and forth between competing demands on women’s 
roles, which on the one hand made demands for domesticity, and on the other sought a place 
in the public realm where they could assert themselves as politicised women. While this was 
path breaking at the time, this merging of a domestic ideology premised on an idealised 
feminine identity, and a feminist ideology which acknowledged the evolving status of women 
in society has been replicated by today’s Christian Right opponents of pornography. The next 
chapter examines the re-emergence of the notion of the ‘true woman’ alongside the rise of the 
new Christian Right and how the frame of the docile, subordinate woman alchemised into a 
discourse of rights. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Competing narratives: True womanhood and empowered womanhood 
coalesce on pornography 
 
Featuring prominently in the Christian Right’s discourse on pornography is a perennially 
salient set of values premised on an idealisation of femininity which took shape in the 
nineteenth century. This set of beliefs has been referred to as the doctrine of ‘true 
womanhood’. Susan M. Cruea explains (2005) that true womanhood set forth a highly 
restrictive and narrow set of standards for the ideal woman. Importantly, the true woman 
should portray an image of delicateness and weakness. She should allow herself to be 
subservient to men, and solely devote herself to duties of the home. In the early twentieth 
century, sexuality emerged as a powerful cultural symbol of true womanhood, and with it a 
dualistic interpretation of female sexuality. “Women were either pure or promiscuous” and 
sexuality either “private and marital or public and prostituted” writes Sanday (2007). This 
rigid framing of sexuality conferred on certain women loyal to the domestic sphere a degree 
of moral superiority, but for women engaged in prostitution and pornography, the cult of true 
womanhood was a cruel ideology, equating them with the lustfulness of men and 
scapegoating them as the root of America’s moral decline.  
This chapter will explore the conservative reemphasis on the doctrine of true womanhood 
that accompanied both the rise of the new Christian Right and the second wave of feminism 
in the 1960s and 1970s. The contemporary revitalisation of the notion of separate spheres has 
occasioned a discourse on pornography that problematises the harms done to women in 
pornography using feminist, rights-based arguments, while simultaneously affirming a set of 
ideals that seeks to undermine women’s emancipation from the domestic sphere. 
     True womanhood re-emerges 
 
In 1963, the same year that Betty Friedan published The Feminine Mystique, Helen Berry 
Andelin released Fascinating Womanhood as a text to accompany a series of classes she was 
teaching with the adult education department of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints.37 The premise of Fascinating Womanhood was that women could get more fulfilment 
in a heterosexual marriage by accepting a subservient position to their husband, rather than 
                                                          
37 See Helen B Andelin Papers (1932-2000), J. Willard Marriott Library, University of Utah. 
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competing for equality. More than 400,000 women paid to access Andelin’s teachings, many 
of whom were economically dependent on their husbands and who subscribed to a 
conservative ideology (Wood, 2011: 91). Based on the strict set of moral values central to the 
nineteenth-century cult of true womanhood, the Fascinating Womanhood movement formed 
during a transformational period in the 1960s and 1970s when movements for gender equality 
were emerging as politically eminent forces. 
Fascinating Womanhood represented a social conservative backlash to the feminist 
movement, encouraging women to regard the home as their rightful place and their husband 
as their moral leader.38 Far from adopting the language of feminism, Andelin believed in a 
“benevolent form of male dominance” in which husbands reward their wife’s unremunerated 
housekeeping and childcare with financial security and relational stability (Freeman, 1979).   
In her assessment of women’s proper place, Helen Andelin encouraged her female readers to 
acquire a man’s love and affection by yielding to him and focusing an inordinate amount of 
time on maintaining his interest, a task best achieved by possessing stereotypically ‘feminine’ 
characteristics, which for Andelin meant mimicking the personality traits of a child (Coltrane, 
2000: 30). The extent to which she believed women ought to exercise these qualities was laid 
out in her book: 
We would do well to copy the manner in which children express emotions, especially 
the emotions of anger, hurt, disappointment, sympathy, tenderness and joy. I believe 
that by doing so, women can solve some of their most difficult marital problems. 
Truly fascinating women always remain somewhat little girls, regardless of their age 
[…] Every woman can become childlike, for we all have this trait somewhere in our 
nature. It is part of being a woman. Remember that it was not long ago you were a 
little girl when these traits were natural to you […] [I]f you are to be loved and treated 
like a woman, you must make him feel like a man (Andelin, 1963: 17, 35, 263, 297). 
The book goes on to endorse tactics such as voice modulation for women, which involves 
avoiding loud or firm tones, as they are strictly masculine; limiting long strides or a “heavy 
gait” as these are typical in men; and acquiring “an attitude of frail dependence upon men to 
take care of you.” Women are also encouraged to express anger in the way a child might, by 
stomping her foot, lifting her chin high and making childlike threats (Andelin in Weiss, 1995: 
                                                          
38 A modern Christian adaptation of Andelin’s ideas surfaced in Laura Doyle’s The Surrendered Wife (2001) 
which counsels women to abandon the quest for equality in order to have a happy marriage.   
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102). Cultivating a “girlish trust” in their husbands, and never appearing to “know more than 
he does” were cited as other effective ways for women to achieve marital bliss (Andelin in 
Coontz, 2011: 15).  
Contrast this with literature being published at the time by second wave feminists, which 
encouraged women to be louder, more assertive, and to occupy traditionally male spaces 
(Bird, 1969; Firestone, 1970; Greer, 1970) and the chasm between the two conflicting 
ideologies could not be clearer. What is more, feminist literature during this period was often 
explicit in its intent to reconceptualise women as bearers of sexual energy. Greer’s The 
Female Eunuch proposed that women reject the feminine socialisation which equated women 
with erotic passivity, and dared them to assume a more assertive sexual role. In Fascinating 
Womanhood, there is barely a mention of sexual intimacy. It is there in the background – 
implied – but a call to sexual submission is not spelled out. This is not entirely surprising 
given that the nineteenth-century notion of true womanhood defined women as passionless 
(Patton, 2000: 67). This shy approach was largely abandoned a decade later in Marabel 
Morgan’s (1973) The Total Woman which used the tenets of true womanhood to instruct 
wives on the specificities of feminine sexual subordination within marriage. In Right-Wing 
Women (1978), Dworkin reveals how Morgan, an evangelical Christian, manages to co-opt 
both Christian teachings and pornographic imagery in her book: 
Morgan’s achievement in The Total Woman was to isolate the basic sexual scenarios 
of male dominance and female submission and to formulate a simple set of lessons, a 
pedagogy, that teaches women how to act out those scenarios within the context of a 
Christian value system: in other words, how to cater to male pornographic fantasies in 
the name of Jesus Christ (p. 25). 
The eroticisation of subordination popularised and normalised by Morgan and Andelin in 
their contemporary reimagining of true womanhood created the problematic perception that 
the Christian Right endorsed, or at least was neutral about, the underlying power asymmetry 
in male and female sexual relationships. The Christian Right’s adoption of broad principles of 
equality, autonomy, and empowerment in their critique of pornography seems at first glance 
incommensurate with the resurrection of true womanhood. 
But in fact true womanhood offers today’s leaders on the Christian Right a narrative on sex 
and sexuality that appeals to moral imperatives and male headship, and also a way of 
protecting female vulnerability that conveys an ethos of care for women’s sexual autonomy. 
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“True womanhood was the only power that stood between man’s destructive sexual impulse 
and the order of the home” writes Nancy F. Cott (1993). For the women who convincingly 
embodied the cardinal virtues of true womanhood – piety, purity, submissiveness and 
domesticity – there was a fragile form of power within their grasp. In practice, this power 
meant virtuous women became the moral guardians of society. Within the unstable, rapidly 
industrialising economy, Americans took comfort in clinging to the highly valued ideals of 
domesticity and respectability these women embodied. This perception of women’s moral 
superiority imbued them with a restricted form of power. This was useful to Willard and 
other temperance reformers who could make the case that women, representing the good 
conscience of Victorian society, had a special duty to protect their country, and therefore 
required the vote (Epstein, 1981: 4).  
The notion of women as “the fairer sex” has been remarkably enduring, and allows leaders on 
the Christian Right to frame women as more vulnerable than men, and thus more susceptible 
to various forms of abuse. It is a clever inversion of feminist pro-woman rhetoric, which has 
tended to avoid claims about women possessing some kind of morally superior essence, 
fearing that this kind of language too closely resembles the kind of biological determinism 
that has been used to marginalise women. Dorothy Wickenden’s (1986) assertion that 
feminism is too narrowly committed to an androgynous equality that denies women’s sexual 
difference proved a scathing critique of this widely-held feminist belief. However, there are 
notable exceptions within feminism that valorise women’s difference and praise the Victorian 
ideal of separate cultural spheres (Chodorow, 1978; Gilligan, 1982; Ruddick, 1989, Tannen, 
1990). These writers propose theories of sexual difference that at certain points closely 
resemble the doctrine of true womanhood – notably that women are more relational and 
nurturing than men.  
These are theories that have made their way into feminist antipornography discourse. As the 
antiporn feminist critic Alice Echols (1983) points out, antiporn feminism relies on the 
assumption that male and female sexuality are polar opposites: “male sexuality is driven, 
irresponsible, genitally oriented, and potentially lethal. Female sexuality is muted, diffuse, 
and interpersonally oriented.” Sentiments that frequently appear in material produced by 
CWA, FOF, and EF.  
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     True womanhood and the elusive female body 
 
The key principles of true womanhood can be found in the way in which leaders on the 
Christian Right have developed discourses on the female body, having implications in terms 
of how key figures in the movement approach the issue of women and pornography. The 
female body is presented as a site of tension and paradox by the Christian Right. On the one 
hand a woman’s body is extolled for its lifebearing potential, and yet the sexual experiences 
which make this destiny possible are treated as a shameful secret. Sorin (2015) explains how 
the nineteenth-century cult of true womanhood wrestled obsessively with this paradox: 
“while religious sermons and female magazines glorified woman’s natural superiority […] 
medical research made public the mysterious insides of the “Angel in the House”’ whose 
womb and ovaries were framed as capricious, complex organs (p. 130). Women had to view 
their bodies in binary terms, as pure yet fertile, inferior yet influential, and above all as 
intrinsically unspiritual. The prevailing and paradoxical view in nineteenth-century America 
that women assert power through submission is still very much alive in the publications of 
contemporary Christian Right groups. For example, FOF argue that pornography weakens 
women’s power in the marital relationship because in situations where a husband is using 
sexually explicit material, it undermines the wife’s ability to “influence” her husband’s 
actions by cooperating with his sexual expectations.39 In both cases, women’s source of 
power is in her ability to quietly persuade the male figures in her life. 
One of the most challenging aspects of pornography for those on the Christian Right is how 
thoroughly it brings explicit depictions of the female body into public view. Female modesty 
is a highly virtuous quality, and defiance of it is nothing short of a sin. In the nineteenth 
century this meant that even female ballet dancers, whose bodies were on public display, 
were widely considered disreputable (Hanna, 2008). Since this period in history, sex has been 
annexed to the private sphere. But pornography violates this assumption by shifting the 
sacrosanct female body into the secular, visible realm where it can be known and possessed 
by anyone (Nead, 2002). Linda Williams (1989) calls this “the frenzy of the visible” wherein 
female pleasure as depicted in hard core film becomes a publicly staged “involuntary 
confession”, as distinct from a secretive pursuit stalked by feelings of shame. According to 
Williams, pornography functions as a way of circumventing the self-conscious control and 
                                                          
39 Slattery, J 2009, Your husband’s sex drive is God’s gift to you, Focus on the Family, Colorado Springs, 
viewed November 2013, <http://www.focusonthefamily.com/marriage/sex-and-intimacy/understanding-your-
husbands-sexual-needs/your-husbands-sex-drive-is-gods-gift-to-you>. 
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surveillance normally exercised by the properly socialised woman over her appearance (p. 
50). In this sense it is the ultimate defiance of true womanhood and its modern-day 
adaptations. Antiporn feminists have likewise expressed discomfort with the visibility of the 
female body in a pornographic context. They locate power in male consumers, who are the 
“bearer[s] of a gaze that humiliates” (Moreland, 2015). The way antiporn feminists had 
begun in the ‘70s and ‘80s to incorporate some essentialist notions of ‘natural’ female desire 
as romantic and passive meant the masculinised depictions of women’s bodies in 
pornography as sexually assertive and adventurous were an affront to their beliefs about the 
intrinsic superiority of women’s intimate lives (Gelder, 2004: 138). This is where the 
philosophical intersection between nineteenth-century purity mores, the Christian Right’s 
beliefs about delicate femininity, and essentialist elements of antiporn feminism are most 
pronounced. At this intersection, antiporn discourse can move fluidly between the feminist 
position and the Christian Right. 
Antiporn feminists established theories on the harms of pornography by developing their own 
perspective on the female body that sought to dismantle long-held beliefs about women’s 
bodies as possessions indistinct from any other commodity. Unlike adherents of true woman 
ideology or today’s Christian Right, antiporn feminists have attempted to deconstruct the 
various ways in which the female body has been defined and addressed as a naturally deviant 
body, “a source of moral and physical contamination” as Rich (1976) puts it, as well as the 
belief that men have proprietorship over women’s bodies (Thompson, 2001). But this did not 
prevent some antiporn feminists from adopting their own binary tropes which portrayed men 
as inherently threatening and aggressive and women as sexually passive. This revived the 
female body as a site of public debate – a space onto which collective anxieties about the 
family, the church, and the state could be engraved. Leaders on the Christian Right have been 
able to identify these areas of rhetorical convergence where antiporn feminists have used 
dichotomous and essentialising language to describe the threat pornography poses to women.  
     The enduring narrative of separate spheres 
 
The cult of true womanhood rose to prominence in a period of material uncertainty, “where 
fortunes rose and fell with frightening rapidity” writes Welter (1966: 152). The rapidly 
evolving social, political, and economic conditions of the United States between 1820 and 
1860 imbued women with the moral and political responsibility to remain a hostage in their 
own home for the good of the country. The re-emergence of the true woman doctrine under 
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the auspices of the new Christian Right came at a similarly pivotal time where unfolding 
struggles for women’s rights, black civil rights, and gay rights were competing with 
advocates of traditional values for cultural and political eminence.  
Because true womanhood was associated with civilisation and progress, any challenges to the 
precepts of the ideology could be interpreted as a reversion to savagery (Clinton, 1994: 51). 
True women anchored the country with a sense of stability. Attempts to rewrite the meaning 
of the true woman were seen as threats to a vacillating national identity. The disjuncture 
between the image of true womanhood and the reality of increasing numbers of women 
leaving the domestic sphere to take up wage-earning work propelled the domestic myth 
further. Moreover, the dreary nature of women’s paid work, repetitive, menial, and providing 
little opportunity to procure a living wage, reinforced the importance of true womanhood 
ideology and the institution of marriage (Frager and Patrias, 2005: 150). Some scholars have 
traced how the rise in the production and visibility of pornography has coincided with the 
emergence of women from the domestic sphere, as a kind of backlash against women’s 
newfound independence. Susan Faludi (1991) highlights this in her aptly titled book 
Backlash, pointing to the sharp increase in rape, and in pornography depicting extreme 
violence against women following the rise of the women’s movement in the 1960s (p. 16).  
Rather than an ideology that transcended class divides, true womanhood was situated within a 
privileged and exclusive sector of society (Lindley, 1996). The ideology was only accessible 
to a select group of women: white, Protestant, upper-middle class women who lived in the 
Northeast of the United States. For many women it was economically unfeasible to remain in 
the domestic sphere, they simply had to seek wage-earning work in order to sustain their 
family. The steadily emerging conflict over whether women should remain in the home and 
endure the misfortune of being tucked away from participation in public matters, or whether 
women should enter public life and risk abandoning some responsibilities in the home, was a 
dilemma only contemplated by white, middle class women. There are many similarities in the 
perception of true womanhood as being an exclusively middle-class pastime, and accusations 
levelled at antiporn feminists for being excessively concerned with preserving the 
respectability of relatively well-to-do, intellectual women who did not need to turn to the sex 
trade to survive economically (Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 2009). The critique being that while 
antiporn feminists engage in a discourse that underscores injustices being practiced against 
poor women, often women of colour, the key figures in the movement tend to be white, well-
educated, and economically secure. The intense focus on pornography above and beyond 
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what are arguably more pressing issues is seen as a mark of the privileged lives antiporn 
feminists must possess, “a spewing of venom that only white middle-class women can 
afford” (Tong, 1984: 156). The perception of the movement as ‘elitist’, rather than grassroots, 
gives it a similar class profile to the Christian Right, whose appeal in suburban, middle-class 
areas where incomes are relatively high has been strong (Cobb, 2003). Prostitution advocates 
argue that this class position insulates both movements from the gritty realities of being poor 
and working class in America, and how this existence pushes some women into survival sex 
(van der Meulen et al. 2013). From this position of relative class comfort and stability, 
antiporn narratives can transition across ideological divides. 
The postbellum period from the 1860s saw a shift from the ‘true woman’ to the ‘new woman’ 
as employers began to welcome women’s low cost labour in roles such as sales clerks, 
teachers, secretaries, nurses, and factory workers (Woloch, 2002).) As a result, ideas about 
women’s essential domesticity and their subordination to men began to fade and were 
replaced by new notions of the modern woman, who was permitted to be economically 
independent of her husband (Gallagher, 2003: 37). What followed for Protestants was a split 
between the fundamentalist and modernist factions of the faith. Fundamentalists stayed true 
to the doctrine of biblical inerrancy despite the rapid cultural change occurring around them 
and as a result became increasingly isolated and socially irrelevant (Gallagher, 2003: 37). 
Using more critical methods of biblical interpretation, modernists attempted to revalorise 
Protestantism, adapting it to the changing contours of twentieth century America. We see 
these two diverging elements coalescing on the Christian Right’s response to pornography 
today. Where on the one hand a traditionalist, biblical, true woman discourse frames 
pornography as an affront to patriarchal marriage and the delicate nature of a woman, and on 
the other hand a modern, secular, rights-based discourse frames pornography as a threat to 
women’s equal status and bodily autonomy.  
Despite accommodations to a modernising image of women, traditionalists have repeatedly 
attempted to recover the idealism of the domesticated wife by entrenching the separate 
spheres of male and female life. The recession of the 1970s which saw the breadwinning 
husband and homemaking wife ideal, now severely threatened by stagnating wages and the 
increasing need for two-income families, once again came to represent the stability of a 
nation (Edwards, 2001). It was during this decade that the groups at the centre of this study – 
CWA, FOF, and EF – were all founded. A growing sense of cultural and economic loss 
incited the Christian Right to mobilise on a platform of family values. However, the cultural 
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conditions had changed significantly since the middle of the nineteenth century, and a need to 
integrate the spheres of domesticity with women’s increasingly dominant presence in the 
workforce presented new and unfamiliar challenges to a movement whose gaze was fixed on 
the rear-view mirror.  
One of the ways the movement attempted to merge these two spheres was with the adaptation 
of ‘Republican Motherhood’ precepts. Republican Motherhood served an important political 
purpose by attempting to integrate domesticity and proto-feminist campaigning “by defining 
women’s domestic behavior as having a direct political function in the new republic.” 
(Rotman, 2009: 15). Not to be confused with the Republican Party, Republican Motherhood 
encouraged young women to uphold the ideals of republicanism and emerged before the 
American Revolution, eventually dying down in the early twentieth century. It was a way for 
conservatives to reconcile a domestic ideology with an unfolding collective gendered 
ideology by combining the private, domestic spheres of true womanhood with the public, 
political spheres of the feminist movement; functioning as a kind of temporal overlap.  
The dual identity offered by Republican Motherhood belied the rigid expectations of true 
womanhood, where venturing into the public sphere was perceived as an ungodly 
transgression. Therefore, women finessing a transition into public life had to navigate a series 
of gendered expectations which prevented them from abandoning their feminine principles on 
the masculinised public stage, despite femininity being seen as antithetical to power. Today, 
prominent women on the Christian Right wrestle with competing expectations about their 
ideal identity. EF’s Phyllis Schlafly and CWA’s Beverly LaHaye have been a constant 
presence in the public arena for decades, pleading with women to put husband and children 
before their own creative pursuits. Any sacrifices this has necessitated in their personal lives 
is kept quiet. They reconcile this public, assertive image with the demure, feminine image by 
insisting that their activism is “selfless and ordained by God” (Diamond, 1990). This 
justification embeds itself in antiporn discourse by prefacing more radical, feminist-inspired 
arguments with a nod to the Bible. 
Republican Motherhood addressed a tension in middle class women’s lives; the blurring of 
spherical boundaries in the day-to-day lived experiences of these women had resulted in a 
“kaleidoscopic spectrum of understandings, interpretations, and implementations of gendered 
roles and relations” (Rotman, 2009: 16). For example, during the Revolutionary War in the 
eighteenth century, women had “boycotted imported goods, increased their workloads by 
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supplying replacements for the boycotted goods, fed and clothed armies, ran farms and 
businesses while their husbands and fathers were away, and engaged in other efforts outside 
of the women’s previous domestic scope” (Rotman 2009: 17).  Republican Motherhood 
presented itself as a mechanism for women to assimilate into ‘the new world’, by altering 
“the female domain in which most women had always lived their lives; it justified an 
extension of women’s absorption and participation in civic culture” (Kerber, 1976: 204).  
Yet the manner in which women could engage in civic culture tended to be through their role 
as wife and mother. For prominent women on the Christian Right today, this expectation has 
evolved to the point where they may not have to engage directly through their role as wife 
and mother, but through a more theoretical, abstract identity in which being a wife and 
mother are of central, but not absolute, importance. For example, Phyllis Schlafly’s marriage 
and children have been occasional themes in her writing, but have been more background 
noise than the only means through which she could assert herself in right-wing political 
spaces. This tension between domesticity and personal fulfilment, between the private and 
public realms of a woman’s life, play out in conservative antiporn material. The domestic 
frame is romanticised as a place to safely retreat from a depraved world. Women’s 
professional endeavours are less valorised by movement leaders, and are treated with a 
realistic pragmatism. Although the Christian Right links women’s participation in the male 
world of work with a whole host of social ills, it is too common a scenario to merit deep 
criticism. In borrowing from feminist rhetoric, the leaders concede that the boundaries 
separating women’s and men’s spheres are becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish. 
     Phyllis Schlafly’s adaptation of true womanhood 
 
Throughout the latter part of the twentieth century, one of the greatest champions of 
nineteenth-century domestic ideology has been the politically astute conservative activist, 
Phyllis Schlafly. Schlafly’s belief in the centrality of the nuclear family in American society 
has seen her engage most critically with the women’s movement. She regards feminism as 
responsible for the decline in women’s self-reported happiness, as it created the conditions 
for women to leave the home to take up paid work, but still left women shouldering the bulk 
of the caring responsibilities (Schlafly, 2003). Schlafly’s campaign against the women’s 
movement gained prominence in the 1970s and still persists today through her stewardship of 
the conservative interest group, Eagle Forum. Concentrating on “the right to be treated as a 
woman,” Schlafly’s activism has relied on tropes of the ideal woman, who is all at once 
126 
 
moral, virtuous and self-sacrificing, embodying distinctly different values and qualities to the 
greedy, selfish ambitiousness of men.  
Schlafly’s successful efforts to mobilise conservative forces against the ERA during the 
1970s has been credited with making the Christian Right synonymous with the Republican 
Party, by thrusting social issues into the political arena. Before Schlafly entered the ERA 
fight and enlisted her broad network of supporters to crusade against it, the Republican Party 
had consistently endorsed the amendment at every political convention since 1940 (Lelyveld, 
1976). Indeed, it had been the party to first add support for the amendment to its political 
platform in 1940, in the hope that doing so would persuade some women voters to desert 
popular president Franklin D. Roosevelt in favour of their nominee. The Democratic Party, 
held back by labour unions whose male-dominated constituencies feared the ERA would 
undermine their power, took another four years to endorse the amendment (Lowenthal, 2008: 
187).  
It was Ronald Reagan’s successful bid for the Republican presidential nomination in 1976, 
due in part to Schlafly’s efforts to portray the ERA as a symbol of feminism that saw the 
Republican Party and the Christian fundamentalist faction of the conservative movement 
coalesce around efforts to dismantle pro-ERA advancements. An aggressive modern 
reassertion of the principles of true womanhood accompanied Schlafly’s campaign against 
the ERA. The amendment was constructed as “unwomanly”, an affront to the God-given 
differences between men and women. But Schlafly went further than merely constructing a 
soft, maternalist vision of the ideal woman as unfit for traditionally male pursuits, she also 
exploited a key point of contention among supporters of the amendment – whether women 
required protection or deserved equal treatment. If women were to be treated as no different 
from their male counterparts, would they actually emerge from the arrangement worse off?  
Echoing the rights-based retorts of conservative antipornography campaigners today, Schlafly 
used the persuasive language of rights to frighten women into believing the ERA would not 
enhance their social, political and economic position, but erode it. Housewives whose 
husbands had been legally required to financially support their family would be made equally 
responsible for financially supporting their progeny, Schlafly warned. “Wives have 
traditionally had in this country a great variety of extensive rights based on their marital 
status” she wrote in 1979, but the amendment risked taking these protections away. Further, 
the ERA would wipe out many labour laws which protected women by acknowledging their 
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distinct and unique needs, such as exemptions from overnight shifts or arduous labour 
(Schlafly, 1973). In employing a rights-based criticism of the ERA, Schlafly co-opted the 
tactics of her feminist opponents in the service of defeating the amendment, and won. 
     Women’s rights and true womanhood unite on pornography 
 
Emboldened by the success of the Stop ERA campaign, Schlafly’s activism expanded to 
include a raft of measures instrumental to the family values agenda. Merging the incongruent 
discourses of domesticity and women’s rights, Schlafly has been a central figure in the 
Christian Right’s construction of pornography as an existential threat to both the good moral 
values vital to the preservation of the family, and also to the welfare of women.    
In one of her best known books, The Power of the Positive Woman (1977), Schlafly 
demonstrates her willingness to reach beyond the morality-focused master frame of the 
Christian Right, by adopting feminist language in her critique of pornography: 
“[P]ornography can be best defined as the degradation of woman. It exploits women 
individually and as a group in the most offensive, degrading, and cruel way. In the 
modern jargon, pornography is the most “sexist” activity of all.” (p. 158 
The rights of women to not be victims of sexual exploitation, and the context in which the 
term ‘sexist’ is used, are analogous to sentiments put forth by feminist antipornography 
activists. In Schlafly’s view, women liberationists are as much a catalyst of the problem as 
any pornographer. This view came through in The Power of the Positive Woman, where she 
asserts “they [feminists] profess outrage at a role-concept fostered by school textbooks that 
include pictures of women in the home as wives and mothers, but they raise no protest about 
the role-concept fostered by obscene pictures of women as playthings for male lust and 
sadism in obscene and “bondage” books, magazines, and movies” (p. 2). But mirroring her 
feminist foes, Schlafly (1987) is alarmed by the notion that pornography is a root cause of 
sexual violence. “Those who become addicted [to pornography] crave more bizarre and more 
perverted pornography, and become more callous toward their victims” she alleges.   
Schlafly’s position on pornography, fusing together rights-based language and feminine 
idealisation, has historical roots in the rhetoric of nineteenth-century temperance activists. 
Writing for the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Andrew Koppelman (2008) 
makes a case for this parallel. In the eyes of Schlafly “pornography functions as a modern 
day saloon” he writes. Like alcohol was to temperance crusaders, pornography functions as 
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an institution that socialises men into a world that is destructively indifferent or even hostile 
to the well-being of their wives and children (p. 119). Like WCTU president Frances Willard, 
whose activism was underpinned by an unquestioned dedication to biological determinism, 
Phyllis Schlafly was driven by a belief that ‘maternal thinking’ – as congenital to women as 
her physiology – can inspire a model for political decision making (Marilley, 1993: 141).  
Willard and Schlafly have both emphasised women’s physical weakness. For Willard, the 
question of how women’s physical capacities would limit them, particularly when it came to 
military combat, was inconsequential, as she believed that women’s greater role in public life 
would have a pacifying effect on America’s war ambitions. This romanticised view of 
women’s influence did not come true, and Willard’s biological determinism would later be 
adopted by Phyllis Schlafly and those on the Christian Right, and used for conservative 
political ends on a range of key issues, including pornography. Willard’s hope that women’s 
unique resources might be used to both preserve the family and improve women’s standing in 
society ultimately became ideological fodder for Schlafly, who assimilated the physical 
weakness argument into her conservative platform as a means of slowing political progress 
for women. 
Still active and driving the social conservative agenda today, Schlafly and her political allies 
have mastered a dual narrative combining women’s rights and domestic ideology, in which 
the idealised, subordinated form of femininity central to true woman philosophy is fiercely 
defended against dissenting voices, namely feminists, who critique this version of 
womanhood as a product of dyadic relations of dominance and subordination. What has 
emerged is a new gender politics that emphasises the right to be treated as a woman, and 
laments the supposedly oppressive assumptions at the heart of equality feminism. “What 
about the rights of the woman who doesn’t want to compete on an equal basis with men?” 
Schlafly asked (in Williams, 2010: 110).  
For many leaders on the Christian Right, the notion that a rights-based analysis of gender 
relations must be synonymous with feminism is being challenged. And as an analysis and 
discussion of contemporary Christian Right material on pornography will reveal in the next 
two chapters, the issue of pornography has been fertile ground for this new gender politics to 
play out. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Case studies 
 
 
Concerned Women for America, Focus on the Family, Eagle Forum and the 
temperance movement 
 
To establish a clear understanding of the nature, extent, and drive behind the Christian 
Right’s appropriation of women’s rights arguments on pornography, it is crucial to move 
beyond a purely historical appraisal of the movement’s approach to questions of women’s 
proper place and how society ought to respond to the decoupling of sex and marriage, and 
instead shift towards a current snapshot of the movement’s framing of pornography. 
Therefore, the remainder of this study will analyse the antipornography material of CWA, 
FOF, and EF – three groups founded within a few years of each other at a time when the 
movement was at its most militaristic, drawing in parallels with the temperance movement 
where appropriate. At the beginning of the rise of the new Christian Right in the 1970s, any 
notion that the movement could eventually acquiesce to feminist theory would have been 
unthinkable. But in the decades since, the movement has shifted and adapted strategically, as 
changing political cycles and public sentiment have thrown up new challenges. The evolving 
nature of women’s role in society has been a particularly complex adjustment for Christian 
Right leaders, who have had to reconceptualise their approach to everything from 
pornography, to abortion and childcare, as women have gradually assumed greater space in 
the public sphere. CWA, FOF, and EF have all engaged in their own way with this political 
reality. Their position on pornography is one vehicle through which new normative 
boundaries of gender relations within the movement are being formed. 
     A profile of Concerned Women for America (CWA) 
 
Beverly LaHaye was 49-years-old, living in San Diego and married to fundamentalist Baptist 
minister and Moral Majority co-founder Tim LaHaye in 1978 when an evening news 
interview appeared on her living room television, sparking outrage and ultimately forming 
the creation of CWA (LaHaye, 1984). LaHaye’s anger was provoked by feminist activist 
Betty Friedan who was being interviewed by veteran journalist Barbara Walters. During the 
exchange, Betty Friedan claimed to “represent the views of a great many women in America” 
(Faludi, 1991: 279). Upon hearing this, LaHaye recalls jumping off her couch and yelling 
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“Betty Friedan doesn’t speak for me, and I bet she doesn’t speak for the majority of women 
in this country” (p. 279). Believing feminism had destroyed a woman’s conventionally 
understood ‘place’ in the world, LaHaye (1987) argued that removing a woman’s high value 
toward family, marriage and children would weaken her feeling of confidence, “because that 
is the way women operate” (p. 5). It was LaHaye’s view that feminists were destroying the 
notion of family in America and that an organised Christian conservative movement of 
women needed to be formed to counteract the impact of the feminist movement.  
It was then that Beverly LaHaye decided something had to be done to prevent feminists from 
destroying the family and the nation. With that, LaHaye called a meeting in San Diego. 
Uncertain if anyone would show up, 1200 women eventually filled the hall. This impressive 
show persuaded LaHaye to conclude that “the majority of women out there don’t agree with 
Betty Friedan and the ERA [Equal Rights Amendment]” (in Gardiner, 1998). Today, the 
group boasts a membership of 500,000 individuals40 and an annual budget of around $8 
million (Schreiber, 2008: 133). The group’s sources of funding come primarily from its 
membership dues, book royalties, and grants from non-profit organisations. The Bill and 
Berniece Grewcock Foundation, which provides grants to Christian organisations, gives 
regularly to CWA. The Center to Protect Patient Rights (CPPR), a secretive and deeply 
political non-profit, with proven ties to the billionaire Koch brothers whose political activities 
have funnelled hundreds of millions of dollars into conservative, libertarian, and free-market 
individuals and organisations, including CWA (Novak, 2012). Grants from such a group 
could be deemed questionable given that many of CWA’s projects operate under a 501(c)(3) 
tax status. Groups with this status are defined as “social welfare” organisations, and are not 
supposed to be primarily political.41 In fact these types of tax-exempt organisations are 
forbidden from engaging in most political and legislative activities. It was Senator Lyndon B. 
Johnson who introduced this ban on political involvement by 501(c)(3) organisations.  
Johnson, a Democrat and pioneer of modern liberalism, was targeting the new measure at 
right-wing, tax-exempt organisations supporting Dudley T. Dougherty (Segers, 2008). 
Dougherty was a conservative Texas Democrat challenging Johnson’s renomination and re-
                                                          
40 As reported by CWA. Anyone who has ever donated even as little as one dollar is considered a member 
henceforth: SourceWatch 2014, Concerned Women for America, viewed February 2014, 
<http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Concerned_Women_for_America>. 
41 Explained further by the Internal Revenue Service: Internal Revenue Service 2014, Exemption requirements – 
501 (c)(3) organizations, viewed February 2014, <http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Charitable-
Organizations/Exemption-Requirements-Section-501(c)(3)-Organizations>. 
131 
 
election to the Senate in 1954. The move was underpinned by Johnson’s efforts to end 
McCarthyism and disunity within Democratic Party ranks (p. 196).  Because CWA’s political 
activities are limited by its tax status, the group also operates part of its activities under a 
501(c)(4) status, which allows the group to engage in campaigning in favour or opposition to 
a particular bill or ballot measure. There is little doubt that CWA is an inherently political 
organisation. The group runs a Political Action Committee (PAC) whose total expenditure 
during the 2008 election cycle reached $323,185. During the 2012 election cycle CWA’s 
PAC made donations to a number of specific candidates, such as Congressman Robert B. 
Aderholt from Alabama, Senator Deb Fischer from Nebraska, Richard Mourdock from 
Indiana, and Governor Mitt Romney, all Republican candidates.42 
The group’s campaigning style has been referred to as “kitchen table activism” (Fetner, 2008; 
Gardiner, 2006) lifted from the group’s fundamental assumption that its women adherents are 
nestled contently in a domestic sphere. In the early years of the Reagan administration, the 
group sent pamphlets to its members titled “How to Lobby From Your Kitchen Table,” 
characteristic of the veneer of a soft, unobtrusive, ladylike style of activism; putting the group 
in stark contrast to the militant, aggressive tactics of traditionally masculine campaigns, such 
as the labour movement.  
In truth, CWA’s tenacious methods of campaigning are far from unassuming. One such 
campaign method demonstrates their truly persuasive style, referred to as “Project 535,” 
denoting the 435 Representatives and 100 Senators in Congress. Project 535 was launched in 
1984 as a volunteer lobbyist program. Each year CWA conducts training seminars in 
Washington, D.C. for Project 535 volunteers, where they receive a manual filled with tips on 
how to lobby effectively, and advice from seasoned lobbyists.43 Gardiner (2006) writes that 
when the Project 535 is activated in response to, say, abortion legislation, its political effect 
can be menacing: 
The program instructs all CWA members to drop an avalanche of letters and phone 
calls to legislators and public officials at both their Capitol Hill and home offices. The 
                                                          
42 Documents available through the Federal Election Committee: Federal Election Commission 2014, 
Concerned Women for America legislative action committee political action committee, Washington, DC, 
viewed February 2014, <http://images.nictusa.com/cgi-bin/fecimg/?C00375865>. 
43 Concerned Women for America 2014, Project 535, Washington, DC, viewed January 2013, 
<http://www.cwfa.org/capitol-live/project-535/>. 
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effects of such efficient organizing can be devastating as thousands of letters and 
phone calls bombard Capitol Hill in a matter of days. 
It is impossible to fully appreciate CWA’s role in a broader political context without 
understanding its position as the right-wing foil to feminism. The group’s campaigns 
certainly go beyond qualms about the influence of feminism, but CWA’s antipathy to the 
women’s movement is its founding principle, and continues to guide its agenda, at least in 
theory.  
In practice, however, the group’s relationship with feminist politics is not as clear-cut as it 
might wish to portray. In fact the group both relies on its overt hatred of the feminist 
movement for maintaining and attracting adherents and also simultaneously depends on 
rights-based, feminist arguments to enhance and strengthen its antipornography stance to 
these same adherents. But because the group depends on condemning feminism for its 
political survival, it has no choice but to pursue this contradictory approach. 
As Gardiner (2006) accurately notes, CWA’s existence would be inconceivable had the 
women’s movement not developed such political salience. The resurgence of a second wave 
of feminism in the United States in the 1970s drove the impetus on the Christian Right for the 
formation of organisations devoted to anti-feminism. Cultural ambivalence concerning 
women’s involvement in political activism across the ideological spectrum means women’s 
entry point into public life has often been through campaigns deemed gender-appropriate, and 
within the conservative movement, women activists have delicately formulated campaigns 
that do not seek to confront patriarchal norms. Rather, CWA’s aims and objectives strengthen 
the patriarchal narrative that women’s capacities are best exercised in the service of husband, 
home, and the children.  
CWA cites six “core issues” on which it focuses its efforts. The group explains its reasoning 
behind the core issues principle by claiming that a culture war has engulfed American 
society, making claims on every area of life, and thus “we must set priorities thoughtfully to 
determine how best to fulfil our calling.”44  
                                                          
44 Since the time of writing CWA’s core issues have been slightly altered. It now lists pornography under 
‘sexual exploitation’ and has also included ‘support for Israel’ as a seventh core issue: Concerned Women for 
America 2014, Our Issues, Washington, DC, viewed June 2014, <http://www.cwfa.org/about/issues/>. 
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Pornography is one of CWA’s six core issues and has been a focal point of the group’s 
activism since 1979. These six issues are what LaHaye believes are at the “front lines [of the] 
spiritual battle”, or the culture wars, in the United States (Morkert, 2008: 154). The group 
describes each issue as, at its root, a battle over worldviews.45   
Table 1: Concerned Women for America 
Definition of 
Family 
Sanctity of 
Life 
Education Religious 
Liberty 
National 
Sovereignty 
Pornography 
Opposition to 
same-sex 
marriage and 
other rights for 
LGBTI 
individuals. 
Opposition to 
all stages of 
legal abortion. 
Abstinence-
only sex 
education. 
Opposition to 
perceived IRS 
bias against 
religious 
nonprofits. 
Opposition to 
women in 
front-line 
combat 
positions and 
openly gay 
soldiers in the 
military.  
Opposition to 
all forms of 
pornography, 
obscenity, 
prostitution and 
sex slavery. 
Promotion of 
heterosexual 
marriages and 
nuclear 
families. 
Promotion of 
legislative 
initiatives 
designed to 
reduce abortion 
rates, e.g. pre-
abortion 
ultrasounds. 
Advocates 
home-
schooling 
children. 
Promotion of 
prayer in public 
schools. 
Opposition to 
United Nations 
having any 
authority over 
the United 
States. 
Promotion of 
enforced 
obscenity laws 
to regulate or 
prohibit 
pornography. 
Criticism of 
feminists trying 
to ‘redefine’ 
traditional 
family roles. 
Opposition to 
most forms of 
birth control, 
HPV vaccine 
‘Gardasil’, and 
stem cell 
research. 
Promotes 
teaching 
creationism in 
public schools, 
critical of the 
teaching of 
evolution in 
biology. 
Opposition to 
political 
leaders deemed 
‘biblically 
hostile.’ 
Promotion of 
fiscally 
conservative 
policies and 
small 
government. 
Support for 
political 
candidates and 
Supreme Court 
nominees who 
want to regulate 
pornography. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
45 Concerned Women for America 2014, About Us, Washington, DC, viewed January 2013, 
<http://www.cwfa.org/about/>.  
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     A profile of Focus on the Family (FOF) 
 
Beginning with a fifteen minute radio broadcast in 1977, FOF founder, Dr. James Dobson, 
cemented his role as an influential figure in America’s new wave of politicised religious 
fervour. Dr. Dobson’s reputation as an outspoken, uncompromising evangelist with a 
doctrinaire approach to the Bible has shepherded FOF to public prominence over the last 
forty years.  
In 2011 an estimated 238 million people across 124 countries listened to one of FOF’s radio 
broadcasts. In addition, over thirteen million people emailed, wrote to, or phoned the 
organisation, and licensed counsellors working for the organisation gave advice to 75,000 
individuals.46 Today the organisation is based in Colorado Springs, following a move by Dr. 
Dobson and his followers in 1991 who were persuaded by the promise of low taxes and cheap 
land. The racial homogeneity of the region’s nearly all-white population was an additional 
draw. Prior to the move, Dobson had run FOF out of Pomona, California as he had become 
increasingly bothered by the racial diversity in the city. His complaint being that non-whites 
brought with them “cultural ideas and religious ideas foreign to the traditional American view 
of life” (Blumenthal, 2009: 48).  
The group’s headquarters house a welcome centre which has been attended by more than 
three million guests since its opening in 1994. The centre reflects the somewhat paranoid 
mistrust FOF has of the outside world, which it routinely refers to as “the culture”. Security 
cameras are strategically placed throughout the centre, and heavily armed security guards in 
bulletproof vests lurk in various locations, fearing unruly intruders from the secular world (p. 
Blumenthal, 2009: 51).  
The relationship between Dr. Dobson and the Republican Party has been instrumental in 
determining the dynamic between the Christian Right and formal political institutions. 
Having campaigned at a grassroots level for family values issues to become a key national 
priority since the 1980s, the presidency of George W. Bush enabled a much closer alliance to 
form between Dobson and the White House. This was exemplified in 2002 when Dobson 
established a secretive committee of political and evangelical leaders in Washington, D.C., 
called the Arlington Group. The Arlington Group was set up by close associates Paul 
                                                          
46 Focus on the Family 2012, Focus on the Family and CitizenLink 2012 Annual Report, viewed January 2013, 
Colorado Springs, Colorado, viewed November 2013, <http://media.focusonthefamily.com/fotf/pdf/about-
us/financial-reports/2012-annual-report.pdf>. 
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Weyrich and Don Wildmon, head of the American Family Association, and chaired by 
Dobson. It had been 21 years since a secretive and politically motivated evangelical group 
had last operated inside the Washington Beltway (Ryan and Switzer, 2009: 60). From the 
vantage point at the heart of America’s political power, Dobson and the Arlington Group 
were able to strategise and prepare for the 2004 presidential election, where issues like same-
sex marriage and abortion would become key wedge issues, angrily dividing the populace 
and contributing to the increasing polarity among voters of similar economic fortune.  
By driving a wedge between working people on these issues, Dobson and his allies were able 
to elevate previously insignificant social issues to the forefront of the mainstream political 
debate. Because abortion appealed to latent sexism, and gay rights to widespread 
homophobia, this narrative found its apotheosis in Republican politics. 
During this time Dobson had a direct line to the White House. A Republican kingmaker, he 
had the ability to make or break rising conservative hopefuls through his multiple channels of 
influence reaching over 200 million people worldwide, and he often exercised this power. 
This was not without scrutiny, and in response to concerns about FOF’s political activities, 
the group expanded in 2004 by creating a political wing of the organisation, Focus on the 
Family Action, now called CitizenLink.  
The 501(c)(4) tax designation of CitizenLink allowed the organisation to pursue more 
explicitly political activities (Scheitle, 2010: 84). Between 2002 and 2012 CitizenLink spent a 
total of $2,912,080 on ballot measures in a number of states, with their largest contributions 
directed at opposing same-sex marriage legislation.47 As FOF’s explicitly political arm, 
CitizenLink calls on adherents to ‘take action’ on a number of fronts. On the subject of 
pornography they have recoiled against Planned Parenthood for normalising and celebrating 
‘deviant sexual behaviour’ by for example suggesting that bondage and sadomasochism can 
be mutually consensual if undertaken in a trusting relationship.48 CitizenLink urged adherents 
to contact their local representative and demand that Congress defund Planned Parenthood, 
an aim long-pursued by other social conservative groups and politicians in the United States. 
                                                          
47 Follow the Money 2014, Focus on the Family, viewed November 2013, 
<http://classic.followthemoney.org/database/topcontributor.phtml?u=6802>. 
48 CitizenLink 2014, TAKE ACTION: Planned Parenthood video promotes teen bondage, sadomasochism, 
Colorado Springs, Colorado, viewed June 2014, <http://www.citizenlink.com/2014/03/06/take-action-planned-
parenthood-video-promotes-teen-bondage-sadomasochism/>. 
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A pivotal milestone in Dobson’s career came when he was granted access to notorious serial 
killer Ted Bundy right before his execution on January 24, 1989. The material gleaned from 
the interview still informs the basis of much of FOF’s antipornography material today. 
Despite Bundy’s record, which included the rape and murder of at least thirty young women, 
he had undergone a spiritual transformation that impressed Dobson. Bundy laid out a riveting 
tale for Dobson of a boy living in a solid Christian home who was swept into the dark world 
of pornography after rummaging through garbage cans in the alleyways of his 
neighbourhood. Soon the devil took hold, and Bundy required increasingly violent 
pornography to feel aroused. When the pornography did not suffice, he moved on to real-life 
victims. It was a neatly packaged causal example of how pornography directly leads to 
violence.  
That Bundy’s tale ended in a spiritual awakening and a repentance of past sins gave it the 
biblical edge Dobson’s followers craved. The interview was quickly turned into a VHS tape 
titled ‘Life on the Edge: Preparing for the Challenges of Adulthood’ which depicts Dobson in 
a room full of adolescents warning them that pornography exists to destroy their future 
marriages.49 Like the group’s other core issues, Dobson sees pornography as a form of 
spiritual warfare, designed by Satan to lead the world astray. “The heated dispute over values 
in Western nations is simply a continuation of the age-old struggle between principles of 
righteousness and the kingdom of darkness” Dobson wrote in a 1995 guest editorial for 
Christianity Today. Pornography is not a symptom of patriarchy to Dobson, but of a fallen 
world disobedient to Christ. 
Under Dobson’s leadership, FOF was not known for compromise, coalition building, or 
careful rhetoric (Diamond, 1998: 2). Rather, Dobson was known to use militant, 
inflammatory rhetoric to get his point across. In a piece for the influential Policy Review 
magazine, published by the conservative think tank, the Heritage Foundation, Thomas 
Atwood (1990) scolded fundamentalists like Dobson for engaging in “spiritual warfare” with 
Americans. “[They] often came across as authoritarian, intolerant, and boastful, even to 
natural constituents” Atwood said of evangelical leaders. He urged them to “start building 
alliances” particularly with “political moderates sympathetic toward one or more of the 
Christian Right’s agenda.”  Fast forward twenty years, and it seems Atwood’s plea has been 
                                                          
49 Life on the edge: preparing for the challenges of adulthood featuring Dr James Dobson 1993, film, Word, 
Inc. and Focus on the Family, Colorado Springs. 
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answered in the form of the toned-down, pro-woman, rights-based rhetoric evident in the 
group’s current antipornography discourse. 
Dobson eventually stepped down as Chairman of FOF in 2009, having already handed over 
the presidency and CEO position to evangelist Jim Daly in 2005. Daly’s appointment in 2005 
signified a shift in FOF’s mission towards a modernised, tempered version of its former self. 
Dobson had represented a greying, antiquated version of the Christian Right which needed to 
broaden its appeal by resisting the ‘anti-everything image’ long conveyed by the movement 
(Hendershot, 2011: 209). There has been some speculation that Dobson was pushed out of 
FOF towards the end of his tenure because his style conflicted with FOF’s new direction, 
which was markedly less divisive. Writing for the right-wing website World Net Daily in 
2010, Ken Hutcherson, a friend of Dobson’s, claimed that the current emphasis at FOF is to 
be “loved and understood” by the secular world. Hutcherson added that he is thoroughly 
unsatisfied with the ‘progressive’ new leadership at FOF, and hopes the group will return to 
Dobson’s more militant style of leadership.  
Essential to the reimagined image of FOF under Daly is the willingness to adopt more 
mainstream positions on key issues. In 2010 Daly went so far as to extend his praise to 
President Obama as a positive example for African American fathers, applauded the 
president’s attention to the issue of human trafficking, and expressed a willingness to work 
with Democrats (Hendershot, 2011). Considering the intense unpopularity of President 
Obama among registered Republicans, Daly’s goodwill had its attendant risks.50 Even in 
areas traditionally met with scorn by conservatives, such as government provision of social 
services, Daly has led a shift in rhetoric, choosing to adopt a more amenable stance as 
opposed to the reactive, attack dog tactics favoured by Dr. Dobson.  
Under Daly’s leadership, FOF appears to be emulating the softer tactics of another 
evangelical group, the Christian Coalition of America. Unlike the Christian Coalition, who 
had built an inclusive, ecumenical organisation by tempering their language, Dobson’s 
former FOF was ideologically inflexible, seizing on politically divisive issues such as 
reproductive choice and gay rights to build its base of constituents. This is not to say that 
FOF has since converted into a progressive organisation, and indeed the political activities of 
                                                          
50 US-based polling company Gallup has described President Obama’s sharply divided approval rating among 
Democrats and Republicans as “historically polarising”. As of February 2015, just 9 percent of Republicans 
approved of the job the president was doing, compared to 79 percent of Democrats. See: 
<http://www.gallup.com/poll/181490/obama-approval-ratings-historically-polarized.aspx>  
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CitizenLink reveal an ongoing commitment to maintaining the ‘super sin’ status of same-sex 
marriage and abortion, at least covertly. However, the shift in tone reveals an inclination on 
the part of organisational actors to moderate what long seemed to be an uncompromising 
stance.  
In a 2012 interview with Huffington Post, Daly claimed that the once vitriolic stance it took 
against abortion and same-sex marriage was a distraction, stating that “it’s fair to say we have 
concentrated on some things that have distracted from the main thing, which is the Gospel of 
Christ.” But rather than dismiss Dr. Dobson’s harsh tactics, Daly rationalises them by 
pointing to generational differences: “I think if I was born in the 30s with that Judeo-
Christian culture and went through the 50s and 60s and saw what I perceived to be a 
dismantling of these things, I think I would have reacted the same way.” Daly adds “it would 
lead you to a venomous mentality. And I understand it. I don’t judge it” (Kaleem, 2012).  
Indicative of the political consequences of acquiescing to a more centrist platform, as FOF 
has softened its hard line on controversial social issues, it has seen its donations gradually fall 
as well. Before Dr. Dobson left the group it hit a staff peak of 1,400 employees in 2002. In 
the last few years the group has had to let go almost 500 workers as donors have deserted the 
organisation. According to Charity Navigator, FOF’s primary revenue has fallen steadily 
from a 2009 figure of $124,223,898 to a 2012 figure of $81,972,759.51 This has happened 
under Jim Daly’s watch and could signify a backlash within the constituency to Daly’s more 
moderate vision, occurring at the same time as the American electorate is historically 
polarised and primed for battle.  
Writing for the Huffington Post, Jaweed Kaleem (2012) posited that the tempered rhetoric is 
actually part of a long-term plan to broaden and diversify the group, eventually leading to an 
increase in donations. To maintain political relevance, FOF must be attuned to the growing 
support for same-sex marriage, particularly among young people. Daly’s willingness to work 
with political foes for a common cause was exemplified by his joining together with 
evangelical leaders in mid-2012 to urge Congress to pass immigration reform. Speaking on 
the action, David Fleming, senior pastor at Houston Baptist church described the moral 
urgency of immigration reform: “The people most affected by this current policy are not 
anonymous to us. We know their names and their faces […] we recognize their inherent value 
                                                          
51 Charity Navigator 2014, Focus on the Family, viewed June 2014, 
<http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=search.summary&orgid=3706#.VJivPV4AEZ>. 
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and their great potential” (Foley, 2012). Among the principles for reform advocated by the 
leaders was a path to legal status and/or citizenship to those who qualify. Despite being a 
group historically seen as a politically obdurate handmaiden for the most dogmatic elements 
of the Republican Party, it has departed from its own playbook on multiple occasions in 
recent years. 
In line with its new approach to immigration reform, and its easing off on the “super sin” 
rhetoric of homosexuality, pornography is another area where FOF is embracing a more 
inclusive approach and emphasising its commonalities with traditional opponents. Through 
an adoptive process that borrows from antiporn feminist discourse, the group is substituting 
its rigid, outdated position developed under its former leadership which focused more 
singularly on the sinful nature of pornography, to a position that more fully considers the 
threats to women’s rights and equality in the proliferation of pornographic material.   
Table 2: Focus on the Family 
 
 
Right to Life Abstinence Adoption LGBT issues 
 
Marriage Pornography Education 
Opposition to 
medical or 
surgical abortion 
from ‘the single 
cell stage of 
development’  
Belief in 
abstaining 
from sex until 
marriage 
Advocate 
preference in 
adoption 
placements be 
given to 
married, 
mother-father 
households. 
Belief that 
sexual 
behaviour is 
moral only 
within the 
institution of 
heterosexual, 
monogamous 
marriage 
Belief in the 
creation of two 
distinct sexes with 
complementary 
qualities 
Belief that 
pornography is 
‘highly 
addictive and 
destructive 
material that 
harms 
individuals, 
families and 
society’ 
Advocacy 
for home-
schooling to 
enhance 
opportunities 
for intensive 
biblical 
lessons 
Support for 
federal and state 
legislation 
placing limits 
and restrictions 
on abortion 
Claims pre-
marital sex 
causes a 
myriad of 
emotional 
and physical 
illnesses 
Support for 
laws that 
prevent 
adoption by 
cohabiting 
couples, 
including 
homosexual 
couples 
Belief that 
same-sex 
attracted 
persons ‘can 
and do change 
their sexual 
identity’ 
Support for the 
Marriage 
Protection 
Amendment 
which defines 
marriage as 
between one man 
and one woman 
Support for 
individualised 
efforts by 
parents to 
prevent their 
children from 
accessing 
pornography 
Advocacy 
for the 
teaching of 
Bible studies 
in public 
schools 
Opposition to 
Intrauterine 
Devices (IUDs) 
and other 
‘abortifacient’ 
methods of birth 
control 
Opposition to 
sex education 
which 
provides 
information 
beyond 
abstinence-
only.  
Advocacy for 
adoption as an 
alternative to 
abortion 
Support for 
reparative 
therapy for 
same-sex 
attracted 
persons. 
Support for 
abolishing taxes 
that burden 
families such as 
the ‘marriage 
penalty’ 
Support for 
legislative and 
enforcement 
actions to 
protect 
individuals and 
society from 
pornography 
Scrutiny of 
education 
reforms 
requiring an 
increase in 
taxation 
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     A profile of Eagle Forum (EF) 
 
Long before EF was founded in 1975, its creator, Phyllis Schlafly, had been ascending in 
prominence, securing her place as a key spokesperson for a powerful conservative movement. 
Schlafly’s life has been both an embodiment of true woman principles, and at the same time, 
a glaring indictment of its ethos.  
In 1949, when Schlafly was twenty-five, she married wealthy corporate attorney John Fred 
Schlafly, fifteen years her senior (Kolbert, 2005). At age twenty-six she had her first of six 
children, an achievement routinely emphasised by her conservative allies. Despite the 
challenges of balancing motherhood and work outside the home, a combination Schlafly 
writes profusely and suspiciously about in the monthly Phyllis Schlafly Report, Schlafly 
embraced the challenge. In 1952 she ran for Congress in Illinois, campaigning on an anti-
communist platform which warned of the spectre of communism, which at the time was 
ideologically advancing in democratic countries. According to Schlafly’s biographer, her 
campaign was motivated by the belief that communism was the “most important problem 
facing America” as it represented an ungodly, collectivist ideology at odds with all that 
America stood for (Critchlow, 2005: 73). Despite losing her Congressional bid to Democrat 
Charles Melvin Price, Schlafly remained a prominent figure within the political Right, 
travelling the state giving speeches on behalf of the Daughters of the American Revolution, 
and conducting research for Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy as he ruthlessly pursued 
communists (p. 71). Schlafly has downplayed her early political ambitions, dismissing them 
as mere “hobbies” and maintaining that she was a “full time homemaker for 25 years.”52  
In many ways Schlafly’s life has resembled that of the ideal feminist archetype. By all 
accounts Schlafly was an outstanding student, earning a Bachelor of Arts majoring in 
Political Science and graduating with honours, among them a Phi Beta Kappa key, from 
Washington University, St. Louis after achieving mostly “A’s” throughout her degree. 
Critchlow (2005) writes that after finishing her degree in three years she applied, and was 
accepted to, Harvard University where she received a Master of Arts in Government from 
Radcliffe College in 1945. Many years later, in 1978, Schlafly went on to earn a J.D. from 
Washington University Law School in St. Louis.  
                                                          
52 Makers 2014, Phyllis Schlafly, viewed June 2014, <http://www.makers.com/phyllis-schlafly>. 
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Within her family Schlafly witnessed her mother enter the labour market in order to keep the 
family afloat after her father entered long-term unemployment during the Depression 
(Ehrenreich, 1983: 152). Schlafly was exposed to factors which would transform many young 
women into ardent feminists. Cummings (2009) believes Schlafly’s resistance to the 
women’s movement stems from her bonds to Catholicism which engendered a deep suspicion 
of “radical” feminist causes, namely the pro-choice movement (p. 193).  
Schlafly’s assumption that a career in public office was possible for a wife and mother is a 
belief long championed by the feminist cause. Fellow conservative Margaret Thatcher, who 
served eleven years as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom throughout the 1980s, had a 
career which embodied the principles of feminism, but she refused to give the movement 
credit for her success, defiantly stating: “I owe nothing to women’s lib” (Thatcher in 
Holehouse, 2013). New World City (2011) describes Thatcher in a biography of her life as a 
‘nascent feminist’ in her early years in political life, “Although she would deny it 
vehemently” (p. 2). Harding (1991) argues that it is politically important to reserve the label 
of feminist for women who work to improve women’s lives (p. 279), which would exclude 
women such as Phyllis Schlafly, Margaret Thatcher, Marabel Morgan, and Helen Andelin 
whose politics is rooted in preserving male dominance in social, political, economic, and 
legal institutions. As Harding asserts, “biology is not enough to make Marabel Morgan or 
Margaret Thatcher feminists” and not enough to inspire such tendencies in Schlafly either.  
A critical breakthrough in Schlafly’s public profile came about in 1964 when she wrote her 
first book, A Choice, Not an Echo, on a standard typewriter from her home in Alton, Illinois. 
This early work differed quite considerably in subject matter from the issues which would 
eventually shape her activism. A Choice, Not an Echo detailed Schlafly’s view that the liberal 
“Rockefeller Republican” wing of the Republican Party had manipulated the Republican 
Party’s choice of nominees in several elections to nominate individuals like Wendell 
Willkie and Dwight Eisenhower. Schlafly urged conservatives to rally against the liberal 
wing and offer a true conservative for the nomination, which at the time was Arizona senator 
Barry Goldwater. 
A Choice, Not an Echo went on to sell three million copies and is credited by some with 
helping Goldwater win the Republican nomination that same year (Critchlow, 2005: 109). 
Schlafly’s position in conservative politics as a vehicle for the restoration of the right of the 
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Republican Party was cemented by the success of the campaign book, and would serve as a 
launching pad for her years of political activism ahead. 
In the years that followed the publication of A Choice, Not an Echo, Schlafly served as 
president of the National Federation of Republican Women where she continued to develop a 
reputation as a formidable political organiser, bringing to the movement grassroots organising 
skills that had too often eluded the corporate leaders allied with the Republican Party.  
The true strength of Schlafly’s organising skills were fully realised in the decade that 
followed. In 1972 she declared a war on the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), and henceforth 
abandoned a broader debate on socialism in favour of a single-issue mission: defeating the 
ERA. In a DVD titled “Doing the Impossible: Defeating the ERA” obtained from the group’s 
Education Centre in St. Louis, Missouri, Schlafly details how the once immensely popular 
amendment was brought to its knees by the formation of Schlafly’s remarkably successful 
STOP ERA campaign, which mobilised thousands of women from a broad range of churches.  
The group first mobilised when Schlafly invited 100 of her newsletter subscribers to meet her 
in St. Louis in 1972. After a lengthy discussion, the large group rode a bus down to the St. 
Louis riverfront and there Schlafly instructed the new movement to become strong 
conservative leaders in their communities. Evangelical women took up the cause from the 
Church of Christ, Southern Baptist, and fundamentalist independent churches. But Mormons, 
Orthodox Jews, and Roman Catholic women were mobilised too. Carolyn Gallagher (2004) 
states that the indelible presence of Phyllis Schlafly at the forefront of the anti-ERA 
campaign is an interesting case study in and of itself, given that Schlafly was a Catholic 
operating in a movement which has long been unified in its opposition to Catholicism. 
Schlafly softens the potential repercussions of this by strongly promoting conservative social 
causes within a nondenominational organisation, having the ironic effect of attracting 
Protestant and anti-Catholic adherents, securing its place in the Religious Right (p. 45).   
In describing the difficulties Schlafly initially had in convincing Americans to oppose to the 
ERA, she asserts that “we didn’t have any friendly radio and TV talk show hosts. Everyone 
was hostile. There was no Rush Limbaugh talking about the feminazis. There was no Fox 
News to give balanced news and let the audience decide […] from the get-go we had to fight 
the semantics and the momentum.”53 The issues on which STOP ERA staked out their 
                                                          
53 Doing the Impossible: Defeating the ERA 2007, DVD, Eagle Forum education center, St. Louis, Missouri.  
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battleground dealt directly with the perceived privileges of being regarded as the more 
vulnerable sex. Whether women would be drafted into military combat and whether women 
would lose certain legal rights, such as the right of a wife to be supported by her husband, 
were of principal concern.  
The most public advocates of the ERA were Gloria Steinem and Betty Friedan, two women 
who embodied the coryphaeus of feminism and the ideological opposites of Schlafly’s 
followers. At Illinois State University in 1973, Schlafly and Friedan had their first public 
debate. During the exchange Friedan famously lost her temper with Schlafly, accusing her of 
betraying her own sex and asserting that she would like to burn Schlafly at the stake 
(Critchlow, 2005). Harlan Ellison, another ERA supporter, said on television that “if Phyllis 
Schlafly walked into the headlights of my car, I would knock her into the next time zone” (in 
Mooney, 2012: 137). Angry outbursts like these played perfectly into the hands of the anti-
ERA campaign, reifying the Right’s notion that feminism is chiefly an expression of latent 
anger and embitterment.  
Stop ERA was a unique campaign in many respects, not least because it marked the first time 
in the twentieth century that women across the faith spectrum were being introduced to the 
larger conservative movement by social issues, rather than anticommunism (Critchlow, 2005: 
220). This new focus on social issues would go on to define mainstream Republican politics 
for the next forty years, and indeed still dominates the debates within the movement today, 
exemplified by the intense focus on where candidates stand on issues such as same-sex 
marriage, immigration reform, and reproductive choice in the 2015-2016 presidential election 
cycle. 
The Stop ERA campaign later evolved into what is today known as Eagle Forum. The group 
now boasts 80,000 members and describes itself as “the most effective national organization 
of […] men and women who share conservative and pro-family values.”54  
Much like CWA, EF produces briefing books and summations of issues for regular release to 
constituents. Schlafly also produces a weekly column of some 700 words in which she draws 
attention to a particular issue. As of December 2013, EF’s ‘spotlight topic’ was Common 
Core, the name given to a decision by the Obama administration to impose a set of national 
standards on public schools. Other topics regularly covered deal with the demise of the 
                                                          
54 Eagle Forum 2014, description of the organisation, St. Louis, Missouri, viewed January 2014, 
<http://www.eagleforum.org/misc/descript.html>. 
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nuclear family, the over assertion of power by the Obama administration, and the supposed 
tendency for the Obama administration to capitulate to feminist demands.  
EF differs from CWA and FOF on a number of fronts. It is smaller, both in the number of 
members and the size of its staff. It is of course led by Schlafly, who is much older than 
CWA’s president Penny Young Nance and FOF’s president Jim Daly. This has a bearing on 
the tactics and rhetoric used by the group, which true to its conservative roots does not 
concern itself as much with staying abreast of the rapidly evolving opinions of the American 
public. Indeed Schlafly’s recently published writing relies heavily on outmoded stereotypes, 
such as her claim in an April 15, 2014 piece for the Christian Post that women prefer clean 
working environments equipped with air conditioning and thus refuse to do the dirtier work 
which pays more, befalling a wage gap between the sexes.55  
Schlafly’s work on pornography has spanned many decades and has at certain junctures 
brought both her rhetoric and campaigning in line with antiporn feminists. I spent a week at 
EF’s Education Centre in St. Louis, Missouri in February 2014 and had the opportunity to 
meet with Schlafly to discuss her current position on pornography, as well as her thoughts on 
where conservatives and feminists agree on pornography, and why some of her political allies 
have borrowed from feminist discourse.  
It is important to note that the features of Schlafly’s antipornography activism are unique to 
the social and political context of the 1960s and 1970s, and have not evolved in style or 
substance in any significant way. As Daniel K. Williams writes in the book God’s Own 
Party: The Making of the Christian Right (2010), the Christian Right’s moral panic 
concerning the proliferation of pornographic material arose in response to a number of 
cultural trends emerging in the United States. The divorce rate between 1965 and 1975 
doubled, the out-of-wedlock birth rate increased by fifty percent, marriage and birth rates 
decreased, and abortion rates increased. Moreover, the X-rated film Deep Throat (1972) 
became a blockbuster hit, and signs of an incipient push for further recognition of women’s 
rights were stirring with the mobilisation of the women’s liberation movement.  
The Christian Right needed a villain, and hence, the burgeoning spectre of feminism provided 
an ideal impetus. Feminism threatened to undermine family hierarchy by encouraging women 
                                                          
55 Schlafly, P 2014, Facts and fallacies about paycheck fairness, April 15, Christian Post, viewed June 2014, 
<http://www.christianpost.com/news/facts-and-fallacies-about-paycheck-fairness-117959/>. 
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to question their role within the family and whether it was, indeed, inevitable. Schlafly 
reacted sharply to the prospects of a feminist awakening, using her striking intellect and 
confident public persona to arrest the winds of change. 
Table 3: Eagle Forum 
 
Constitution Health/Life 
issues 
Courts Immigration Family, Fathers, 
Feminism 
Jobs, 
economy 
Globalism vs. 
Sovereignty 
Supports the 
right of 
Americans to 
own firearms 
Opposition to 
the Patient 
Protection 
and 
Affordable 
Car Act 
Opposition 
to 
‘tyrannical’ 
judges 
seeking to 
take over 
powers of 
the other 
branches of 
government 
Advocates 
significantly 
reducing 
America’s 
refugee intake 
Supportive of women’s 
role as ‘fulltime 
homemakers’ 
Advocates 
significantly 
cutting the 
size and 
scope of 
government  
Supports a 
more 
isolationist, 
protectionist 
America 
Opposition to 
the Equal 
Rights 
Amendment 
Opposed to 
legalised 
abortion and 
abortifacient 
contraception 
Opposition 
to judicial 
activism 
Supports 
Donald J. 
Trump’s 
proposition of 
a temporary 
ban on all 
Muslims 
entering the 
United States 
Argues that the Family 
Court system unfairly 
discriminates against 
fathers’ rights 
Opposed to 
investing 
money in the 
‘green 
economy’ 
Critical of free 
trade 
agreements the 
United States 
has entered 
into 
Resistance to 
attempts by 
progressives 
to change 
aspects of the 
Constitution 
Anti-
vaccination, 
particularly 
with respect 
to the cervical 
cancer and 
Hepatitis B 
vaccines 
Upholding 
the Founding 
Fathers 
vision of a 
restrained 
judiciary 
Supports 
putting the 
promise to 
build a wall 
between 
Mexico and 
the United 
States in the 
official 
Republican 
Party platform 
Argues that the assertion 
that American women 
earn 77 cents for every 
dollar men make is a 
‘feminist fallacy’ based on 
flawed logic 
Blames high 
government 
spending and 
free trade for 
high 
unemployme
nt 
Believes global 
warming is a 
lie invented by 
political elites 
to reduce 
Americans 
standard of 
living 
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Analysis and discussion 
 
 
     Feminist terminology for antifemimist ends 
 
A number of years after Schlafly founded EF, and the ERA she strongly opposed had been 
defeated, she wrote a book detailing the testimonies from the Attorney General’s 
Commission on Pornography and titled it Pornography’s Victims (1987). In the introduction, 
Schlafly highlights how the strong arm of the law comes down on material depicting abuse 
against ‘blacks, or Jews, or Native Americans, or children’, she then asks: 
Why, then, are these acts not likewise against the law when the group targeted for 
rape, assault, battering, degradation, humiliation, or other abuse is women? Can these 
things be socially acceptable just because women are the victims? (p. 10) 
In her earlier work The Power of the Positive Woman (1977) Schlafly again reverted to 
feminist terminology to emphasise her point, describing pornography “as the most sexist 
activity of all” (p. 158). The explicit use of feminist terms to describe pornography is perhaps 
indicative of the period of soul-searching the Republican Party was undergoing with respect 
to women’s rights in the 1970s. Catherine Rymph (2006) notes that the influence of feminism 
was felt widely during this decade, leading even Republican women to engage with a wide 
range of feminist causes (p. 234). Republican women were particularly open to their party 
pragmatically incorporating women’s rights principles analogous to economic liberalism into 
their platform, such as facilitating women’s access to paid work. Schlafly knew her audience 
was receptive to the framing of pornography as sexist at the time.  
However, after Ronald Reagan rose to political prominence in the late 1970s following his 
governorship of California, the Republican Party embraced an explicitly conservative 
position on social issues. The party shifted from an almost exclusive focus on economic and 
foreign policy for much of the twentieth century, to an agenda which prioritised social issues. 
An October 1980 issue of Conservative Digest captures the period of transition the movement 
was in at the time: 
The New Right shares the same basic beliefs of other conservatives in economic and 
foreign policy matters, but we feel that conservatives cannot become the dominant 
political force in America until we stress the issues of concern to ethnic and blue-
collar Americans, born-again Christians, pro-life Catholics and Jews. Some of these 
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issues are busing, abortion, pornography, education, traditional Biblical moral values 
and quotas (p. 11). 
Social scientists tend to rely on two interrelated theories to explain the New Right’s emphasis 
on social issues. The first holds that right-wing movements must tether the social classes 
together by combining economic conservatism, which appeals to the higher strata, with social 
conservatism, which appeals to the lower strata (Lipset and Raab, 1978). The other theory 
posits that as the United States evolves away from an industrial economy to a knowledge 
economy where an increasing number of jobs require a university education, the social 
classes reverse their political positions on social issues. In other words, as the upper-middle 
class becomes more educated, it assumes a more open-minded, permissive stance on issues 
such as gay rights, abortion, and liberalising drug laws. In contrast, lower-middle and 
working class Americans, reacting to the perceived elitism of educated, successful liberals – 
the ‘oppositional intelligentsia’ – are receptive to conservative political figures who argue 
that the intelligentsia are out of touch with the values of ordinary Americans (Frank, 2004).  
This changing dynamic made feminism less palatable to many working class Americans, as it 
too came to be associated with an intelligentsia. “[…] the environmental and feminist 
movements – were dominated by members of the professional middle class and by college 
students, most of whom were preparing for professional occupations” asserts Brint (1984: 
31). As a result, feminism became an effective wedge issue throughout the 1970s and 1980s, 
and religious right-wing leaders like Schlafly became much more explicit in their hatred of 
feminism at the same time as they were aping the language of antiporn feminism. Schlafly’s 
more recent 2003 book Feminist Fantasies, a thorough rebuke of what Schlafly believes has 
been the damaging effect feminism has had on the institution of marriage, masculinity, the 
workplace, and child-rearing, is evidence of the intensification of Schlafly’s antifeminism.  
The Republican Party’s abrupt withdrawal of support for the ERA in 1980, an amendment the 
party had endorsed since the 1940s – likely on the grounds that the ERA could dismantle 
protective labour legislation – signified the reorientation of the party around new principles 
of social conservatism (Rymph, 2006: 81). These changes were also reactionary, and 
“reflected the immediate historical moment” (Himmelstein, 1983: 28). With the Supreme 
Court ruling in favour of a woman’s right to access abortion in 1973; an increase in 
affirmative action programs; and the evolution of the women’s movement from its formation 
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in Christian ethics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, into a manifestly radical 
movement by the 1970s, determined the emphasis on social conservatism in that decade. 
Although never explicitly endorsing the feminist position, EF kept borrowing from feminist 
rhetoric throughout the rise of the New Right and Christian Right in the 1970s and ‘80s. This 
was exemplified during one of EF’s conferences held on September 27, 1986 in St. Louis, 
Missouri. The speakers, Andrea Vangor and Leanne Metzger, point to a problematic 
stereotype in pornography while underlining the logic of antiporn feminism: 
Rape is portrayed in pornography as if it’s the woman’s fault […] these people 
[women] are not quite human, they’re not like you, they don’t have feelings, and 
besides, they ask for it. They want it. They deserve it. That is the message of 
pornography – the feminists are quite right, they are quite right about that. 
This characterisation echoes section (c) of the antiporn feminist definition of pornography 
outlined in the 1983 ordinance, that pornography presents women as sexual objects who 
experience sexual pleasure in being raped. The admission that ‘feminists are quite right’ 
about the relationship between pornography and rape reveals an understanding on the part of 
EF that antiporn feminists have established a theory of pornography with precepts that 
resonate with the Christian Right.  
This perspective was again underscored during a conference held by EF in St. Louis on 
domestic violence where conservative activist Barbara Hattemer argued that pornography 
“encourages male aggression by showing women giving in to force and enjoying it [..] thus 
perpetuating the myth that women want to be abused and raped.”56 In a similar criticism of 
the normalisation of sexual violence in pornography, FOF authors Gene McConnell and 
Keith Campbell argue that the material ‘eroticizes rape and makes it arousing’ by showing 
women being ‘raped, fighting and kicking at first, and then starting to like it.’57 CWA 
believes the themes of violence and coercion in pornography will unquestionably lead 
viewers to commit acts of sexual violence because “they are more likely to rape”.58 EF 
echoes this line of argument in a 2012 article citing Thomas Schiro and Ted Bundy as 
                                                          
56 The Problem of Domestic Violence – Part 1 1984, CD-ROM, Eagle Forum education center, St. Louis. 
57 McConnell, G & Campbell, K 1996, Pornography Lies, Focus on the Family, Colorado Springs, viewed June 
2014, <http://www.focusonthefamily.com/marriage/divorce-and-infidelity/pornography-and-virtual-
infidelity/pornography-lies>. 
58 Concerned Women for America 2010, One third of children view online porn by age 10, Podcast, 
Washington, DC, viewed November 2013, <http://www.cwfa.org/one-third-of-children-view-online-porn-by-
age-10/>. 
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extreme cases of pornography-fuelled violence. Schiro obsessively took pornography with 
him to the scenes of all his crimes, including the final one that included the necrophilic rape 
and murder of 28-year-old Laura Luebbehusen.  Bundy murdered at least 30 women and girls 
in seven states in the United States between 1974 and 1978 and during an interview with FOF 
founder Dr. James Dobson, Bundy described how pornography had aroused in him feelings 
and ideas that became impossible to contain and were eventually acted out on. In the article, 
EF use Schiro and Bundy as examples of how men with a predisposition to sexual aggression 
may feel compelled to act on these impulses as a result of using violent pornography. For 
sexually aggressive men “pornography likely results in fantasies that they are only too likely 
to act out”59 and this is a risk we should not be willing to take. 
The feminist case against pornography has tried to draw out the connections between 
pornography and rape. During the pornography civil rights hearings in Minneapolis, Dr. 
Pauline Bart testified that pornography fuels male sexual violence. Bart had spent a decade 
studying rape and rape avoidance and had spoken to forty-three women who had been 
victimised. It was Bart’s contention that the “ideology of pornography” says that women 
enjoy forced sex and enjoy forced pain. Men are not born believing that women enjoy rape, 
she said, but pornography educates them (MacKinnon and Dworkin, 1998: 73). The Christian 
Right groups’ adoption of the rape frame is a shift away from the child-focused, obscenity-
oriented critiques typically associated with the Christian Right’s position on sexual politics.  
Whitney Strub (2010) argues in her book Perversion for Profit: The Politics of Pornography 
and the Rise of the New Right that the Christian Right’s increasing focus on adult 
pornography into the twenty-first century, where they had previously favoured an imperilled 
children frame, was indicative of their greater political assertiveness during the George W. 
Bush years (p. 286). The movement had a new and dynamic strength, allowing leaders to 
more effectively tackle difficult policy areas. By the 2000s the new Christian Right had been 
building political capital for more than two decades, and broadening their discourse to 
incorporate women’s right language, demonstrating a show of strength from a movement 
willing to venture into hostile political terrain. 
In addition to pointing out how pornography normalises rape, the groups habitually borrow 
from feminist rhetoric to describe the way in which pornography transforms women into 
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objects. Dworkin and MacKinnon outlined this problem in the ordinance in section (a), 
defining pornography as material which presents women as dehumanised sexual objects, 
things or commodities. Glenn Stanton of FOF makes this case in a 2004 article for the group, 
stressing that pornography “dehumanizes sexuality and depersonalizes people by turning the 
viewer into a taker and the one viewed into an object.” The danger, Stanton argues, is that we 
start to see others in our lives the same way we see the object in the pornographic material, 
“as a nobody, a thing that exists for our pleasure.”60 In a 2010 CWA podcast on children’s 
exposure to pornography, Janice Shaw Crouse underlines the objectifying effect of 
pornography, and also decries the representation of women in pornography as unequal to 
men:  
In pornography women are objects, they are not people with feelings, they are not 
people who are due respect, they are not people who are equal to men, instead they’re 
objects to be abused, they’re objects to be used.61 
The reference to equality indicates that Crouse regards the perception that CWA supports 
equality between the sexes as politically important. Given that the Christian Right strongly 
abides by an Order of Creation narrative – teaching adherents that male headship and female 
submission honours the Lord – the adoption of a feminist equality frame shows the group’s 
willingness to extend the margins of their discourse beyond traditionally delineated 
boundaries.  
The groups’ entwine the notion that pornography both objectifies and degrades women. 
Degradation is a concept that has resonance with proponents of sexual purity as it evokes 
notions of the spoiled woman. In other words, that nonmarital sex diminishes the quality or 
value of a woman.  
CWA’s Janice Shaw Crouse describes pornography as laden with ‘hard-core degradation’ 
depicting ‘horrific objectification of girls and women.’62 Here, the reference to degradation 
reassures adherents that sexual purity is still at the essence of the group’s antipornography 
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agenda. Frequent references to the way pornography degrades women undermines a 
potentially more radical interpretation of the groups’ position. 
EF also demonstrated this amalgamation of feminist and conservative language during a 1983 
conference in Cincinnati. One of the founders of Morality in Media spoke, stating that 
“pornography cruelly strips woman bare of every vestige of her dignity, leaving her lying 
discarded as a useless object. Woman is used and abused in ways I cannot even mention 
here.” The speaker clarifies, claiming that by degradation he means “woman is no longer a 
person, but an animal.”63 FOF uses essentialising language to stress the point that 
pornography objectifies women. In a 2009 piece, Paul Coughlin writes that biologically 
speaking, men are ‘the more visually inclined gender’ who are easily seduced into delusional 
beliefs by sexual imagery. This delusion leads men to believe ‘the object can be possessed’.64 
Women become a commodity, a point Jim Daly reiterates in a 2014 piece on sex trafficking 
and the Super Bowl.65 The objectification point here is clear, but the rhetoric is attenuated by 
a nod to the traditional framework of sexual purity and biological determinism.  
Degradation was an important and emotive political symbol for temperance activists, 
precipitating the rise of early feminism and shaping how subsequent movements framed 
threats to women. One of the most visible and outspoken supporters of temperance, Elizabeth 
Cady Stanton, used the symbolic power of the degraded woman to agitate for enhancing 
women’s legal and political rights. While other temperance reformers saw alcohol as the 
primary source of women’s oppression, Cady Stanton drew the connection between women’s 
economic dependence on drunkard husbands and their meagre economic autonomy, which as 
Davis (2008) writes, was “the deeper cause of women’s degradation” (p. 90). Only through 
the right to vote could women bring about legislation to restrict the sale of liquor, thereby 
bringing the soft womanly virtues that held the home together into the public sphere. This 
early infusion of a moral plea with women’s rights language is a rhetorical feature that has 
been taken up by CWA, FOF, and EF. 
                                                          
63 National Consultation on Pornography, Cincinnati, Ohio 1983, CD-ROM, Eagle Forum education center, St. 
Louis. 
64 Coughlin, P 2009, Erosive influence of porn on husbands, Focus on the Family, Colorado Springs, viewed 
November 2013, < http://www.focusonthefamily.com/marriage/divorce-and-infidelity/pornography-and-virtual-
infidelity/erosive-influence-of-porn-on-husbands>. 
65 Daly, J 2014, Did you know about this scandal at the super bowl? Focus on the Family, Colorado Springs, 
viewed June 2014, <http://jimdaly.focusonthefamily.com/did-you-know-about-this-scandal-at-the-super-bowl/>. 
152 
 
CWA leaders Brenda Zurita and Janice Shaw Crouse (2012) also engage with unambiguously 
feminist terms, whether claiming that “misogyny” (the hatred of women) is commonplace in 
pornography,66 or that “sexism” was behind an article written for Playboy.com in which 
conservative women deemed attractive were chosen for what the author offensively termed 
“hate rape.”67  
The dehumanisation of women is a theme repeated in CWA’s material on pornography, lifted 
from a civil rights narrative which challenges social exclusion based on unfair distributions of 
power. However, before the reader can be convinced that CWA has fully adopted the feminist 
tool book, the authors warn: 
We must also consider the moral and ethical dimensions — what are the ramifications 
of treating a woman as an object and violating the God-given purpose of sexual 
relations between a husband and wife? The harms to specific individuals are 
multiplied by the offense against natural law, morality, and Biblical mandates for 
human interaction. 
Here we see a convergence of the feminist notion of objectification with the biblical belief 
that sex must be confined to the parameters of a marriage. The actual physical, psychological 
and social harms of pornography are intensified, or “multiplied” as the authors say, by a 
specific set of moral teachings within Christian fundamentalism. Women’s rights language 
has been appropriated in the service of the patriarchal family – warning adherents that 
marriage is at stake as a consequence of pornography. 
     Making sense of innate male aggression 
 
The assumption that men have a natural predisposition to violence is a view shared by those 
on the Christian Right and antiporn feminists alike, enabling the groups to mimic feminist 
discourse on pornography without getting too far out of their rhetorical comfort zone. A 
prominent theme in the groups’ antipornography material is that of inevitable male anger, 
most threatening when it materialises during sex. This theme has resonance across the 
spectrum, for moral reformists and antiporn feminists alike.   
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This theme was at the heart of the push by temperance activists to frame female 
contraceptives as tools which entice uncontrollable male lust. In 1873 Frances Willard and 
Elizabeth Blackwell led a purity crusade that made the suppression of birth control 
information a major plank in their agenda (Rothman, 1978: 82). They supported legislation 
defining contraceptive information as “obscene material”, and by the 1920s the distribution 
of such information was illegal in almost all jurisdictions in the United States. Willard and 
Blackwell’s objection to the distribution of contraceptive information they deemed ‘obscene’ 
was based on the presupposition that “the male was a savage beast who would subvert and 
corrupt women in order to satisfy his animal impulses” (p. 82).  
It was believed that widely available contraception would allow men to indulge all his lusts 
while free of the responsibilities of child-rearing. In other words, contraception would turn 
women into ‘a slave to her husband’s desires’ (p. 82). There are parallels here with 
MacKinnon’s 1987 interpretation of legalised abortion, which she argued “does not liberate 
women” but instead “frees male sexual aggression.” Dworkin (1983) saw the willingness of 
left-wing men to enthusiastically support legalised abortion as a sign of trouble: “It was the 
brake that pregnancy put on fucking that made abortion a high-priority political issue for men 
in the 1960s” (p. 94). Both positions assume either innate or deeply socially conditioned male 
sexual aggression, and anything granting men greater access to a woman’s body will abet 
harmful treatment of her.  
Ellen Willis, one of the leaders of the ‘pro-sex’ feminist movement, compared the rise of 
antiporn feminism in the 1980s with the temperance movement, and asserted that feminist 
critiques of pornography ‘reinforced right-wing propaganda’. In a related context, Willis 
(1983) explained that the antiporn feminist assumption of innate male aggression undermined 
feminist theory and practice more broadly: 
Whatever its intent, the effect of feminists’ emphasis on controlling male sexuality – 
particularly when that emphasis is combined with a neo-Victorian view of women’s 
nature and the conviction that securing women’s safety from male aggression should 
be the chief priority of the women’s movement – is to undercut feminist opposition to 
the right. It provides powerful reinforcement for conservative efforts to manipulate 
women’s fear of untrammelled male sexuality, intimidating women into stifling their 
own impulses toward freedom so as to cling to what little protection the traditional 
roles still offer (p. 30). 
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While both antiporn feminists and the Christian Right assume innate male aggression, the 
right essentialises the response, and calls on women to submit to male power. The feminist 
response is one of resistance – to unwanted sexual advances from men, and in the form of 
political lesbianism, to men entirely.  
FOF’s Dr Juli Slattery takes the typically essentialist position and invokes God to naturalise 
male sexual impulsivity, reminding women that their role is in managing this inevitability: 
“While acknowledging that sex is a huge force in your husband’s life, don’t neglect the fact 
that God created that force for your use as well.”68 Male sexuality is ultimately the 
responsibility of women. Just as women entice and lead men to sin, women abate sin 
tendency by moderating their own behaviour. The burden is always hers. Dr Slattery makes 
this viewpoint clear, stating how, “just as twisted women are able to pull men into sin, 
virtuous women can use the influence of sex to call men to morality, love, and godliness.”69 
Finally, in a shrewd reframing of submission as power, Dr Slattery tells women that 
pornography cannot replace them as their husband’s ‘teammate’ and ‘confidante’ because 
“This is your place; this is your power; this is your gift.”70  
In another FOF article from 2008, the author reasons that marriage has numerous social 
benefits, one being that it inspires women to socialise men into channelling their sexual 
aggression in socially productive ways.71 The assumption is that male sexual aggression is 
inevitable, but can be assuaged by a civilising force like marriage. Andrea Dworkin argued 
that the Christian Right offers women a sense of structure and safety within predetermined 
roles. “The Right promises to put enforceable restraints on male aggression, thus simplifying 
survival for women.” So long as a woman devotes herself to wifely duties, she will be 
rewarded with her husband’s protection and economic support (in Berlet and Lyons, 2000: 
232).  
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In a further endorsement of the notion of innate male aggression, a 2006 issue of EF’s The 
Phyllis Schlafly Report derided feminist groups who were pushing for further inclusion of 
women in the American military. In Schlafly’s view, such a development would ‘feminise’ 
the military and effectively emasculate the male soldiers whose dominator, risk-taking, 
aggressor instincts would be softened by the passivity and timidness of their female 
counterparts (Schlafly, 2006). Despite asserting the inevitability of male aggression and 
calling on women to redirect their husband’s energy into something beneficial, the groups 
present a contradictory set of claims when specifically addressing pornography.  
While sexual aggression is something women are called to tolerate and placate within a 
marriage, it is entirely unacceptable when played out in a pornographic context. This is where 
the groups reach for feminist arguments. Arguing that pornography is incompatible with 
family values, EF published an article in 2012 stating that because men are “prone to sexual 
aggression” they are at great risk of acting out on the acts they witness in pornography.72 
Framing male aggression as good and inevitable in certain contexts, but dangerous and 
uncontainable in others, is a contradiction reflective of the broader set of conflicting 
narratives in right-wing antipornography discourse. The co-existence of a hierarchical Order 
of Creation narrative alongside an egalitarian, rights-based, pro-woman narrative reveals the 
extent to which the groups are attempting to reconcile the widely held belief, including 
among evangelicals, that certain behavioural characteristics such as aggression are hard-
wired in men, with increasing public intolerance for violence against women.  
The same assumption that it is a woman’s duty to moderate the wayward behaviour of men 
underpinned nineteenth-century writing on marriage in the temperance period. Following the 
Civil War, wives had a new and urgent responsibility to civilise their husbands by curbing 
their ‘animal’ instincts (Rothman, 1978: 22). One female writer insisted in 1886 that “few 
women understand at the outset that in marrying, they have simply captured a wild animal 
[…] the taming of which is to be the life work of the woman who has taken him in charge” 
(Haller and Haller, 1977). More than just taming her husband, women were tasked with 
taming society, and feminising an entire culture through the power of purification and 
unselfish devotion that only woman possessed.  
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The porn addicted husband, like the drunkard husband, represents an inversion of the role of 
the middle class male, that of protector of the home. Pornography and alcohol, as with other 
forms of vice, arouse in men a latent aggression that puts wives and girlfriends at most 
immediate threat. One infraction easily leads to another. Liberal defenders of pornography do 
not make the same instinctive connection that antiporn feminists and the Christian Right do 
between sexualised violence in pornography and women’s increased risk of abuse in the 
home.  
This position is tested most forcefully on the issue of sadomasochism in pornography, a 
practice specifically intended to transgress the boundaries between sex and violence. Despite 
being predicated on the eroticisation of power asymmetry and bodily injury, liberal advocates 
of sadomasochism insist that it is consensual, and that violence can only be present where 
consent does not exist (Truscott, 1991). Pat Califia (1994), who has long defended 
sadomasochistic practices in pornography, disagrees with the assumption that violence is an 
inherently male phenomenon, stating in Public Sex that “Dworkin and many other members 
of the antipornography movement define […] maleness as violence.”  
Indeed, Dworkin stated during a speech at San Francisco’s Galileo High School in 1978 that 
“sex and murder are fused in male consciousness” and asserted that for men, the destruction 
of women’s bodies is intrinsic to their arousal. Califia accuses Dworkin of exaggerating the 
threat to women, “I resent attempts like this to distort my perceptions of reality and make me 
unduly afraid.” Califia admits to not knowing why men become rapists, but whatever the 
reason, pornography is ruled out by Califia as a realistic cause (p. 111).  
Antiporn feminists and the Christian Right both make the essentialising assumption that 
women have nothing to do with violence, that they have no access to violent practice, “actual 
physical brutality, or discursive violence directed towards others” (Lentz, 1993). Violence is 
specifically the domain of the masculine. In the antiporn feminist attempts to capture the 
ways in which systems interlock to make sexual violence far more complex in its effects on 
women’s lives (Berlin Ray, 1996), they have formulated a narrative based on intrinsic female 
goodness and innate male badness that can be easily misappropriated by the Christian Right. 
     A female essence 
 
In their discourse on pornography, the groups construct a notion of female ‘essence’. Women 
are believed to be more emotional and relational than men, who are supposed to be primarily 
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logical and visual. FOF’s Dr Slattery explains men’s use of pornography with this essentialist 
dualism:  
A woman’s sexual desire is far more connected to emotions than her husband’s sex 
drive is. A man can experience sexual arousal apart from any emotional attachment. 
He can look at a naked woman and feel intense physical desire for her, while at the 
same time he may be completely devoted to and in love with his wife.73 
When a woman is the one using pornography, FOF stresses that she is going against nature, 
because ‘she is being the initiator, she is the one seeking it out’. Men’s use of pornography is 
justified or excused by the naturalisation of male sexual aggression, but for women there is 
no such relief.  
The debate on women possessing a ‘female essence’ is located in the way social science 
developed to examine whether males and females have essential sets of attributes linked to 
their sex at birth, or whether these attributes develop in response to a social construction of 
gender. Mead’s 1928 study on coming of age in Samoa was the first study to examine the 
theory of gender as socially constructed from a cross-cultural perspective. Although Mead’s 
study used questionable methods and was subsequently challenged (Freeman, 1992), it 
nevertheless represented a paradigm shift away from assumptions about essential and 
immutable differences between men and women. 
The distinctly separate roles set out for men and women fostered a sexual antagonism that 
preceded the subsequent first and second waves of feminism. As Epstein (1981) asserts, 
everything WCTU did was informed by a commitment to what were perceived as in the 
interests of women and by an antagonism to what was seen as a masculine culture (p. 125). 
This attitude even manifested in WCTU’s efforts on prostitution. Despite the extreme taboo 
of prostitution at the time, WCTU pushed for laws to prosecute men who profited from 
prostitution, while maintaining an attitude of sympathy for prostituted women themselves, as 
long as they regarded the institution as evil (p. 126). The women of Iowa WCTU secured a 
law requiring that “men who frequent the haunts kept by degraded women shall be punished 
as felons” (in Epstein, 1981: 126). This position has notable parallels with the Nordic model 
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on prostitution first established in Sweden in 1999 and later adopted by Norway and Iceland, 
with versions also being implemented in France and Canada. The Nordic model criminalises 
the purchase of sex, but legalises the selling of sex. The law is premised on a commitment to 
women’s rights rather than moral anxiety (Förbud mot köp av sexuell tjänst: en utvärdering 
1999-2008). The belief that men’s proclivity for sexual aggression precludes the possibility 
of a mutually safe and consensual sex contract is evident in both the conservative and 
antiporn feminist interpretations of prostitution. 
However, there is an important distinction between the views of the Christian Right and 
antiporn feminists on this question of male and female essence. Antiporn feminists reject any 
conflation of gender with sex. Sex is defined as the “anatomical and physiological differences 
of males and females” and gender as the “psychological, social, and political significance 
these differences come to have in society” (Diquinzio, 1993: 2). The groups in this study tend 
to treat sex and gender as one and the same. God made man masculine and woman feminine 
for complementary purposes.74 Despite antiporn feminist resistance to essentialist claims on 
gender, there is a strong emphasis on the conditioned differences between men and women in 
antiporn feminist literature and this is a perspective which resonates with religious 
conservatives and opens up opportunities for appropriation.  
The groups frame women as collective victims of men’s use of pornography. Gamson (1992) 
describes this discursive process as ‘injustice framing’, which allows those on the Christian 
Right and antiporn feminists to see the issue of pornography in terms of right and wrong and 
identify more keenly with the perceived victims of such an injustice.  The emphasis by both 
sides on the differences, innate or conditioned, between men and women are distinct from the 
liberal feminist concept of human nature, which posits that “male and female natures are 
identical […] there is no such thing as male and female nature: there is only human nature 
and that has no sex” (Jaggar, 1983: 37). It is for this reason that liberal feminists present no 
fundamental challenge to the sex trade, seeing the exchange of money for sex as merely a 
contractual agreement between two rational humans, rather than a representation of the few 
options available to women in a system where men and women have unequal access to 
material power. 
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The groups’ belief in a female essence comes through strongly in their antiporn material: 
Between bad ideas of gender neutrality and even worse ideas about the innocence of 
pornography, we reach the world […] where men act like stereotypical women, and 
retreat from a real marriage into a fantasy life via pornography […] and where women 
conversely act like stereotypical men, taking the lead in leaving their marriages and 
firing angry charges on the way, out of frustration and withheld sex.75 
Therefore pornography is problematic because it teaches men to use their natural qualities as 
initiators destructively, as FOF senior analyst Daniel Weiss explains: “Pornography teaches 
that the only value women have is how submissive they are to the sexual perversions of 
violent men.” He then adds that through pornography: “Men are taught to control, harm, and 
degrade women.”76 EF’s Tottie Ellis argues that pornography’s callousness towards women 
has connections with domestic violence, 77 a view CWA echoes. Citing a study on the social 
costs of pornography, CWA claim male domestic violence offenders who utilise the sex 
industry have been found to use more controlling behaviours, and engage in more sexual 
abuse, stalking, and marital rape against their partners than males who do not use the sex 
industry. 78 The connection between pornography and domestic violence is one that antiporn 
feminism has long espoused.79 In the case of alcohol, temperance activists presented evidence 
linking wife beating and neglect with excessive consumption of intoxicating beverages 
(Epstein, 1981: 114). In both cases, alcohol and pornography are the symbols of a strain of 
masculine hostility to women and the family. 
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     A new focus on the links between domestic violence and pornography 
 
The issue of domestic violence has traditionally been met with ambivalent vacillation by 
groups on the Right. Christian Right leaders have grappled with how to respond to the issue 
of violence against women since it came to political prominence during the debates over the 
ERA between 1972 and the amendment’s eventual demise in 1982. The conventional position 
for social conservatives has been to disregard feminist interpretations of the causes of 
domestic violence, which attribute men’s violence against women to patriarchal cultural 
norms which eroticise and institutionalise male dominance. In step with the antifeminist 
leanings of the Christian Right, CWA, EF and FOF’s lobbying affiliate CitizenLink, all 
oppose the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). CWA bases this position on its fiscal 
conservatism, taking issue with large federal programs which foster wasteful spending and 
encroach on people’s civil liberties. EF takes the same stance, asserting that VAWA is a tool 
of “radical feminists” who have “devised a scheme to cash in on a flow of taxpayers’ 
money.”80 This highlights the tension felt by the Christian Right in terms of reconciling the 
competing realms of fiscal and social conservatism, and the opportunistic manner in which 
the groups magnify one or the other depending on the issue at hand.  
Despite their opposition to VAWA, the groups’ material on pornography give the impression 
that violence against women is now a chief concern for the movement. CWA’s Penny Young 
Nance highlights this, stating: “Yes, it is definitely a worthy goal for VAWA to seek to 
reduce domestic violence against women.” However, the cost of the measure pacifies any 
urge to see this through: “VAWA doesn’t seem to have made enough of a difference to 
justify the cost to taxpayers” Nance claims.81 Although the scepticism concerning VAWA 
seems to undermine CWA’s concern for victimised women, CWA does not trivialise the 
problem of domestic violence, instead it connects the very real and widespread instances of 
domestic violence to one of its cultural enemies – the breakdown of the family. CWA is 
fixated on specific findings within domestic violence data to enhance its pro nuclear family 
values, asserting that: “everybody should also know that the majority of “domestic violence” 
incidences are committed by the boyfriends of mothers, not husbands and biological fathers” 
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adding, “the breakdown of marriage and family has been a major factor in increasing 
violence and abuse against women and children.”82  
This is where CWA and antiporn feminists diverge on the issue of men’s violence against 
women. While CWA argue that marriage offers women safety and protection from violence: 
“A married father-mother home is the safest and most nurturing place for the nation’s women 
and children,” feminists contend that it can be one of the most dangerous situations for a 
woman to be in. For example, writing in Ms Magazine, Barbara Findlen (1995) describes 
marriage as “a place of oppression, danger, and drudgery for women.” EF takes a much 
harder line and sees virtually no merit in the premise of VAWA, which they regard as 
discriminatory in its framing of men as aggressors and women as victims. In a strange 
misreading of the feminist position, EF characterises VAWA supporters as endorsing “innate 
gender difference […] men are naturally batterers and women are naturally victims.”83 This 
assertion also conveniently overlooks the biblical teaching on innate male headship and 
female submission. 
Despite the groups’ anxiety about VAWA, on the issue of domestic violence more broadly, 
CWA and FOF in particular have adopted a gender conscious view of domestic violence that 
incorporates feminist arguments into its platform. CWA author Rebekah Tooley exemplifies 
CWA’s confident adoption of a feminist domestic violence frame: 
Okay, seriously now, how violent is pornography? And while we’re at it, what’s so 
bad about pornography? If we are talking about a woman’s worth […] what does 
pornography communicate about the worth of women? How about a man punching or 
choking a woman while having sex with her? Does that honor and protect her? No, it 
perpetuates violence against women.84 
Here the more explicitly feminist domestic violence frame is placated by a reference to 
honour and protection, in keeping with the group’s sexual purity instinct. In the New 
Testament, honour is strongly associated with self-respect. Luke 14:7-8 states that honour 
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cannot be sought or taken, but earned through godly character. The loss of honour signals the 
onset of shame. In her account of biblical shame, Johanna Stiebert (2002) writes that scripture 
teaches that honour and shame are elucidated by a set of related means values, one of them 
being purity. Therefore, a person who is pure rather than polluted should know how to 
maintain honour and avoid shame. Purity thereby functions as a means value because it 
“facilitates the realization of the core values of honor and shame” (Plevnik in Stiebert, p. 35). 
CWA, FOF, and EF use references to honour as a means of reminding adherents that 
pornography pollutes the pure. It is of course women and not men who are made impure by 
sex. The innate lasciviousness of men means they cannot reasonably be held accountable for 
sex they initiate or engage in, therefore it is women who must control when sex takes place, 
and who must bear full responsibility. 
Just as CWA soften their language on objectification by adding that pornography “degrades” 
women, the group also employs this rhetorical strategy in their material on pornography and 
violence. CWA’s Angie Vineyard wrote in a 2003 article that pornography is “degrading and 
detrimental to women’ and ‘encourage[s] violence to women.”85 In a similar piece published 
in 2010, Rebekah Tooley argues that pornography is not art, but a sin that degrades, exploits, 
and abuses women to “sate a man’s depravity.”86  
FOF sees pornography as a central to the normalisation of violence against women, acting as 
a guidebook to its viewers: “Some people become so desensitized and addicted [to 
pornography] that they must act out their twisted fantasies on others.”87 Antiporn feminist 
scholar Sheila Jeffreys has observed the conservative shift in rhetoric on violence against 
women and the sex trade, asserting: 
Christian organisations that have, for their own reasons, objected to prostitution in the 
past have in the last ten years or so absolutely adopted the feminist perspective and 
they talk about prostitution as violence against women (Jeffreys in O’Brien et al, 
2013: 44). 
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Indeed domestic violence is a relatively new issue for the Christian Right. Deliberately 
ignored in the past because activists worried that emphasising the prevalence of domestic 
violence might undermine the institution of marriage and allow government to meddle in 
“internal family business” (Strub, 2010: 278), it is now a key focus of CWA and FOF in 
particular.  
EF has not been as willing to incorporate feminist arguments into its discourse on domestic 
violence. A 1984 Eagle Council conference titled ‘The Problem of Domestic Violence’ 
provides some insight into EF’s resistance to the domestic violence frame. EF’s Tottie Ellis 
explains: 
While this interest [in domestic violence] may sound wonderful, it also creates many 
problems. The problems involved are not just the tragedy of the victims […] but the 
fact that the feminist movement and left-wing groups have claimed domestic violence 
as its own.88 
Ellis’s frustration with feminists claiming domestic violence as their issue highlights the 
competitive political landscape social movement organisations face when competing for 
political legitimacy on women’s issues. Ellis is concerned that feminists have seized upon the 
genuine issue of domestic violence as a means of securing federal funding for shelters. Ellis 
objects to such shelters on the basis that they temporarily house women, not men, in sum: 
“These shelters push the feminist agenda […] to teach women that they don’t need 
husbands.”89 The concern that domestic violence shelters are in fact surreptitious 
indoctrination camps run by feminists is supplemented by the claim that feminists “never 
address the connection of pornography and domestic violence.” Mischaracterising the 
women’s movement as a homogeneous group that collectively fails to make associations 
between pornography and violence is a deliberately misleading tactic by the group. EF’s 
leaders are aware of the work antiporn feminists have done toward framing pornography as a 
form of violence against women. This is evident in the same Eagle Council conference, in 
which Indianapolis city council member Beulah Coughenour discusses her alliance with 
antiporn feminists in efforts to introduce an antipornography ordinance in her city. 
Coughenour campaigned against the ERA during the 1970s and describes working with 
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feminists to frame pornography as a civil rights issue as ‘a real mental adjustment.’90 It is 
worth noting that Coughenour opposed laws against banning rape in marriage on the basis 
that she is “very protective of the family”, but took a less doctrinaire approach to 
pornography, believing some harm to women can be linked to men’s use of the material (in 
Downs, 1989: 110). But of course being transparent about the areas where EF and antiporn 
feminists agree on the relationship between pornography and domestic violence would 
undermine the group’s governing framework which explicitly rejects feminist ideology. 
It is how CWA chooses to further articulate and support this traditional view that illustrates 
its crossover with antiporn feminist discourse. One of the framing mechanisms CWA uses to 
demonstrate the threat pornography poses to marriages is to emphasise the risk of abuse 
towards the wife, reverting to the aforementioned domestic violence frame. This technique is 
by no means unheard of within the Christian antiporn movement. As far back as 1958 Ralph 
A. Cannon wrote in Christianity Today that pornography “de-personalized” women and 
represented them as “pliant machines which men utilize for brutish pleasure” (in Mielke, 
1995: 56). These are sentiments echoed by antiporn feminist activist Gail Dines, who has 
explained in a podcast titled ‘increasingly violent porn hijacking our sexuality’ that 
pornography depicts “brutal body punishing sex designed to debase and degrade and 
humiliate [women]”. The themes of debasement and degradation are not too far removed 
from Christian notions of impurity and sins committed against one’s own body, and therefore 
resonate with the groups’ perspective on pornography. 
     Recasting hegemonic masculinity and subordinate femininity 
 
The groups display a contradictory set of arguments on the subject of hegemonic masculinity 
in the context of pornography. While each group uses theological rhetoric to naturalise sex 
hierarchy, there are numerous examples where this position becomes fractured by the 
adoption of a critique of masculinity more typical of antiporn feminist discourse.  
Hegemonic masculinity is a concept that arose out of R.W. Connell’s (2005) gender order 
theory, which theorises that there are multiple masculinities occupying various positions in a 
given pattern of gender relations. Hegemonic masculinity simply refers to the most dominant, 
culturally exalted form of masculinity. It is a contestable position, continually challenged and 
reconstructed based on cultural norms (Carrigan et al. 1985: 63-100).  
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The clearest expressions of hegemonic masculinity are manifest in sexual harassment, rape, 
incest, wife beating, and violent pornography (Kaufman, 1987). This is because a central 
feature of hegemonic masculinity is the need to aggressively prove heterosexuality, which 
reveals itself in antagonism towards women and anyone deemed effeminate. For this reason, 
homosexual men and academically inclined men represent subordinated masculinities 
because of their associations with femininity. Marginalised groups such as men of colour and 
low socioeconomic status men represent nonhegemonic masculine identities that can exist in 
tension with, and appropriate aspects of, hegemonic masculinity. Despite such efforts, these 
marginalised identities can never penetrate dominant masculinity. Men of colour are 
marginalised by a discourse which centres the Western white male subject, and poor men 
have failed to adequately embody the ‘Provider’ role demanded by hegemonic masculinity, 
thus feminising them. Hegemonic masculinity is not normal in a statistical sense, very few 
men might actually enact it, but it is normative (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 832).  
The valorisation of hegemonic masculinity represents the general thrust of Christian Right 
discourse. Male dominance is a central pillar of the romanticised nuclear family. In fact a key 
argument of FOF president Jim Daly’s (2016) recently published book Marriage Done Right 
is that marriages are failing in the United States because men have allowed themselves to 
become feminised. It is only in reclaiming lost vestiges of their former, more masculine 
selves that their relationships will be restored.  
However, in the groups’ discourse on pornography, key facets of hegemonic masculinity that 
are usually insisted upon come under critique. For example, in a September 2004 radio show 
for CWA, psychotherapist Rory C. Reid postulates that men are socialised to accept 
pornography’s precepts due to cultural inculcation. Reid argues that pornography is 
predominantly a male problem because it is a “function of emotional avoidance,” which is 
more likely to affect men because they are “socially conditioned” to be emotionally 
disconnected, a fact that Reid assures listeners does not mean that men are “not capable of 
becoming more emotionally aware and emotionally connected.” 91 The subject of masculinity 
is also addressed by CWA leaders Crouse and Zurita in a piece on the objectification of 
women in pornography. Citing antiporn feminist Gail Dines, they assert that: “pornography 
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socializes boys to help shape the ways that they develop their masculine identity”92 Evoking 
(i) of the antipornography ordinance, CWA warns that pornography strips the humanity from 
women to such a degree that “all women become objects” who are simply there to appease 
the sexual appetite of a men “in ways that shore up their masculinity.”93 FOF also worries 
about the influence of pornography in terms of shaping male identity: “[pornography creates] 
the need to validate masculinity through beautiful women […] the great majority of men who 
never come close to sex with their dream woman are left feeling cheated or unmanly”94 
[emphasis added]. Elsewhere, FOF argues that pornography makes men feel they need 
“sexually submissive women” to affirm their masculine identity.95 FOF’s Dr. Juli Slattery 
affirms the view that masculinity is socially conditioned in men. Writing to women whose 
husbands have lost interest in sex, she assures them that he has been “programmed to believe 
that masculinity equals sexual conquest and that real men can perform in bed.”96  
By challenging the Christian Right masterframe that seeks to explain and justify masculinity, 
CWA and FOF subtly embrace the social constructionist view of antiporn feminists, or the 
idea that the meaning of the body is changeable, and not fixed by a biologically 
predetermined set of differences between men and women (Willis, 1983).  
While CWA and FOF’s rhetoric on pornography and masculinity suggests some openness to 
the antiporn feminist argument that gender is a fluid, unstable state, elsewhere the groups 
explicitly reject such a claim. Although CWA’s Crouse co-opts Dines’ argument regarding 
the socialisation of boys with respect to pornography, she is much more averse to the idea 
when confronted with it directly, as she makes clear in a 2007 piece “The irony of socially 
constructing gender” in which the United Nations International Women’s Day erasure of 
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gender differences is described as “nonsense” and “lunacy.”97 The more explicitly anti-
feminist EF is unambiguously opposed to any critique of masculinity: 
[…] the feminist movement was never about equality. It was always about 
interchangeability, and when the facts of human nature are too overwhelming to make 
men and women interchangeable, feminists are determined to get rid of anything that 
is truly masculine.98 
When pornography is not the focal point, FOF endorse unequal relations between the sexes 
through a narrative that legitimises hegemonic masculinity and subordinate feminity. For 
example, FOF has an extensive archive of podcasts devoted to the principles of wifely 
submission in marriage with titles such as “What Does it Mean to be A Submissive Wife?”99, 
“Submission: Finding Strength in God’s Design”100 and “Submission When Your Husband 
Isn’t Nice”101 which teaches women to be “intentionally kind” to their husbands “even when 
he doesn’t deserve it” because God has called her to that role. CWA is less keen to discuss 
biblical submission, with few contemporary references to it. When biblical submission in 
marriage is raised by the group, it is framed in reference to equality and the supposed “equal 
submission” of men and women to the Lord.102 Characterised by a need to appeal to 
culturally accepted notions of gender equality, CWA’s reconceptualisation of biblical 
submission as equally onerous on husbands as it is on wives underscores the wide-reaching 
influence of feminist principles. 
Temperance movement literature similarly attempted to draw power from subordination 
through the idealisation of domesticity. Epstein (1981) writes that marriage manuals tried to 
demonstrate that “domesticity augmented women’s power” (p. 84). It was argued that, 
although work in the home seemed trivial, women’s domestic work in fact held families 
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together and was therefore the basis of a strong society. This subtle but invincible female 
power was believed to be preserved by women’s seclusion – it was women’s perceived 
powerlessness that made their moral and spiritual superiority unshakeable. 
Pornography weakens women’s power in relation to men because it is through the strategic 
use of male sexual urges that women exercise power. FOF’s Dr. Juli Slattery makes this clear 
in her summation of marital intimacy: “While acknowledging that sex is a huge force in your 
husband’s life, don’t neglect the fact that God created that force for your use as well” 
[emphasis added]103 the emphasis being on utility, not equivalency. Pornography distorts this 
delicate relationship by occupying the marital space as the ever compliant sexual participant, 
denying women the ‘power’ to both enflame and lull male urges at convenient times. To 
those on the Christian Right, women do have opportunities for exercising power – by 
guilefully influencing the behaviours of their more powerful husbands. In this sense, the 
groups reconceptualise subordinate femininity in their antiporn discourse as a source of 
power, by framing men as easily manipulated and controlled by women who can use their 
feminine sexual appeal to their advantage. This view is a distorted take on the feminist 
concept of power. Indeed, the assumption that women significantly control sex has been 
challenged by antiporn feminist Catharine MacKinnon (1989). MacKinnon argues that 
women feel compelled to preserve the dualism of male dominance and female subordination 
because men enforce it through the distant or imminent threat of forced sex (p. 184-5). The 
groups accept MacKinnon’s take on male dominance within the context of pornography, 
believing women to be at significant threat of male violence, but within the context of 
marriage women’s powerlessness is transformed. Again, the nuclear family unit is framed as 
the one institution in which women can possess some form of power. 
     Pornography and familial women: wives, mothers, daughters 
 
The tension between motherhood and the women’s movement has been thoroughly 
documented (Alpert, 1974; Daly, 1978; Dinnerstein, 1976; Griffin, 1977; Rich, 1976). Once 
Betty Friedan (1963) described the plight of white, middle-class women who wanted to leave 
the domestic sphere and take up professional vocations alongside men as “the problem that 
has no name,” motherhood moved into contested terrain.  
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The early stages of the women’s liberation movement defined motherhood and child-bearing 
as the locus of women’s oppression, and antimaternalism came to define feminism, 
subsequently alienating many American women who preferred to emphasise the positive 
aspects of motherhood. In contrast, CWA, FOF, and EF have consistently placed motherhood 
at the centre of their discourse on pornography as an identity worthy of special privileges, and 
eliciting exceptional sympathy. This also gives the groups greater leverage to make 
representational claims about American women, most of whom will be mothers by the time 
they reach their forties (Pew Research, 2010). 
Out of the discourse of nineteenth-century true womanhood, motherhood was conceptualised 
as a sacred calling “in which the ‘true woman,’ the white woman, emerged as desexualized, 
indifferent to intellectual life, imbued with Christian piety […] and devoted to home and 
church” (Mankiller et al, 1998: 380). The belief was that once a woman moved into 
motherhood her identity became desexed against the hypersexualised version of femininity 
represented by pornography. What remains of the mother’s sexuality is condensed into one 
very deliberate function and must be delimited by procreative functions and duties to the 
family.  
The groups endorse this opinion, reminding readers on several occasions that pornography is 
especially degrading to mothers. FOF warns that the depictions of ‘kinky sex’ in pornography 
incite men to demand similar from their wives.104 CWA worries that the introduction of 
pornography into the family home inevitably divides “mothers from children” and “husbands 
from wives.” CWA upholds this viewpoint by borrowing from feminist rhetoric, stating 
“there is no equality in pornography; one party dominates, subjugates, degrades, demeans or 
humiliates another.”105 This typifies the tendency, particularly by CWA, to articulate their 
argument using the frame of motherhood, but supplementing this with language that appeals 
to modern women’s openness to equality-based rhetoric. In evoking both promaternal and 
women’s rights language, CWA in effect caters to both the fear that feminism seeks to 
undermine the nuclear family, and at the same time accepts that feminism has changed 
perceptions of women’s appropriate role in society.  
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The groups rely on mother-centred antiporn rhetoric because the mother of patriarchal 
Christian mythology is the antithesis of all things pornographic. Her sexuality simply does 
not exist beyond her reproductive potential (Walker, 2003). The idealisation of the asexual 
Virgin Mary counters the threat of the aggressive sexuality embodied in Eve, as Walker notes 
“Christianity balances its […] contempt and idealisation in the figures of Mary and Eve” (p. 
136). Positioning mothers as asexual paragons of virtue epitomises the image of the holy 
mother and child, impregnated without sexual contact, nurturing untouched by the passion of 
female desire (Macdonald, 1995).  
Feminist Adrienne Rich (1967) asserts that patriarchal systems of power require that the 
mother be divested of sexuality: “women are permitted to be sexual only at a certain time of 
life” (p. 183) – before she is made unsexual by her children. The more male dominance came 
to characterise western culture, the greater the disassociation between sexuality and 
maternalism was embedded in cultural representations of womanhood (Rossi, 1973). In 
stripping women of maternal associations, they become pornified by the absence of 
procreative-centred sexual behaviour. The groups use this binary by relying on maternal 
evocations in discussions of pornography to uphold the crucial moral line between 
nonprocreative sin and procreative virtue.  
The centreing of mothers and wives in the groups’ discourse on pornography also serves to 
define women in terms of their relationship to others. This was exemplified during a 2013 
radio broadcast hosted by CWA’s Martha Kleder. The broadcast discussed an initiative called 
‘She’s Somebody’s Daughter,’ which aims to humanise pornography victims by encouraging 
its users to imagine that the women in pornography are related to them. The project’s 
manager, Tammy Stauffer, warns listeners: “if you don’t want your daughter, your sister, 
your mother, your cousin, your son, being treated this way or being sexually abused on 
camera, why would we accept it for anybody’s daughter, or anybody’s son.”106 This 
rhetorical strategy is based on a belief that women are more ‘relational’ than men, a claim 
often repeated by FOF to explain a woman’s interconnectedness with her children and 
dependency on her husband, who is imagined to perform a more autonomous and self-
directed role within the family unit.  
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This is a clear point of divergence with contemporary feminist theory which has gone to great 
lengths to establish an understanding of women as independently significant. This struggle 
has been manifestly captured in the campaign for reproductive rights which has sought to 
separate the woman from foetus. Rothman (1978) notes that from the debate over abortion 
rights emerged a doctrine of woman as person which implicitly suggested that maternal roles 
might not be consistent with women’s needs, effectively positioning woman and child in 
conflict with one another (p. 246). Commenting on the trilogy of mothers, children, and 
parenting, theological expert Bonnie Miller-McLemore (2011) problematises a tendency in 
feminist and religious writing to sharply separate the subject of children and the subject of 
women, believing their plight to be “intricately connected” but warns “neither subject should 
be reduced to its relationship to the other” (p. 19). In Of Woman Born, Adrienne Rich (1976) 
explains that the Western institution of motherhood demands that women see themselves in 
relation to others rather than the creation of the self (p. 42). CWA, FOF, and EF use 
pornography as a rhetorical vehicle to reify feminine selflessness and affirm maternal 
interconnectedness.  
The unwillingness of the Christian Right to see women as full and separate subjects apart 
from their familial connections limits their ability to engage with the feminist 
antipornography arguments centred on the liberatory potential to self-define the boundaries of 
sexual practice. It is through the site of the mother that the groups make judgements about the 
moral wellbeing of society. This was demonstrated in an FOF radio broadcast from March 
2013 in which the co-host John Fuller asks true womanhood advocate Nancy Leigh DeMoss 
why many women struggle to switch from being a professional to being a mother, to which 
DeMoss responds: “Our feminist culture does not value children, and I’m talking about 
Christian feminists here […] taking care of children isn’t really that important […] but God 
has placed a nurturing heart in a woman.” In their view, women are abdicating their maternal 
responsibilities by “imbibing the culture of feminism”107 which exalts career aspirations. 
Because of women’s traditionally held role as nurturer of children, feminist efforts to push 
women into the masculine public sphere imperil the nation’s children, resulting in greater 
levels of pornography use. 
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    Childhood innocence 
 
Fear centreing on the destructive potential of pornography on the impressionable mind of the 
child underpins a significant degree of the groups’ antipornography material. As Schreiber 
(2008) well notes, children are a population who tend to elicit more sympathy than women do 
in Christian Right discourse.  
CWA make it clear that children should be viewed as extremely vulnerable in the context of 
exposure to pornography: “the real tragedy is that young children are watching this porn and 
will grow up thinking sex as depicted in pornography is how it should be”108 [emphasis mine] 
and “[…] most importantly, adult pornography harms children”109 [emphasis mine].  It is 
made clear that the childhood years are a time of innocence, before the true depravity of a 
fallen world is realised – “a time when you're establishing in [children] and around them a 
healthy, God-governed life” as FOF’s Vicki Courtney contends. This stance is premised on a 
belief in the separateness of childhood and in the pure innocence of children, a school of 
thought that grew out of the nineteenth century when the domesticisation of the family 
transformed the role of children in society. 
The separateness of childhood has its origins in nineteenth-century Victorian ideology which 
played a dominant role in temperance discourse and shaped the modern-day understanding of 
children and sexuality. Weeks (1981) notes that as the image of the home became more 
sentimentalised there was an intensification of emotional investment in children and a fear of 
sexual corruption.  
Temperance literature reveals a strong preference for framing the evils of alcohol in terms of 
its deleterious effects on children and helpless mothers. One temperance almanac (Dewey, 
1843) described the conditions a mother lived in at the hands of her drunkard husband: “poor 
mother and her babes are cowering over a few decaying embers, blue and shivering with the 
cold […] the mother weeps as she hugs still firmer in her embrace the little one which is 
striving to draw nourishment from her bosom.”  It was believed that lessons of temperance 
“taught by the tender eloquence of maternal lips” might save children. Women, particularly 
mothers, were best equipped to correct the devastation of male vice on the unblemished child. 
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However, as Weeks adds, the middle-class family was a peculiar combination, for it both 
“stressed the innocence of childhood, its asexuality, and its potentiality for sexual corruption” 
(p. 51).  
FOF demonstrates this paradox in their talking points on pornography, asserting that 
“children who are exposed to pornography tend to exhibit sexually deviant attitudes and 
behavior, including sexual violence and crime.”110 While children are on the one hand moral 
innocents, the ever-present potential for sexual transgressions is repeatedly stated.  
Kinsey’s model of sex education is particularly detested by the groups, which CWA 
resentfully describes as encouraging children to “explore their natural sexual desires.”111 The 
dualistic positioning of children as innocents or devils is a construction that has extensive 
roots even in Western liberal traditions. 
It is possible that the groups are not elevating children to a position of greater concern than 
women because a child’s innocence and goodness exceeds that of women, but rather because 
children have such a tendency for defiance and rebellion “associated with the powers of evil” 
(Mercer, 2005: 145). The groups emphasise the extreme vulnerability of children, who they 
believe lack the capacity to defend themselves from powerful impositions such as 
pornography, but rather paradoxically, a child’s wilful sinfulness means they struggle to 
make good moral decisions.  
Although CWA acknowledge the depravity pornography evokes in all its users, they pay 
particular attention to how it shapes the minds of children. After alleging that one-third of 
children view pornography before the age of 10, Crouse states during a radio broadcast that 
children are ‘more likely to rape’ and ‘more likely to view violence as part of the sex act.’112  
The role of the market in reconceptualising the child as consumer and exploiting the moral 
ambivalence of children also shapes the Christian Right’s narrative on children and 
pornography. In the consumer context, children are used as scapegoats for broader social ills. 
They are pathologised and held responsible when they succumb to the pressures of 
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consumerism, “their ways of participating in consumerist society […] are deemed responsible 
for society’s problems.” (Mercer, 2005: 74). In other words, one can assess the health of a 
society based on the pastimes of its children.  
The groups are devoted to the notion that children require undivided maternal attention in 
order to evade predatory men. CWA warns mothers that dressing their children 
‘provocatively’ might invite attention from users of child pornography and prematurely 
shorten this period of innocence: “by allowing our children to dress and act provocatively, are 
we not sending a message to someone with a proclivity toward sexual deviancy with a minor? 
In their minds it is okay to have sex with children, and when children are dressed like 
seductive adults, it can encourage their behavior rather than clearly delineate the line between 
normalcy and deviancy.”113 Fictional work at the height of the temperance movement placed 
a similar burden on children whose mothers had exited the home for whatever reason, taking 
with them their ever-watchful eye over the wellbeing of their progeny. In these situations, 
children’s dependency and vulnerability became a form of power, wherein they could redeem 
their drunken father from his life of vice, but not before the predatory father had violated the 
sexual innocence of his daughters (Sanchez-Eppler, 2005). In both scenarios, a mother’s 
abandonment of her children ends in the most abhorrent of circumstances. 
This view is in line with the belief held by the groups that male sexual aggression is virtually 
impossible to control and therefore anything that might provoke it should be eliminated. On 
October 24, 2012, CWA and She’s Somebody’s Daughter hosted a ‘Parents Awareness 
Night’ in Oklahoma City designed to warn parents about the myriad of ways they might be 
contributing to their child’s pornography exposure. FOF echoes this idea, warning parents 
that the “monster in their modem” is hurting their children, and proposes that removing the 
high-speed internet connection from the home might be one reasonable solution.114  
EF’s Schlafly sees pornography as part of a wider conspiracy by the left to inculcate children 
with the values of a fallen world, amongst “abortion, sodomy, [and] same-sex marriage 
license[s]”115 Paying particular attention to sex education in public schools, the group implies 
that the government is engaged in a conspiracy to pollute the minds of young children with 
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various perversions, including at age sixteen “teaching […] common sexual behaviors 
including use of pornography.”116  
However, in a measured convergence of women’s rights and children’s rights, the groups 
sometimes intersect these narratives, co-opting feminist arguments to strengthen their point: 
When the sexualization of girls begins from the time they are born, how will they ever 
grow up to be strong, capable women who value their femininity and their abilities 
without relying solely on their sex appeal?117 
In contemporary religious discourse, children are constructed as extremely vulnerable, 
lacking the capacity to defend themselves from powerful impositions such as pornography. 
Perhaps most troublingly, their “wilful sinfulness” means they struggle to make good moral 
decisions (Mercer, 2005: 46).  
FOF underscores this point in a 2004 article on restoring teenagers after pornography use, 
stating that “even when a teenager has a faith-based life in Christ, he or she will still be faced 
with quite a bit of sexual temptation.”118 The groups seem aware that young minds are sex-
curious, but as Strub (2010) notes, the tendency of the Christian Right is to see aberrant 
sexual behaviour as a direct result of pornography, rather than a human inevitability.    
CWA draws on feminist activist Gail Dines’ work to enhance their argument about sex-
curious young people. “Gail Dines tells of talking to her son when he became a teenager” 
writes Crouse and Zurita “her remarks are a good warning to all young men and women […] 
her talk is a good model for parents.”119 Dines’ talk to her son involved cautioning him 
                                                          
116 This assertion is based on a 1988 SIECUS report written by Debra Haffner; Schlafly, P 1999, The 
consequences of sex education, Eagle Forum, St. Louis, viewed March 2016, < 
http://www.eagleforum.org/psr/1999/oct99/psroct99.html> 
117 Zurita, B 2008, The dichotomy of girls’ toys: princesses or prostitots, Concerned Women for America, 
Washington, DC, viewed January 2014, <http://www.cwfa.org/the-dichotomy-of-girls-toys-princesses-or-
prostitots/>. 
118Jackson, R 2004, Preventing future use, Focus on the Family, Colorado Springs, viewed January 2014, 
<http://www.focusonthefamily.com/parenting/sexuality/when-children-use-pornography/preventing-future-
use>. 
119 Crouse, JS & Zurita, B 2012, WRAP week – 10 harms of pornography, harms #3 and #4, Concerned Women 
for America, Washington, DC, viewed November 2013, < http://www.cwfa.org/images/content/CWA-
WW_PornHarms_3-4.pdf>. 
176 
 
against “hand[ing] over” his “valuable and precious” sexuality,120 a narrative that appears to 
resonate with Christian beliefs about the sacrificial nature of sexual intimacy.  
The groups’ centreing of the child is ultimately a political manoeuvre. Highlighting the harm 
pornography does to women alone does not have the same persuasive potential because adult 
women are imagined to have sexual agency in all or most cases, while children’s minds are 
unequivocally clean, pure, asexual in contrast. Cottle et al’s (1989) study on the attitudes to 
pornography of eighty-five individuals in the United States provides evidence for this view. 
The researchers found that of the respondents described as ‘Liberal’ (as opposed to religious 
conservative and antiporn feminist), the only type of pornography they objected to was 
material involving children, and they disagreed that pornography harms women (p. 319). 
Unlike children, “adults are assumed to have the maturity to make responsible decisions for 
themselves” (p. 318) and implicit in this is the assumption that men and women’s experiences 
in pornography are largely alike and not distinguishable by sex.  
Unlike liberals and the Christian Right, antiporn feminists reject the centreing of the child in 
antipornography discourse and have problematised the assumption that adult women always 
have sexual agency. As MacKinnon (1989) argues “interpreting female sexuality as an 
expression of women’s agency and autonomy, as if sexism did not exist, is always 
denigrating and bizarre and reductive, as it would be to interpret Black culture as if racism 
did not exist” (p. 153). 
While women’s sexual agency under patriarchy is an ongoing subject of debate in feminist 
politics, the innocence of children goes largely unquestioned. This sentiment echoes the 
beliefs of humanist philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau who considered children to be 
naturally saintly, virtuous, and unspoilt, and distinctly different from adults in their limited 
experiences of life (Rousseau, 1992 [1762]). Any capacity for sexual agency in childhood is 
roundly condemned, as Kampmark (2012) asserts, the presumption of childhood innocence is 
predicated on a construction of children as lacking the capacity for “self-awareness, cognition 
or manipulation” (p. 7).  
Antiporn feminism agrees with this characterisation of childhood vulnerability, but extends 
the same sympathy to adult women as well. Dines, Jensen and Russo (1998) accused liberal 
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pornographers of ‘neutralising’ the power asymmetry between adults and children (p. 17) 
arguing that the defenders of pornography similarly overlook the power imbalances between 
men and women.  
The political consequences for antiporn feminists who centre the child in debates on 
pornography are greater than they are for the right-wing groups in this study. As Abigail Bray 
(2011) asserts, the regulation of feminist critiques of child pornography is the direct result of 
a hegemonic paradigm which serves to paint antiporn feminists as hysterical or moralising. 
Carol Smart (1989) takes this viewpoint, arguing that the antiporn model of Andrea Dworkin 
and Catharine MacKinnon has led to a “shared platform with the moral right and the slippage 
into law and order rhetoric” (p. 116). The conflation of feminist critiques of pornography 
with moral outrage has a stifling effect on left-wing critiques of pornography because 
discussing child exploitation through a left-wing, rights-based frame becomes susceptible to 
derailing tactics from critics who immediately dismiss their concerns as a precursor to 
moralism and censorship.  
Indeed, many civil libertarians take the position that strong legal remedies to address child 
pornography are a precursor to future regulation of sexual expression between ‘consenting 
adults’. A 1978 discussion among Michel Foucault, Guy Hocquenghem, and Jean Danet 
published as Sexual Morality and the Law (1988) reveals Foucault’s belief that sexual 
moralising about children will mean sexuality becomes a “roaming danger, a sort of 
omnipresent phantom, a phantom that will be played out between men and women, children 
and adults […] Sexuality will become a threat to all social relations” (p. 281). In his view, 
seeking to prevent child exploitation amounts to an unnecessary sentimentalisation of 
children, and will inevitably encroach on adult expression.  
In Gayle Rubin’s (1984 [1999]) essay on sexuality and the law she describes the urge to 
protect children as ‘erotic hysteria’ and ‘erotic terror’ resulting in misdirected and ill-
conceived laws (p. 146). Bray (2011) notes the gendered subtext in the claims of ‘hysteria’ by 
antiporn feminists, a term that has long been used to pathologise women who are child sexual 
abuse survivors.   
The successful effort by liberals of conflating feminist concern about child sexual abuse with 
sexual moralising and sentimentalisation has tainted the child-focused elements of feminist 
antiporn discourse. It is this conflation in particular that invites critics to draw parallels 
between contemporary antiporn feminism and nineteenth-century social purity politics.  
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Two American historians, Ellen Dubois and Linda Gordon (1983) endorse this view: 
Today, there seems to be a revival of social purity politics within feminism, and it is a 
concern about this tendency that motivates us in recalling its history. Like its 
nineteenth century predecessor, the contemporary feminist attack on pornography and 
sexual ‘perversion’ shades at the edges into a right-wing and antifeminist version of 
social purity, the moral majority and pro-family movements of the new right. 
As Dubois and Gordon allude to, the common thread between moralist and antiporn feminist 
fears about pornography is the view that exposure to obscene material is dangerous primarily 
because it can excite the inevitably aggressive tendencies of the male sex drive.  
Bearing striking resemblance to Christian Right and feminist antiporn campaigners, 
advocates of temperance and certain elements of the woman’s suffrage movement were in 
agreement that women were the more virtuous sex. Just as antiporn feminists have had to 
endure decades of critique from sex-positive feminists, the suffragettes who equated women 
with moral rectitude, good housekeeping and sobriety, and men with drunkenness and 
corruption, were met with disapproval from sexual radicals, who were often younger women 
with a much more extreme agenda to shift the status of women in late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century America.121 The essence of the sex radicals’ concern was that “they 
[suffragettes] supported the repressive codes of Victorian morality rather than demanding full 
sexual and emotional freedom for women” (Joannou and Purvis, 1998: 108). Indeed, as sex-
positive feminists have attempted to link antiporn feminism with the Christian Right in an 
effort to undermine and discredit their claims about the harmful nature of pornography, anti-
suffrage activists tried to link women’s enfranchisement with temperance by claiming they 
wanted to close bars and dancing clubs (Banaszak, 1996). But as historian Lesley Hall (1998) 
notes, the conflation of some suffragettes with social purity, and not sexual reform, is much 
too simplistic an interpretation. These were not ‘embattled camps’ she argues, but two 
elements within a wide spectrum of opposition to conventional wisdom about women’s roles. 
The same could be said of the conservative and feminist wings of the antiporn movement 
today, who are both attempting to reimagine women’s roles through different – but 
occasionally converging – ideological frames. 
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     Antifeminist platform enhancing opportunities for co-option 
 
In order to position themselves as the true arbiters of women’s rights, CWA, FOF and EF use 
arguments that attempt to cast doubt over the way in which the feminist movement has 
improved women’s lives. They frame feminism as a movement which has failed to deliver on 
its central theme of lifting women’s status in society. As CWA alleges: 
Since 1987, in spite of the feminist movement that was supposed to keep women from 
being mere sex objects, women have increasingly been depicted in degrading and 
debased ways. Now, with the demand for younger and younger images, the harm has 
spread to children.122 
According to the groups’ leaders, the feminist movement originally had a worthwhile 
position on pornography, but somewhere along the way bowed to cultural pressures to 
succumb to sin. “[…] the feminist movement [has] turn[ed] its entire position on pornography 
on its ear from initially opposing it, to now saying its empowering”123 argues Laurie Higgins, 
Director of School Advocacy for the Illinois Family Institute during a CWA podcast. 
Andrea Vangor’s statement at the Pornography Caucus held by EF in 1985 reiterates this 
deliberate obfuscation: 
One of the problems I have with the feminist viewpoint on pornography is, they 
believe in this myth of the ‘good pornography’ – erotica. If the woman is smiling, and 
especially if she’s on the top of the couple, it’s OK […] I don’t care if the woman’s 
on the top or the bottom, women end up on the bottom in a society where sexual 
behaviour is made into public entertainment.124 
Vangor’s statement – that pornography leaves women ‘on the bottom’, demonstrates how the 
leaders employ women’s rights language while simultaneously delegitimising feminism. It is 
an endorsement of the message, but not the messenger.  
CWA’s Crouse used a similar tone in her review of the effects of the contraceptive pill on 
American women: “While feminism delivered many benefits for women, the “free-sex” 
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movement [attributed to] the contraceptive pill, has advanced neither the fairer sex nor its 
well-being.”125 Crouse adds that the sexual revolution “chiefly benefited men, not women” an 
argument that antiporn feminists such as Sheila Jeffreys (1990) in her book Anticlimax: A 
Feminist Perspective on the Sexual Revolution have long made.  
A Phyllis Schlafly Report article echoes the belief that the supposedly feminist-endorsed 
sexual revolution has been anything but liberatory for women, but instead “deprived women 
of the societal support they need to refuse to engage in casual sex.”126 Rather than using faith-
based language to criticise feminism, the groups have seized the rhetorical tools of their foe 
and are using it against them. 
Hostility towards feminism has been noted by scholars as a salient frame within the Christian 
Right (Gerhards & Rucht 1992; Johnston 1991; Meyer 1995; Voss 1996). The groups 
perceive feminism as being responsible for the denigration of motherhood in the United 
States and they tie this concern back to the increasing ‘pornification’ of society. They 
romanticise a time in the mid-twentieth century when motherhood alone, without the added 
burden of paid work, was regarded as adequately fulfilling, before the push for middle class 
women’s participation in the workforce started to receive wide support.  
In recent times EF has used pro-feminist Facebook executive Sheryl Sandberg as the 
scapegoat for their anger, accusing Sandberg of peddling an ideology which sees small 
children as demeaning to educated women.127 Again, feminism is perceived as the culprit 
separating women from their maternal role, effectively transforming them into men whose 
unbridled sexual appetite can only be tempered by the desexualised maternal woman. CWA 
connect the supposed feminist acceptance of pornography with declining levels of societal 
compassion in this piece on whether CWA or Gloria Steinem truly represents women:  
Conservative women — moms and wives, sisters and daughters — are standing up 
because they’ve had enough.  They’ve had enough of the “feminists” telling them 
pornography is empowering.  They realize the consequences that have come with 
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abortion-on-demand and a complete lack of care and compassion for both the woman 
and her unborn baby.128  
Reflecting the individualising tendencies of the groups and the valorisation of motherhood, 
CWA wrote an article comparing a number of conservative women leaders with prominent 
feminist activists on the basis of their success as mothers and wives. In the piece they claim 
that Betty Friedan, Gloria Steinem, and Germaine Greer all had unstable marriages, and 
because of choosing career over family, failed as mothers: “her three children had to undergo 
therapy” CWA’s Crouse writes of Friedan. These feminist figures are juxtaposed against 
CWA’s founder Beverly LaHaye, and EF’s founder Phyllis Schlafly. LaHaye and Schlafly’s 
long marriages and large families are lauded as the ultimate accomplishments a woman can 
make, and feminism is scolded for having “lost its way,” and for excluding the personal 
dimension from the belief that women should be able to have it all.129 This sort of 
antifeminist rhetoric is very typical of CWA’s efforts to discredit the competing movement.  
In discussions unrelated to pornography, CWA criticises feminists for attempting to 
characterise women as “victims,”130 but when pornography becomes the focal point, the 
group repeatedly highlight its victimising effects of the material, whether they be the women 
in pornography131 or women in society as a whole.132 The group even recognises an annual 
‘Victims of Pornography Month’ in May, established by CWA’s close allies Citizens for 
Community Values who insist that pornography renders a woman “the victim of a man who 
sees her as a mere sex object.”133 The dual strategy of delegitimising feminism as a political 
force and simultaneously co-opting feminist argument works to politically marginalise the 
movement. Misciagno (1997) notes that a delegitimised movement is far less likely to 
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generate mobilised support and thus the tactic is one employed with mundane regularity (p. 
64). 
In efforts to remain politically relevant in a culture where young women are responsive to 
rights-based, pro-equality sentiments, the groups employ this language while simltaneously 
assigning blame to feminists for the hypersexualisation of women in the United States. Snow 
and Benford (1988) refer to this process as ‘diagnostic framing’, one element of which 
involves identifying a problem and then assigning blame or causality to a specific agent (p. 
200). The attribution of blame is a powerful motivating factor in political mobilisation as it 
allows the formation of binary categories: the oppressor and the oppressed, the victimiser and 
the victim. As bell hooks (2013) notes, a politics of blame in which binaries emerge resonates 
with the dominator thinking that is so prevalent in the west (p. 30). 
     Co-option or cooperation? Adopting antiporn feminist strategy  
 
During a 2013 podcast featuring FOF founder Dr. Dobson, Phyllis Schlafly and conservative 
author Suzanne Venker, Venker warns that “feminism has infiltrated the conservative 
movement just as much as it has the liberal one.” 134 It is the politics of sexuality that is the 
clearest expression of this feminist infiltration. But rather than exhibiting an exclusively 
hostile position against feminism as the previous section explored, the groups also engage in 
a tacitly collaborative exercise of validating feminist theory in discussions of pornography, 
occasionally even reaching out to key antiporn feminists for material that can add theoretical 
weight to their argument. 
The groups engage in this exercise with differing enthusiasm. The staunchly antifeminist EF 
is the least fond of this collaboration. Their audio material from the mid-1980s reveals a 
keener embrace of feminist theory and strategy during an historical height of antiporn activity 
around the time of the antipornography civil rights ordinance, but they have since shied away 
from associating with groups on the Left.  
At a 1985 EF conference on family violence and pornography one of the speakers, a woman 
named Bueller Coughenour, discusses her involvement with antiporn feminists on the 
Indianapolis civil rights ordinance.135 Coughenour’s tone is ostensibly cautious as she 
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recounts her cooperation with feminist adversaries on the ordinance. She states that the 
ordinance is “couched in the language of the feminists” and admits that is “a little hard for 
some of us to swallow”. Coughenour contends, however, that pornography is a point where 
“some of the feminists have joined the battle” with the Christian Right.  
The possibility of a tacit coalition with feminists on pornography is brought up on more than 
one occasion. During a Pornography Caucus held that same year in Washington, D.C., 
Andrea Vangor tells the audience that defeating pornography will require deflecting attention 
away from their organisational affiliation and towards the issue at hand: “we want to raise the 
issue in the media […] that [porn] is the problem, not us.”136 Redirecting attention from the 
group to the issue is a strategy advocated by Christian Right leader Ralph Reed. Reed sought 
a guerrilla warfare approach that comprised of an “air war” – a vast network of politicised 
Christian radio programs, and a “ground war” – mobilising adherents in thousands of 
evangelical churches across America. “To paint [one’s] face and travel at night” was the aim 
(Saberi, 1993: 782).  
Drawing too much attention to oneself runs the risk of generating media accusations of so-
called “astro turf” political organising, which refers to campaigns organised by wealthy and 
influential corporate elites. Vangor was effectively acknowledging that the groups’ far-right 
credentials pose a problem in terms of gaining the political credibility necessary to bring 
antiporn critique from the margin to the centre. She makes this position clear by urging 
adherents that as Christian activists they need to take off their ‘red coat’ which she believes 
make them a target of media outlets that quickly dismiss their concerns on the ground of 
supposed fanaticism.  
Vangor further states that the group “needs to build broad-based coalitions on this single 
issue” reassuring activists that it will “work to our advantage”. But as the group makes clear 
during another conference in 1989 on tactics to build the movement, a coalition should be an 
anonymous operation. Press releases should not reveal which groups are participating at the 
risk of distracting observers and inviting scrutiny rather than mobilisation. With all the risk 
associated with building coalitions across ideological boundaries, it is not immediately clear 
why EF seemed eager to engage in cross-movement collaboration. The incentive, they claim, 
is the fear of what antipornography politics might become without a moral perspective: 
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It seems to me to be a more appropriate tactic to get involved and try to steer these things 
in the right direction than to take a step back and watch them do something that we may 
not agree with […] in the name of the issues we support.137 
Appropriating the language and strategic framework of antiporn feminism is central to this 
agenda. Vangor explicitly states that the feminist civil rights framework does not rest easy 
with her philosophically, but “as a construct” to help raise awareness about the harm of 
pornography “it is a beauty” she states “and it works.”138 Schlafly demonstrated an openness 
to the feminist civil rights position in Pornography’s Victims (1987) asserting that “the civil 
liberties of the abusers [in pornography] are ranked higher than the civil rights of the abused” 
(p. 11).  
What is clear is that the groups do not have a precise and concrete approach to dealing with 
feminism as theory and practice. By way of example, a 2010 article by CWA’s Janne Myrdal 
makes the claim that the word ‘feminism’ has been “hijacked and used for decades solely for 
not-so-feminist issues with great hostility towards faith.”139 Differentiating between ‘leftist 
feminism’ and ‘conservative feminism’, Myrdal attempts to reframe feminism using the 
conservative principles of individualism, merit, and morality. This is one of a number of 
examples of the groups attempting to reappropriate the ‘feminist’ term. 
Temperance reformers similarly found cooperating with suffragettes to be beneficial to their 
cause. When suffragettes started appropriating more traditional conceptualisations of 
women’s roles in their demand for voting rights, a coalition between temperance reformers 
and suffragettes flourished (Cornfield and McCammon, 2010: 80). Particularly during periods 
where the goals of WCTU were threatened, ties between temperance activists and 
suffragettes emerged, as Frances Willard came to realise that women having the vote was 
essential to combat the evils of alcohol (McCammon and Campbell, 2002). As leaders on the 
Christian Right have become more comfortable using the arguments of antiporn feminists, 
both movements have shown some willingness to engage in collaborative action.  
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     Publicly embracing feminism 
 
When it suits the groups, they assume a more conciliatory posture towards the feminist 
movement. Of the three groups in this study, FOF demonstrates the most open and willing 
embrace of feminism in its material. An April 2008 article on FOF’s website titled “The One 
Thing Christians and Feminists Agree On” details how opposition to pornography in the 
1980s provided an unlikely link between two groups that had typically had little else in 
common. The author revives the idea of a coalition, asserting that, “Maybe 30 years later, 
though we still can’t agree on much else, Christians and feminists could agree on the danger 
of pornography and fight it.”140 In another article written by FOF president Jim Daly on 
casual sex, the feminist label is adopted by Catholic Association Senior Fellow, Ashley 
McGuire by way of reconceptualising casual sex as hostile to women’s liberation. McGuire 
states “I consider myself a feminist, and there is nothing that is more antithetical to feminist 
progress than the hookup culture. Because what it does is it puts women in a position where 
they feel the expectation to behave in ways they’re totally uncomfortable with.”141  
Rather than feminist politics representing the worldly, secular, antimaternal image it does in 
other examples from the groups, feminism is represented as complementary to biblical 
versions of womanhood. Even the sacred institution of marriage is not exempt from a 
feminist revision. A March 2010 article by FOF’s Glenn Stanton goes to great lengths to 
explain how marriage is in fact a feminist institution.142 Invoking the vision of higher female 
morality lauded by WCTU’s Frances Willard, Stanton cites George Gilder, arguing that “the 
crucial process of civilization is the subordination of male sexual impulses and biology to the 
long-term horizons of female sexuality.” Willard’s call to temperance followers to “make the 
whole world homelike” – in other words, more persuaded by feminine influence, is Stanton’s 
core message.  
The group also endorses collaboration with antiporn feminists in legal battles. In a 2010 
article published by FOF’s political arm, CitizenLink, exploring the links between 
pornography and prostitution, Lisa Thompson from the Salvation Army discloses her support 
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for feminist Donna M. Hughes’ view that the legal system should punish the buyers and not 
the sellers of sex. Also known as the Nordic model on prostitution. “I totally support and 
endorse it” Thompson says of the model, adding that she worked with Donna Hughes in 2005 
to address the demand side in the reauthorisation of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act.143 
Donna Hughes has been a key figure in terms of linking the contemporary social conservative 
and antiporn feminist movements together.  
In a piece published by the Washington Post in 2004, Donna Hughes and fellow feminist 
academic Phyllis Chesler confront the reality of collaborating with the Christian Right: 
In the past, when faced with choosing allies, feminists made compromises. To gain 
the support of the liberal left, feminists acquiesced in the exploitation of women in the 
pornography trade -- in the name of free speech. The issue of abortion has prevented 
most feminists from considering working with conservative or faith-based groups. 
Feminists are right to support reproductive rights and sexual autonomy for women, 
but they should stop demonizing the conservative and faith-based groups that could be 
better allies on some issues than the liberal left has been. 
 
Hughes and Chesler add that feminists have been unnecessarily hostile to religious groups, 
viewing them “as a dangerous form of patriarchy”. Hughes and Chesler believe this view is 
too simplistic and reflects an antiquated view of Judeo-Christian faiths. Forty years ago 
religious groups were undoubtedly antagonistic towards feminism, but today they offer “a 
system of law and ethics that benefits women”, evident in the leading position faith-based 
groups have taken in the global fight against sex trafficking. “Human rights work is not the 
province of any one ideology” Hughes and Chesler allege, and in fact assuming that the Left 
has possession of human rights has led to fractured relationships between progressive-left 
adherents whenever the question of men’s right to purchase sex is raised.  
The human rights organisation Amnesty International found itself in the cross hairs of this 
debate in early 2014 after a proposal advocating the full decriminalisation of prostitution 
drafted by the organisation was leaked.144 Radical feminists and prostitution survivor 
advocacy groups reacted angrily to the proposal. Believing that Amnesty International’s 
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commitment to human rights made them natural allies, abolitionist groups felt betrayed, 
accusing the organisation of taking a position “that contradicts their own mission as a charity 
concerned with human rights.”145 The unreliability of the progressive-left and much of 
feminism on the pornography and prostitution issues have driven Hughes and Chesler to 
demarcate new boundaries for antiporn activism that is inclusive of those on the Right: 
Saving lives and defending freedom are more important than loyalty to an outdated 
and too-limited feminist sisterhood. Surely after 40 years feminists are mature enough 
to form coalitions with those with whom they agree on some issues and disagree on 
others. 
According to this view, a tacit coalition with the Christian Right is not so much a threat from 
a movement dedicated to preserving the patriarchal family model, but a sign of the ‘maturity’ 
of contemporary antiporn feminists. It is an improbable development given that antiporn 
feminist politics is rooted in a materialist analysis of pornography. Concerned with the 
structural factors that lead women to become involved in pornography, antiporn feminists 
have examined the way systems of power such as patriarchy, white supremacy, and 
capitalism intersect to subordinate women, particularly women who occupy multiple 
oppressed castes, a theory referred to as ‘intersectionality’.  
The willingness on the part of antiporn feminists like Hughes and Chesler to discount the 
material consequences of the Christian Right’s position on pornography – a hybrid of rights 
and morality – is perhaps evident of the confrontation antiporn feminism is having with an 
identarian, poststructuralist form of feminism. 
Identity politics urges mobilisation around a single axis and positions that identity in relation 
to issues deemed of most importance to those claiming the identity. It has emanated from a 
postmodern, poststructuralist perspective that prioritises the self-defined ‘identity’ of a person 
above the material realities determining their position in society. In praising conservatives for 
engaging with feminist politics and displaying a willingness to work with those on the Right, 
antiporn feminists balance unsteadily between a critical theory emphasising materialist 
aspects and an uncritical liberal practice allowing two ideologically hostile parties to merge 
together based on identification with a single issue. CWA and FOF in particular have 
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formulated a politics of identity based on the supposedly universalising power of sex, and in 
lending legitimacy to this formation have appropriated the woman-identified discourse of 
antiporn feminists.  
FOF does more than simply appropriate feminist discourse, but actually reaches out to 
antiporn feminists for comment. In a 2008 piece on the link between pornography and sex 
trafficking, FOF’s Stephen Adams includes excerpts from a conversation the group had with 
feminist psychologist Dr. Melissa Farley where she states, among other things, that 
“pornography is men’s rehearsal for prostitution.”146 The same article quotes antiporn 
feminist Gail Dines on the prevalence of pseudo child pornography as a gateway to child 
pornography and paedophilia, as well as feminist Dr. Donna M. Hughes. Seemingly 
attempting to bolster the credibility of the argument, Adams adds that “this is not just the 
view of the religious right. Increasingly, feminists are coming around to this perspective, 
too.” Here the philosophical differences between the two movements are proof of the 
widespread acceptance of pornography’s relationship to sex trafficking. What is more, the 
feminist perspective is regarded as morally sound to the extent that Farley, Hughes, and 
Dines can be called upon to help make the conservative case for women’s rights.  
Obviously wary of being seen to cooperate with the Christian Right, Gail Dines addressed 
suggestions of a feminist collusion with conservatives in a 2011 piece in The Guardian 
newspaper. Dines insists that any claims that feminists who oppose the ‘pornification of 
society’ are stirring up a moral panic confuses a politically progressive movement with right-
wing attempts to police sexual behaviour. The harm done to women in pornography is not a 
moral issue, Dines contends, but a political one. In her view, antiporn feminists are suffering 
from guilt by association, as outward observers incorrectly conflate the political objectives of 
feminists and the religious right. The right’s seizure of pro-woman concepts does not do 
much to dissuade this theory, but neither does Dines’ collaboration with conservative 
politicians or Hughes and Chesler’s plea with antiporn feminists to give the Right a second 
glance. 
It could be the case that FOF’s less forcefully antifeminist stance can be attributed to the fact 
that unlike CWA and EF, FOF is not a women’s organisation. Women’s groups and 
ministries within the Christian Right are expected to actively promote a perspective on 
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gender relations that echoes true womanhood ideals. This is central to their political survival 
as many of their key competitors endorse feminist theory and practice. Although FOF has a 
predominantly male leadership, it is not regarded as a men’s group and not tasked with 
catering to ‘men’s issues’ due to the invisibility of maleness within a culture that sees 
maleness as normative and femaleness as the other. This invisibility gives FOF greater 
leverage to explore a wider array of perspectives without being as vulnerable to accusations 
of surrendering to feminism.  
The political limits placed on conservative women’s organisations by virtue of their status as 
representatives of women were felt by the campaigners during the temperance movement. 
Well before the formation of WCTU in 1874, women’s involvement in the temperance 
movement was strongly criticised for blurring the lines between the feminised private sphere 
and the masculinised public sphere. Although it would be decades before the WCTU formed 
and moral suasion would be abandoned for more concerted political work, male political 
leaders were wary of the threat of female influence.  
According to the temperance newspaper the Lily, minister Henry Mandeville of Albany 
explained “when a woman goes out of her sphere, when she goes miles attended or 
unattended […] I say she unsexes herself, is a hybrid, and I for one wish to do nothing in 
approbation of it” (in McMillen, 2008). The purposeful exclusion of women from male-
organised temperance conventions throughout the 1850s galvanised women, culminating in 
the formation of WCTU. However, trepidation about the extent of women’s influence 
underscored the origins of WCTU, and the organisation’s first president epitomised this 
apprehension. In 1874 under the founding leadership of Annie Turner Wittenmyer, the 
WCTU advocated moral suasion to reform problem drinkers, deliberately evading 
participation in political work. It was Wittenmyer’s contention that women’s suffrage would 
“strike a fatal blow at the home” and therefore could not be endorsed (in Berkeley Fletcher, 
2008: 103). But once Willard took over the presidency five years later the organisation 
“almost immediately and forcefully began to delve into political work” (p. 104) causing a 
tension between women’s rights and the virtues of true womanhood. This tension created an 
impasse that saw the undoing of the dominance of true womanhood ideology by the 1880s 
(Lippy and Williams, 2010: 515). This tension was perhaps best encapsulated in the ‘Home 
Protection’ principle coined by Willard in a 1876 speech to the Women’s Congress in 
Philadelphia. 
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Temperance reformers tried diligently both to combat intemperance and insulate free market 
ideology from scrutiny (Martin, 2008: 124). In this sense the parallel with today’s 
conservative antiporn reformers is clear. The profitability of the pornography industry is 
emphasised as proof of moral decay, but the driving force of the industry – the capitalist 
imperative of infinite growth – is not fundamentally questioned. The evil is in the 
commodity, not the impulse to commodify.  
The rallying cry of Home Protection allowed WCTU to use temperance as a vehicle to agitate 
for expanding women’s rights. Under the banner of home protection activists could frame 
women’s intent to win the vote as necessary in the fight against alcohol. Without women’s 
honourable influence in the political sphere, the scourge of alcohol would persist. Only when 
women won the vote would the country be returned from the dens of sin. Willard’s 1876 
speech blended feminist ideology and domestic ideology together, asserting “God has 
indicated woman, who is the born conservator of the home, to be the Nemesis of the home’s 
arch enemy, King Alcohol” (Martin, 2008: 223).  
Here we see the ideological basis of contemporary conservative women’s organisations 
engaged in the struggle against pornography. Rather than entirely usurping the male domain 
of the public sphere, sacrificing the feminine virtues of meekness and passivity, Christian 
women with a heart for political change tread carefully between the two spheres, 
appropriating women’s rights language where deemed advantageous, but always returning to 
a narrative of morality and sin. As women’s groups, CWA and EF invoke the virtues of true 
womanhood through their promotion of purity, piety, and submissiveness, but they are 
inheritors of WCTU’s reconceptualisation of the limits of women’s influence.  
Indeed the legacy of the temperance movement in terms of constructing women as uniquely 
suited to solving social problems has paved the way for groups like CWA and EF to loosen 
traditional norms barring women’s political participation. As Blee (1998) notes, CWA and 
EF have been able to adeptly use the success of early feminism in normalising women’s 
public activism to, ironically, mobilise antifeminist women. Moreover, as the women’s 
movement transformed matters of sexuality from an intensely private subject to the centre of 
public discussion, CWA, FOF, and EF were able to use sexuality as a cornerstone of their 
‘pro-family’ agenda (p.173).  
The task of enforcing sexual morality is unique for women’s groups within the movement. As 
women’s organisations, CWA and EF are expected to balance their oftentimes competing 
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narratives of antifeminism and opposition to pornography to an extent that is not required of 
the male-led FOF. Being seen to sympathise too overtly with the feminist perspective carries 
greater political consequences for CWA and EF whose formation depended almost entirely 
on an opposition to feminism.  
As a matter of principle both CWA and EF routinely employ antifeminist arguments on a 
wide array of issues to an extent far exceeding FOF. However, on the specific issue of 
pornography CWA is less forcefully antifeminist than EF. CWA is not averse to adopting 
rights-based, feminist arguments in their criticism of pornography. In a 2011 article on 
modern-day slavery, Crouse asserts that pornography fuels prostitution, which she describes 
as a ‘swirling vortex’ of ‘violence, slavery, and misogyny.’147 As the abovementioned 
material indicates, EF did demonstrate openness to antiporn feminist arguments in the 1980s 
and was willing to cooperate with feminists to formulate an effective legal case against 
pornography, but has since abandoned this strategy, retreating from its implicit endorsement 
of feminist arguments to a more stubborn social conservative position which primarily views 
pornography as an issue of concern to parents of young, exploitable children. Schlafly’s 
fading political influence and the relative success of other conservative women’s groups such 
as CWA and the IWF in eclipsing EF over the last decade have also contributed to the shift in 
rhetoric. Rather than catering to a more diverse pool of adherents, EF’s audience are on the 
ideological margins. CWA has adapted to the demands of secularisation more effectively 
than EF, thus securing its political survival.  
     Common ground on law and order 
 
Antiporn feminists might have a traditional home on the political Left, but their willingness 
to propose punitive, law and order solutions have made some of their arguments particularly 
appealing to the groups in this study who are happy to endorse legal remedies which punish 
producers and consumers of obscene material.  
 
The United States is a unique case study when it comes to advocacy for victims of crime – “it 
defies left-right categorization,” according to Valdivia (2003) because it has traditionally 
involved the confluence of politically disparate groups. Therefore, a better frame through 
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which to examine positions on pornography and the justice system is class. In Sex Panic and 
the Punitive State, Lancaster (2011) argues that liberal, middle-class women have been 
receptive to the crime-control approach because they have not had to live in the poor 
neighbourhoods which bear the brunt of increased policing and incarceration. Distance from 
the effects of excessive policing has resulted in some feminists being eager to pursue antiporn 
laws that contribute to an atmosphere of punitiveness, putting them in near propinquity to 
their antiporn counterparts on the Right who have traditionally favoured prosecutorial 
vindictiveness (p. 210). 
 
One prominent left-wing antiporn feminist who has visibly moved towards the law and order 
orientation is Gail Dines, whose work the groups’ cite on numerous occasions. Following the 
announcement by the British Prime Minister David Cameron in 2013 that internet service 
providers would be encouraged to bar their customers from accessing pornographic material, 
Dines came out in agreement. Appearing on a Canadian Broadcasting Corporation radio 
program in July 2013, Dines described the filter as “taking the onus off parents who have had 
to basically look over their kids’ shoulders.” Later that year Dines appeared alongside 
Conservative MP Joy Smith and evangelical Julia Beazley at an event on the harms of 
pornography in Ottawa, Canada and expressed her support for Canada adopting a similar opt-
out model.148 Indeed on a range of issues from antiporn and antiprostitution laws, to raising 
the age of consent, feminists have been drawn into alliances with archconservatives 
(Lancaster, 2011: 210). 
Elsewhere in the conservative movement, Christian Right activists are using Dines’ work to 
redefine their relationship to feminism. In a 2010 issue of The Journal for Biblical Manhood 
and Womanhood, Denny Burk refers to Dines’ book Pornland (2010) and states, “on every 
other issue, Gail Dines and I would probably be on opposite sides, but not on this one.” Burk 
methodically dissects Dines’ argument, agreeing that pornography portrays the degradation 
of the body and is not an expression of sexual freedom. But Burk diverges with Dines on her 
argument that patriarchy is synonymous with abuse. “Biblical patriarchy is not abusive but 
strives toward the protection of women and children”, proclaims Burk. Male headship is 
ultimately selfless, he continues, symbolising a chivalrous, protective instinct that all men 
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ought to possess. Only when male headship is disregarded do men dishonour women on a 
wide scale. In other words, Dines is right that pornography corrupts men and alters their 
behavior towards women, but patriarchy holds the ultimate solution to this predicament and 
should not be condemned. This is strikingly similar to the position taken by the groups in this 
study, whose endorsement of the feminist position extends only so far. 
The law and order frame provided another opportunity for CWA to co-opt antiporn feminist 
arguments in the wake of rape allegations at Steubenville High School in Ohio. In a rare 
public showing of consensus, CWA joined forces with UltraViolet, a pro-choice group 
devoted to combating sexism and advancing women’s rights, to address the case. In her 
statement on the alliance, CWA president Penny Young Nance appealed to both a pro-woman 
and law and order angle, citing the tragedy of society’s sexualisation of girls and the 
seriousness of rape, and pledging to address it through the power of the punitive state. The 
co-founder of UltraViolet, feminist Shaunna Thomas confessed that an alliance with those on 
the Right was an unlikely one, asserting that “there are few things that Ultraviolet and 
Concerned Woman for America agree on, but when it comes to rape case in Steubenville we 
are united. Every last person involved in the cover-up of this crime must be prosecuted.”149  
 
Feminist analyses of pornography are often so multi-layered that fitting it within a legally 
constituted statute has proved difficult, argues Carol Smart (1989: 116). Preferring to view 
issues like pornography in terms of absolute truths, conservatives have had an easier time 
applying law and order solutions to complicated social problems. Smart warns that this could 
be a suicide ritual for the feminist position against pornography, which risks becoming a 
“latterday moral crusade” prepared to concede more power to an anti-feminist legal system in 
order to achieve limited legislative regulation over some forms of pornography (p. 116). 
 
Feminists have experienced a similar dilemma when confronted with the question of how to 
punish perpetrators of rape. Criminalising marital rape was celebrated as a victory for 
feminism, but with it came tougher penalties, which played into the conservative thirst for a 
more prosecutorial climate. Conservatives have driven the framing of pornography as a legal 
conundrum, and despite disparate sources of objection to pornography, feminists have 
followed, narrowing their focus onto a legal framework. In the foreword to Phyllis Schlafly’s 
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book Pornography’s Victims (1987), CWA founder Beverly LaHaye borrows from feminist 
rhetoric on the harm pornography does to women, but ultimately arrives at a law and order 
remedy: 
The defenders of pornographers’ “rights” are, knowingly or unknowingly, creating an 
environment that legitimizes the further spread of abuse of women and children. By 
ridiculing and opposing all attempts to prosecute and track down those depicting even 
illegal activities, they are obstructing justice and promoting the violation of our civil 
rights. 
 
Feminists have defended the legal ground shared with conservatives by assuring critics that 
obscenity laws are a moral idea championed by the Christian Right, while the civil rights 
platform has its origins in left-wing campaigns against racial segregation and oppression.  
 
The temperance and social purity movements of the late nineteenth century reveal parallels to 
today’s antipornography efforts in terms of both collaboration and tension between 
conservative Protestant women and early feminists in the area of sexual misconduct and the 
law. Early feminists used the language of the time to denounce unbridled male sexuality and 
“sexual excess”, promoting in its place “continence” and bodily integrity to protect women 
and children (Jeffreys, 1985: 27).  
 
Stemming from deep anxiety about growing industrialisation, increasing immigration, 
sprawling cities and the decline of rural America, the social purity movement attracted both 
conservative and progressive adherents. It was believed that such rapid change had led to the 
commercialisation of contraception and more men using prostitutes to satisfy sexual needs 
outside their marriage. Sexuality itself needed to be restricted. For early feminists this fit a 
perception that male sexuality needed to be placated. Emanating from this belief was a deep 
ambivalence about the role birth control played in facilitating male sexual dominance, 
leaving women with no excuse to avoid his advances. The suffragette Lucy Re-Bartlett 
(1912) demonstrates this position: 
 
Those artificial means which in the educated classes are so largely resorted to in order 
to prevent results leave the animality resulting from the undue use of the sexual act 
the same as in the populace, adding to it a new element of degradation through the 
violation of physical nature which in the populace rarely, and in the animal never 
appears (p. 59).  
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Birth control merely meant women had to submit to more sexual intercourse. It did not 
restructure the societal relations which render women the subordinated sex. The conservative 
position, more concerned with protecting a nationalist agenda of restoring America to its once 
proud tradition of religion, home and empire nevertheless found temporary friends in early 
feminists who supported their legislative aim of criminalising contraception and abortion. 
 
The conservative panic with regard to abortion stemmed in part from a constellation of fears 
that with the growing number of migrants settling in the United States, racial imbalances 
would arise if middle class white women chose to forego motherhood (Freedman, 2006: 181). 
The collaborative effort between conservatives and feminists was exceedingly successful. 
Until the 1860s, abortion and contraception had gone largely unchallenged in the United 
States, but the social purity movement accelerated the criminalisation of abortion throughout 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, which held firm until the Roe decision in 
1973.  
 
Like the anti-feminist and conservative campaigners today whose language can be difficult to 
distinguish from one another, social purity reformers were united by rhetoric that could seem 
prudish and pious to contemporary observers. For example, the problem of ‘sexual vice’ was 
well documented by the Suffragette newspaper, and it was widely understood that men’s 
‘moral degeneracy’ had brought venereal diseases into the home (Jeffreys, 1985: 47).  
 
Indeed, the paradox underpinning today’s antiporn discourse on the Christian Right which 
regards the use of pro-woman, equality rhetoric as necessary in the service of maintaining 
unequal gender relations was first trialed by social purity reformers. August Forel (1922) 
captured this contradiction perfectly in his work The Sexual Question in which he advocated 
for equal rights between men and women for the preservation of intrinsically unequal 
separate spheres. Forel believed women should be given equal rights so that they might “react 
freely according to their feminine genius” (p. 504). In other words, women ought to be free, 
but within the constraints of femininity. 
 
CWA takes the firm position that upholding women’s rights and enforcing law and order are 
one and the same. “If we do not enforce obscenity laws stringently, the ripple effect on the 
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rest of the culture will lead to a tidal wave of degradation and destruction.”150 But they 
distinguish themselves from their feminist rivals on the Left by going one step further, “The 
legality of pornography is but the first consideration in regulation, a deeper consideration is 
the moral basis for legal regulation.”151 In their view, without authoritative bases for 
distinguishing between right and wrong, judges cannot be expected to make the sound moral 
judgments that will protect women.  
 
FOF’s position is almost identical. “Strong laws can successfully curb the spread of 
pornography and reduce the harm associated with it,” they contend152 These measures are 
what is required to preserve “God’s design for sexuality”, but also to protect women from the 
attitude that they are merely “possessions and playthings”153 for men, reminiscent of the 
language used in section (a) of the 1983 Minneapolis antiporn ordinance feminist definition 
of pornography.154  
 
EF’s language on pornography is strongly orientated towards law and order, partly owing to 
Phyllis Schlafly’s background as a constitutional lawyer. For Schlafly, “The evil fruits of the 
Supreme Court’s endorsement of pornography as a First Amendment right are everywhere 
apparent, and the pro-pornography bias of the federal courts continues to this day” wrote 
Schlafly (2004b). EF in its contemporary form focuses much more than CWA and FOF do on 
pornography’s harmful effects on children, tending to avoid language that could be perceived 
as sympathetic towards feminism. This is a shift from its antiporn discourse in the 1980s, 
which wove in far more references to male sexual aggression and female victimhood.155 
Today the group prefers to convey their argument in more affectless terms about using 
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prosecutorial power to recapture the country’s moral foundation, rather than about protecting 
women from harm.  
 
When the issue at hand is not pornography, feminist action on the legal front is triviliased and 
even ridiculed by some leaders in the groups. For example, Phyllis Schlafly alleged that the 
attempt by women’s groups to bring legal action against men who sexually harass women in 
the workplace was driven by little more than feminist paranoia that men are conspiring to 
victimise women.156 In the same vein, Schlafly strongly opposes the battered woman 
syndrome defense, which she believes is used to free guilty women from being convicted of a 
violent crime. Once an acknowledged ally of many EF members during the antipornography 
civil rights ordinances, Schlafly also takes aim at feminist lawyer Catharine MacKinnon for 
her work on the Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson case which recognised certain forms of 
sexual harassment as a violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Title VII. MacKinnon’s 
views regarding consent have made many conservatives balk, and Schlafly was no exception. 
In a 2006 interview for The Guardian with Stuart Jeffries, MacKinnon reaffirmed her 
position that in rape cases, consent is irrelevant. “My view is that when there is force or 
substantially coercive circumstances between the parties, individual consent is beside the 
point” MacKinnon is quoted as saying, adding “if someone is forced into sex that ought to be 
enough.” The Christian Right worldview which views women as both the regulators and 
tempters of male sexuality, and at the same time as sexually passive and undesiring, does not 
centre issues of consent in its discourse on sexuality and marriage 
 
The implicit feminist aim in all of these legal challenges, Schlafly claims, is not equality, but 
instead to usurp male dominance with its polar opposite – domination by women. “The 
feminist goal is not fair treatment for women” asserts Schlafly, but “the redistribution of 
power” from one sex to the other.157 CWA’s Janice Shaw Crouse also criticises a worldview 
which she believes frames social relations only in terms of the oppressor and the oppressed. 
 
Legal action taken by feminists in the area of sexual harassment amounts to a hostility toward 
masculinity, adds Crouse, and has created “an uncertain environment, if not a hostile one, 
where men have to watch their every word and action lest it be misunderstood or 
                                                          
156 Schlafly, P 1996, Feminist assault on reasonableness, Eagle Forum, viewed March 2013, 
<http://www.eagleforum.org/column/1996/aug96/8-15-96.html>. 
157 Schlafly, P 1996, Feminist assault on reasonableness, Eagle Forum, viewed March 2013, 
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198 
 
misinterpreted.”158 To conservative leaders like Schlafly and Crouse, sexual harassment laws 
are an obfuscation, drawing attention away from the true problem of marital infidelity and 
sexual impropriety.159 Therefore sexual harassment is less a question of “economically 
enforced sexual exploitation” as Catharine MacKinnon (1979) terms it, and more a case of 
private immorality threatening public morality. 
 
At first glance, Schlafly and Crouse’s opposition to sexual harassment law while 
simultaneously advocating stricter laws against pornography might seem contradictory. 
Indeed Schlafly’s assertion regarding sexual harassment that it should not be the job of 
government to “catch some man who’s a slob” could just as logically apply to a man caught 
procuring pornography as it could a man harassing a female co-worker (Schlafly in Saguy, 
2003: 119).  
 
However, the key difference between the conservative objections on the one hand to sexual 
harassment law and their support of antipornography law on the other, is the fact that the 
construction of sexual harassment law was a direct response to issues which arose when 
middle-class women’s participation in the workforce increased dramatically. The Christian 
Right is uncomfortable with women’s workforce participation, particularly when the woman 
is employed on a full-time basis, necessitating childcare for her children and undermining her 
husband’s role as the family breadwinner. This positon was well captured by Schlafly in a 
November 6, 2014 radio show, where she declared that women have realised that “having it 
all” is a myth, adding that “raising children while pursuing a successful, high-powered career 
at the same time just doesn’t work for most moms.”160  
 
The valorisation of the stay-at-home mother is a prevailing theme in the groups’ discourse. 
Stay-at-home mothers are encouraged to think of themselves as undertaking work that is 
equally, if not more difficult and important than mothers who work outside the home.161 To 
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make this clear, FOF appropriates J. Howard Miller’s 1943 wartime propaganda poster of 
Rosie the Riveter which has been used by feminists as a symbol of women’s empowerment 
(Kimble and Olson, 2006). The group edited an image of a baby into the arms of Rosie the 
Riveter in a 2012 article about the value of stay-at-home mothers; adopting the cultural icon 
of a strong, powerful, independent woman in the service of upholding the male breadwinner 
family model.162 Therefore, sexual harassment law is perceived as a superfluous remedy to 
address a problem that need not exist had women remained in their rightful place in the 
home. Sexual harassment law will only lead to the further marginalisation of men in the 
workplace, worsening the perversion of natural roles defined by the order of creation.  
 
Antipornography law poses no such threat. Rather than reordering male and female roles, 
antipornography law affirms the marriage relationship by insulating it from external 
temptation. It must be noted that President Reagan’s Meese Commission, although couched 
in the language of women’s rights and social science, was primarily concerned with 
maintaining the marital relationship and reaffirming the inseparability of sex and procreation.  
 
Indeed, the Meese Commission serves as one of the most salient representations of the 
intersection of pro-law and order feminist and Christian Right narratives, eventuating in a 
new discourse in which the women’s movement was exploited and co-opted to serve 
President Reagan’s pro-law and order agenda. It was the cementing of a new paradigm in the 
approach the Christian Right took to pornography. They would continue with the law and 
order ethos and of heavy surveillance of cultural deviance, but would use the work of 
feminists to help broaden the scope of obscenity prosecutions (Jackson and Scott, 1996: 346).  
 
Whether it is in their articulation of pornography as an affront to women’s rights, their 
problematisation of male sexual aggression, a new consideration of pornography’s role in 
men’s violence against women, or critiquing the way in which pornography encourages 
hypermasculinity, the groups are seizing arguments which originated in antiporn feminism 
and undermining notions of male primacy which are the cornerstone of the family values 
agenda. But elsewhere in their antiporn material, a more traditional set of values 
sentimentalising married women and children and proposing punitive law and order measures 
resuscitate the traditional far-right case for coming down hard against pornographers. By 
pursuing this rhetorical strategy, the groups unite the romantic portrait of the domestic ‘true 
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woman’ with her radical counterpart, for whom feminist arguments are most persuasive. It is 
a stark parallel with the political trajectory of the temperance movement under Willard’s 
stewardship, which pioneered the version of conservative feminism now being taken up by 
the Christian Right. 
 
Socio-political influences: why the Christian Right are co-opting feminist 
arguments 
 
 
To provide some context in terms of why it is that CWA, FOF, and EF have opted for the 
tactic of appropriation, it is worth examining the attendant socio-political factors in the 
United States which have motivated the groups towards this rhetorical strategy. This section 
delves into some of the key factors at play, these include: the way paralleling fundamentalist 
tendencies have allowed the Christian Right and antiporn feminists to both construct a notion 
of pornographers as unequivocally bad; how women’s changing relationship to the public 
sphere created a political imperative for the Christian Right who had to adapt or perish; the 
role political polarisation has played in motivating the Christian Right towards tactics that 
appear conciliatory and bipartisan; and the way sheer political opportunism has compelled the 
Christian Right to temper some of their hyper-religious rhetoric in favour of a pro-woman 
stance that appeals to the moderate, pluralist, and secular rungs of American democracy. 
 
     Pornography, fundamentalism, and the single-issue coalition 
 
A unifying feature of both antiporn feminism and the Christian Right is a degree of 
fundamentalism that underpins both positions. Scholars are divided on the precise boundaries 
of fundamentalism, but there is a general consensus that it emanates from anti-modernism, “a 
reaction against developments in science, in society, but even more rigorously in theology 
and religious leadership” in the words of Heinz Streib (2007: 151). A penchant of 
fundamentalism is the belief in the struggle between good and evil. “Fundamentalists define 
themselves in large part by what they are against” asserts Richard T. Antoun (2001: 56) in 
his book on fundamentalist traditions. The groups in this study employ the rhetoric of good 
and evil in their discourse on pornography as they do on all social issues where an 
oppositional stance has been developed.  
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Feminist antiporn politics is also premised on a strong oppositional posture of rejecting the 
hegemonic heteropatriarchal sex practices glorified in pornography. But because they have 
not been able to precisely articulate what more equal sexual relations would look like, 
accusations of ‘sex-negativity’ have been waged at antiporn feminists. A failure to balance 
such an oppositional model with a vision for more egalitarian sexual relationships between 
men and women may stem from an understanding that capitalism inevitably co-opts and 
contorts women’s attempts to pursue their own fulfillment in sexual relationships. Indeed 
contemporary pornography arose out of the sexual liberation movement of the 1960s in 
which women were led to believe their sexual preferences and behaviour would carry no 
more shame or judgment than those of their male counterparts, particularly with the threat of 
pregnancy diminished by the contraceptive pill. Experienced businessmen like Hugh Hefner 
and Larry Flynt exploited the emancipation of sex from the private to the public sphere, and 
built profitable magazine empires on the commodification of women’s bodies.  
 
With this recent history in mind, antiporn feminists remain hesitant to explore the liberatory 
possibilities of heterosexual relationships, instead maintaining a position of oppositional 
resistance that is unsuited to the realities of postmodernity. Through the interpretive 
framework of postmodernism, a broader perspective on gender, sexuality and the formation 
of identity can be realised (Pitchford, 1997). Remaining trapped in an older oppositional 
model of politics and representation sees antiporn feminists converge with the Christian Right 
in terms of framing pornography in absolutist terms, arguing, in essence, that all pornography 
is bad. Possessing no redeeming features, pornography is framed by both sides as intrinsically 
harmful, consisting of images and film of women “to be acted upon” as MacKinnon puts it 
(1987: 130).  
 
The position that all pornography constructed on the premise of dominance and subordination 
is a violation of women’s civil rights reflects a strong tone of moral absolutism. 
Constructionist approaches to pornography which explore the possibility that women can be 
sexual agents who self-define their desires and limitations are dismissed by antiporn feminists 
as merely an extension of patriarchal logic. The remarkable rhetorical consistency within 
antiporn feminism over the last forty years speaks to the rigid self-assurance of the 
movement.163  
                                                          
163 Although recent antipornography publications, the most notable being Gail Dines’ Pornland (2010) have 
explored new aspects of the debate (the rise of online pornography), the framing of the problem and the 
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The common fundamentalism underpinning both positions occasioned strategic alliances and 
blatant co-options of feminist arguments throughout the 1980s, but the political landscape has 
changed since then. The George W. Bush era allowed the Christian Right to affix itself to the 
political establishment through the Republican Party. Movements focused on material 
conditions of power such as antiporn feminism found themselves with diminished cultural 
resonance due to a political climate that was less responsive to class-based, materialist 
analyses of power (Haverty-Stacke, 2009). The 1990s saw a shift “from the class-based 
concerns of the Old Left to the more personal, self-oriented politics of the late twentieth 
century” (p. 227). A cultural politics of recreation, personal freedom, and individual rights 
had taken over from a critique of capitalism within the left.  
 
The emerging neoliberal paradigm had substituted such analyses with individualist therapies 
such as the positive thinking movement and the notion that one’s contentedness is determined 
by how they choose to think about their circumstances, and not by the material reality of 
those circumstances. These coexistent factors gave the Christian Right unprecedented 
influence over the outcome of elections and the public discourse on social issues. This 
position of advantage allowed the movement’s leaders to borrow from feminist rhetoric, 
exploiting the movement to modernise and secualrise its image.  
 
While the Christian Right had the political connections necessary to guide and shape public 
policy, it needed to attune itself to a new social and economic dynamic which had changed 
women’s relationship to the state. High female workforce participation; widespread use of 
birth control; high rates of cohabitation; an increasing divorce rate and declining marriage 
and fertility rates became new realities. By imbibing the language of women’s rights and 
forging opportunistic alliances with feminist figures, the Christian Right ensures its 
compatibility with a culture constantly reevaluating the role of women. 
 
It is a movement adept at forging these kinds of alliances around single-issues. On abortion, 
the Christian Right has been able to capitalise on widespread feelings of insecurity and 
personal loss to make connections with feminists who are critical of abortion. The non-profit 
group Feminists for Life represents the most organised feminist objection to abortion, 
critiquing the issue from a human rights perspective. In their view, abortion is “a reflection 
                                                          
proposed avenues of redress are consistent with the arguments Andrea Dworkin made in 1981 in Pornography: 
Men Possessing Women. 
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that our society has failed to meet the needs of women.”164 The new framing of abortion as 
harmful to women’s mental and physical health is also indicative of the alliances that have 
been forged between antiabortionists on the Christian Right healthcare providers. The Ohio-
based Association of Pro-life Physicians, directed by Christian physician Dr. Patrick Johnson, 
provides contact information on a vast network of antiabortion doctors within each state in 
the union on its website.165 Other medical groups like the American Association of Pro-life 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists and the Christian Medical Association offer similar referrals 
to healthcare professionals with strict opposition to abortion.  
 
On the issue of sex trafficking, which the Christian Right regards as inextricably linked with 
pornography, single-issue alliances have been formed as well. In a January 8, 2014 radio 
program on human trafficking, FOF president Jim Daly admits that he worked with 
Democrats and a “homosexual activist group” to ensure that House Bill 14-1273 was passed 
in Colorado, which made trafficking of a minor a sex offence.166 The bill also states that a 
minor cannot consent to being prostituted, and defendants can no longer argue that they do 
not know the age of the minor they are accused of trafficking. The issue has facilitated a 
strategic relationship between feminist abolitionists and the Christian Right in the pursuit of 
tougher prosecution of sex traffickers. From this alliance the Christian Right have emerged 
wielding the universally appealing language of human rights, permitting them to make 
significant inroads on sex trafficking legislation on an international level (Kamrani and 
Gentile, 2013). Morality discourse does not have the same power as liberal rights to influence 
the legal framework on trafficking internationally, particularly outside of a North American 
context where evangelical policing of sexual behavior and biblical binaries denoting what is 
irrefutably ‘good’ and ‘evil’ are constrained by cultural relativism.  
 
Temperance reformers found their own version of a single-issue coalition in the slogan of 
Home Protection. Nineteenth-century feminist groups organised around the central goal of 
women’s equality, whereas evangelical women and temperance reformers took as their 
central goal the moral reformation of American society (Epstein, 1981: 4). The two 
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movements converged on the principles of the Home Protection ballot, urging that women, as 
the morally superior sex, had a special duty to protect their country and therefore required the 
vote. In other words, female suffrage would enable women to rescue America from its moral 
demise. However, where the interests of women and the defense of family and moral values 
diverged, the temperance movement chose the latter, dividing the early progressive feminist 
and temperance movements.  
 
Just as Home Protection served as a single unifying point on which conservatives and radicals 
could converge in the nineteenth century, the antipornography movement has allowed these 
two groups to meet again. In both the temperance and antipornography movements, political 
issues outside of the single-issue coalition have caused rifts between adherents. Conservative 
temperance activists found themselves at odds with the anti-slavery abolitionists in the ranks 
of the American Temperance Union, and disputes over whether activists ought to campaign 
for moderation in liquor consumption or total abstinence caused some division as well 
(Johnson, 2010: 85). Differing views on women’s sexuality also divided temperance leaders. 
While WCTU leaders Wittenmyer and Willard conceived of women’s sexuality as distinct 
from men’s – tamer and less receptive to temptation – feminist activist and temperance 
supporter Elizabeth Cady Stanton took a different view. “A healthy woman has as much 
passion as a man” argued Stanton, whose belief it was that women should not be liberated 
from men’s sexuality, but instead allowed their own (in Stainton Rogers and Stainton Rogers, 
2001: 126).  
 
Similar disputes over sexual agency plague the antipornography movement, with the defining 
point of convergence being the Christian belief that women control the sexual impulses of a 
man by manipulating his sexual energy. Antiporn feminists do not possess the same 
confidence that women have any such power under patriarchy, and maintain that men 
routinely violate women’s sexual boundaries. Other rifts on issues such as abortion, birth 
control, child care, and marriage have further sullied relations. 
 
Beneath the partisan, antagonistic veneer of Christian Right family values politics is a far 
more complicated set of beliefs regarding faith and public policy that are being constantly 
redefined and renegotiated by movement leaders. Before his fall from grace, influential pastor 
Ted Haggard argued that “evangelical does not mean any particular political ideology” 
(Stafford, 2005: 42). Richard Cizik (2000) of the National Association of Evangelicals argued 
that the nature of evangelical political involvement is changing. “Evangelical coalition-
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building is breaking new ground on a variety of issues” alleged Cizik (p. 82). Fears of guilt 
by association no longer dissuade those on the Christian Right from finding common ground 
with erstwhile opponents to seek a larger end. 
 
     Political polarisation and antiporn rhetoric 
 
The willingness by some Christian Right leaders to adopt feminist arguments is occurring 
against a backdrop of extreme political polarity in the United States. The Pew Research 
Center’s 2014 study of some ten thousand adults in the United States found that self-
identified Republicans and Democrats are further apart ideologically than at any other point 
in history. The study’s findings point to a stiffening in people’s ideological attachments, 
resulting in an unprecedented level of philosophical homogeneity within the major parties. 
The typical Republican is now more conservative than ninety four per cent of Democrats, 
compared with seventy per cent twenty years ago. And the typical Democrat is similarly 
more liberal than ninety two per cent of Republicans, up from sixty four per cent. Moreover, 
the most ideological Americans are the most energised and likeliest to participate in primary 
elections.  
These animosities extend beyond the political sphere. Partisan Americans have self-
segregating preferences which motivate them to live around people with similar viewpoints. 
Geography is a strong polarising factor, as is the liberal desire to live in a small home within 
walking distance to schools, compared with the conservative preference for a large home 
requiring a car that can transport them to a school miles away. “The tendency for liberals and 
conservatives to self-segregate most likely reinforces the ideological and partisan divide” 
writes Nate Cohn (2014) for the New York Times, the effect is that “voters silo themselves 
into echo chambers where dissenting opinions are rare.”  
Within this climate of uncompromising partisan loyalty, the Christian Right, occupying an 
ideological position on the margins of conservative politics, have exploited one of the few 
areas of common ground they have with the progressive-left. Using their more substantial 
resources, the Christian Right have been able to seize ownership of a feminist narrative by 
merging the liberated woman with the true woman.  
Essential to the success of this adaptive process is another key source of ongoing tension and 
polarity: the feminist movement itself. In the absence of a broader feminist consensus that 
pornography is fundamentally harmful to women, the antiporn feminist movement, with little 
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political leverage, is left vulnerable to external political forces determined to co-opt 
marginalised feminist perspectives.  
In a climate of widely acknowledged ideological polarity, coming across as a unifying force 
attracts praise and widens a group’s appeal. Writing for FOF, Ed Chinn criticises Christians 
who engage in hostile political exchanges with their opponents. “Politics has never been 
about truth or righteousness” proposes Chinn, “it is about compromise and consensus.”167 In 
place of the reactionary style of some Christian leaders, Chinn suggests followers of Christ 
employ a strategy of “serious and long-term craftsmanship” that unites old political foes in a 
“majestic mission of reconciliation.” As a movement known for its sententious moralising 
and stubborn devotion to traditional values, the Christian Right is not typically seen as a 
bastion of compromise.  
In a chapter on the Christian Right and civic virtue, long-time scholar of religion and politics, 
Clyde Wilcox (2010) explains that those on the Christian Right are far less likely than other 
Republican donors to agree that compromise is an essential part of politics (p. 193). 
However, Wilcox concedes that the uncompromising characterisation of the Christian Right 
is often overstated, “Christian Right activists are willing to be persuaded in at least some 
political conversations and to engage in compromise that does not involve core principles.” 
This is playing out on the antipornography front. The Christian Right and antiporn feminists 
agree on the core principle that pornography is harmful. The rhetorical tactics employed to 
support this position are subordinate to this governing principle.  
At the same time as the American people are shifting further apart ideologically, the major 
political parties are drifting closer together. While the division of Americans with common 
economic interests has become increasingly pronounced, an uncritical acceptance of fiscally 
conservative ideology has permeated throughout the United States with the convergence of 
the major parties, particularly on matters of taxation. Levin and Shapiro (2001) refer to this as 
the ‘fiscalization’ of the policy debate. Prior to the 1980s, Republicans and Democrats were 
less focused on conflicts over the budget. Muted against the backdrop of the Cold War, the 
budget did not start becoming a central political concern until the Reagan era, when an 
economic slowdown served as the impetus for a return to Gilded Age era fiscal policies, 
slashing the top income tax rate from 70 per cent to 28 per cent. As a point of contrast, the 
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top income tax rate was 94 per cent in 1944 under Franklin D. Roosevelt, ushering in decades 
of post-World War II social equality and middle-class prosperity. Since the 1980s the 
doctrine of trickle-down economics has come to be regarded as untouchably sound, and 
certain cardinal virtues go unquestioned, such as the assumption that inequality is inevitable; 
enormous defence budgets are necessary; and the private sector is the best source of ingenuity 
and productivity. 
In her book The Twilight of Equality? Duggan (2003) dissects the political landscape that 
developed in the 1990s whereby the progressive-left started to reproduce itself as divided into 
economic vs. cultural issues. The illusion that categories of social life can be practically 
abstracted from one another gave rise to single-issue, identity-based political movements, and 
the possibility of ideologically nonsensical coalitions between antiporn feminists and the 
Christian Right.  
The big difference, Duggan argues, between leaders in neoliberal organisations like CWA, 
FOF, an EF and key antiporn feminist theorists, can be observed in the culture of 
redistribution. The conservative groups in this study co-opt feminist rhetoric, but they do so 
within a broader framework of upward wealth redistribution; whereas antiporn feminists, in 
line with the Left, support the goal of downward redistribution. Business and financial 
interests sully the potential for the groups to make serious inroads in terms of a women’s 
rights-centred strategy to defeat pornography. Without embracing the larger project of 
downward redistribution, Duggan contends that organisations settle for “stripped-down 
equality, paradoxically imagined as compatible with persistent overall inequality” (p. XX).  
Duggan is referring here to progressive-left organisations, but the same analysis can be 
applied to the groups in this study. Without lining up their rhetorical strategies with a policy 
agenda that supports equality across the board, the appropriation of women’s rights language 
by these groups has few opportunities to translate into meaningful antipornography reform. 
The tactic of selectively appropriating aspects of feminist discourse is superficial, incapable 
of inspiring the kind of activism required because it constantly contradicts itself. At nearly 
every turn the radical language is placated by discursive reassurances that the philosophical 
core of the groups are still intact.  
Another monumental change in recent decades has been the corporatisation of political 
parties, which has undermined the cause of social justice movements such as antiporn 
feminism that are grounded in a structural analysis of power. Since the 1980s a new 
208 
 
liberalism has emerged, described as a ‘third way’. Set against the old liberalism advocating 
progressive taxation, a substantial welfare state, and the universality of civil rights, new 
liberalism retained support for progressive responses to so-called ‘social issues’, but 
weakened its resolve against neoconservative efforts to frame happiness, liberty, and the free 
market as interrelated. That is, liberty cannot exist without private ownership (Duggan, 
2003). As a result, new liberals began to see government as less of a vehicle for ensuring fair 
and equitable treatment, and more as a burden, an impediment to individual brilliance that 
had to be diminished. This had the effect of legitimising the individualist economic 
worldview possessed by those on the Christian Right. 
Within previously progressive-left circles it became accepted that good governance ought to 
be judged using business principles. That is to say, the state should mimic the corporation. 
“The era of big government is over” announced newly re-elected Democratic president Bill 
Clinton during his inaugural address in 1996, demonstrating the extent to which 
conservatives had successfully framed government provision as fundamentally wrong. This is 
a far cry from the position progressives took during the early twentieth century, during the 
Progressive Era, and later the New Deal under President Franklin D. Roosevelt. During this 
period there was considerable support for the idea that the power of the state ought to be 
expanded to regulate economic relations, such as the hours and conditions of labour (Duggan, 
2003: 7). The policies of the New Deal, including the establishment of social security, 
minimum wage laws, abolishing child labour, redistributive taxation, and public works 
programs initiated decades of unprecedented American prosperity. State regulation of the 
markets came to be regarded as common sense; necessary for upholding the principles of a 
liberal democracy, and the ‘vital centre’ between democracy and totalitarianism, as 
Schlesigner (1998) posited.  
In the 1950s and 1960s, in an effort to reprivatise public assets, conservatives mobilised to 
reframe the state as an intrusive, stifling force, except in matters of sexual politics, where it 
was entirely reasonable for the government to have a say in the personal affairs of Americans. 
The push rightwards in American politics came with the assimilation of neoconservatives into 
the base of the Republican Party. Previously identified liberals, that is, those who supported 
the Democratic Party and labour unions, but who possessed strong anti-Stalinist views, 
abandoned the Left and turned on many of the precepts of the New Left, such as the feminist 
and gay liberation movements. These neoconservatives migrated from the left during the 
New Deal era to the ranks of the Republican Party by the 1960s, accusing the progressive-left 
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of social engineering a class of unproductive and elitist public sector workers (Horwitz, 2013: 
1940).  
Neoconservatives have been able to successfully portray the progressive-left as an elite class 
fundamentally out of touch with ordinary working class Americans. This has led to the 
formation of coalitions between neoconservatives and the Christian Right, whose opposition 
to the secular humanism of the ‘elite left’ makes the two groups natural allies. The problem 
for the progressive-left has been that the association of their politics with the intellectual elite 
has become somewhat of a self-fulfilling prophecy. The Democratic Party has shied away 
from New Deal era economic reforms concerned with the nationalisation of industry and the 
expansion of labour unions, in favour of so called ‘social issues’ and reforms that appeal to 
those suspicious of government intrusion into the private sphere, such as a woman’s right to 
terminate a pregnancy, and the rights of gay and lesbian couples to wed (Duggan 2003). Both 
appealing prospects in a libertarian mindset concerned with minimising the role of the state. 
With the neoconservative-infused Republican Party jolting the right-of-centre party further to 
the right, and the Democratic Party diminishing its once robust economic agenda in favour of 
social issues, the differences between the parties have become more a matter of where one 
stands on, say, the issue of abortion than on redistributive taxation. As the fictional character 
Josh Lyman quipped on The West Wing “now what we’ve got is two corporate parties - one 
pro-life, one pro-choice.”168 
To make matters worse for those on the progressive-left, the influence of labour unions and 
fraternal organisations which once linked blue collar workers to the political establishment 
has declined at the same time as conservative political organisations have ascended. Making 
up much of this landscape are so-called “astroturf” organisations that purport to be broad-
based but are in fact run by industry organisations and have few actual members (Soss et al. 
2001: 12). As the Democratic Party have echoed the Republican Party’s belief in the self-
regulating power of the market economy and shifted their focus to social issues, the 
opportunities for single-issue coalitions and the co-option of rhetoric have become more 
tenable.  
Because both the Christian Right and antiporn feminists emerged out of the sexual liberation 
movement of the 1960s at a time when economic issues were playing second fiddle to 
concerns about the moral degradation of American society, class-based analyses of 
                                                          
168 What kind of day has it been 2000, DVD, The West Wing Season 1, Episode 22, Warner Bros. Television. 
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pornography failed to resonate with a public unconvinced that the United States was divided 
along class-based lines after a period of significant middle class prosperity. The public was 
less concerned with the pivotal role poverty played in the production of pornography, and 
more concerned with the consequences of sexual promiscuity on malleable young minds. 
Temperance activists faced a similar predicament. “Instead of indicting the whole economic 
system” writes Blocker et al. (2003) of the temperance reformers, they “stressed the moral 
aspects of overindulgence.” The individual was responsible for his poverty by spending his 
money on drink (p. 259).  
In What’s the Matter with Kansas?, Thomas Frank (2004) details how the geographical, 
racial, and religious divisions among Americans have been able to cement themselves so 
convincingly, largely because the Democratic Party has softened its position against supply-
side economics. Meanwhile Republicans have been engaged in a fierce program of 
ideological transformation, legitimised by an intelligentsia consisting of multiple structures, 
such as media organisations like Fox News, The Spectator, and the editorial page of the Wall 
Street Journal, as well as theory emanating from the Chicago school of economics 
(Krugman, 2007). The Democratic Party has forgotten blue-collar voters, Frank argues, and 
concentrated instead on recruiting affluent, white-collar professionals who are liberal on 
social issues but are more or less indifferent to issues affecting working people, such as 
organised labour and privatisation.  
The result, political writer E.J Dionne (2004) points out, is that both the Republicans and the 
Democrats became “vehicles for upper-middle class interests” (p. 12). As the differences 
between the two major political parties dissipate before the American people, old rivalries 
become less significant. In a peculiar paradox, groups like CWA, FOF, and EF can exploit 
growing polarity within their constituency to enflame antifeminist sentiments, while taking 
advantage of a broader political meeting of the minds that obscures the traditional boundaries 
of political action, allowing old foes to meet on common ground.  
     Political opportunism and rhetorical co-option 
 
Fundamentalist groups operating within a secular, pluralistic society must be mindful of the 
socio-political landscape on which it stands. Hopson and Smith (1999) reason that “the 
rhetorical strategy of the leaders of the [Christian Right] has been to wed a selected set of 
biblical imperatives with their particular vision of the public good in such a manner that their 
message may be embraced by an ostensibly democratic pluralist society” (p. 6). The call to 
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abstain from sex until marriage and to restrict sexual practice to procreative behaviour is 
biblical in origin, but it has an alienating effect on the broader community, particularly 
towards women whose sexual impropriety is regarded as especially unacceptable. Although 
Americans tend to hold conservative views with regard to sexual morality, particularly when 
it comes to what information children are given about sex, studies show a general resistance 
to abstinence-only education and an openness in terms of providing children information on 
contraceptive methods.169  
It is through pro-woman rhetoric that groups on the Christian Right are managing their 
relationship with the moderate political centre. There are numerous examples of this that 
extend well beyond the activities of CWA, FOF, and EF. For example, back in 2008 an 
evangelical organisation based in Washington, Sojourners-Call to Renewal, recognised that 
the movement’s reputation for being opposed to abortion and same-sex marriage was hurting 
its image. Worrying to evangelical leaders was the fact that the movement was becoming 
increasingly removed from the politics of young Americans and threatening the future 
strength of evangelicalism. The organisation’s CEO, Jim Wallis, organised meetings in 
Columbus, Ohio attended by 10,000 evangelicals, with a focus on the movement’s origins in 
woman’s suffrage and the abolition of slavery. Reverend Rich Nathan, senior pastor at the 
Vineyard Church of Columbus asserted that many feel that the evangelical label “has been 
taken captive by a very narrow political program” concerned primarily with the right-to-life 
issue (Carr Smyth, 2008). Although taking a more inclusive, rights-based, women-oriented 
approach may well be a strategic façade, the consequence is still pluralist and secularist in 
outcome (Moen, 1992: 1367). As Bates (1995) incisively asserts “exclusive language is used 
to motivate movement members” whereas “inclusive language is used to lessen the fears of 
outsiders” (p. 47). In order to expand their constituency, the Christian Right is engaging in 
the politics of inclusivity.  
Post-traditionalist movements like the Christian Right have no real means of dismantling the 
structure of modern, secular societies and are therefore required to accommodate and adapt to 
ensure their political survival (Wilson, 1982). CWA and FOF have responded to this 
inevitability, and given that their opposition to pornography has some allies in the feminist 
                                                          
169 For example, a 2006 study on published in the Archives of Paediatrics and Adolescent Medicine, a 
publication of the American Medical Association, concluded that adults, regardless of their political position, 
favour a more balanced approach to sex education that encompasses information on contraception and abortion. 
212 
 
movement, have exploited this uncomfortable liaison. EF has not adapted so seamlessly, 
clinging to a more antiquated, narrow view of pornography as an affront to scripture.  
The evidence is overwhelming that, through the vehicle of pornography, the Christian Right 
are pivoting towards the mainstream, or what Moen (1997) describes as “the societal 
consensus.” But the risk is that feminist concepts are being appropriated by the movement in 
the service of patriarchy, to eventually close off those same opportunities. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis set out to explore to what extent, how, and why the Christian Right in the United 
States have appropriated pro-woman, rights-based, equality-conscious arguments into their 
opposition to pornography, and specifically, how the movement has borrowed from antiporn 
feminist literature in the service of conservative ends. For a movement defined by its 
vehement opposition to feminism, it is an ideological aberration that carries as many political 
risks as it does rewards. 
The chapters gradually pick apart this question, first by delving into the dawn of the new 
Christian Right, wherein key figures set a distinct tone for the movement, drawing an 
ominous picture of a country gripped by the forces of evil.  
To survive spiritually, Americans would have to return to patriarchal family values and 
aggressively resist the incipient threats of feminism, gay rights, and black liberation. Because 
pornography depicted nonprocreative sex and normalised transgressive sexual practices, it 
was implicated in the breakdown of the American family. Feminists who were 
problematising patriarchal institutions such as the family and church were blamed for 
contributing to a morally depraved culture in which sexual excess was becoming the norm. 
These were early iterations of what came to be known as a “culture war”, in which 
pornography formed part of a broader anxiety about women agitating for independence from 
male control. 
As the women’s movement intensified in the 1970s and ‘80s, so did the rhetoric of the 
Christian Right, giving rise to figureheads like Phyllis Schlafly who led the successful 
campaign to dismantle the Equal Rights Amendment, striking at the heart of the feminist 
movement’s goal of overcoming Freud’s famous assertion that biology is destiny. Reviving 
nineteenth-century gender politics which sentimentalised women and consigned them to the 
home, Schlafly and the Christian Right convinced women that the ERA would not take into 
consideration their unique vulnerabilities, and perhaps counterintuitively, would end up doing 
them more harm. After the amendment failed the ratification benchmark in 1982, the role of 
women on the Christian Right became far more crystallised.  
Far from being voiceless figures, certain women in the movement were instead given a 
platform where they could function as effective foils against feminism. However, 
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constraining expectations on conservative women’s organisations when it came to their 
engagement with women’s policy produced unique challenges. They were required to appear 
both sympathetic to women adherents who have become accustomed to antiporn arguments 
expressed through a rights-conscious frame, and conciliatory to forces within the movement 
determined to preserve the tenets of male headship.  
Through their involvement in the Meese Commission Report and antiporn civil rights 
ordinances in the 1980s, prominent figures in the movement were exposed to antiporn 
arguments developed from the civil rights perspective. The legally contentious position that 
pornography is strictly an obscenity was on unsteady ground, and feminist postulating about 
pornography being an affront to women’s rights presented the Christian Right with new 
opportunities to advance a conservative agenda couched in the progressive language of rights 
and equality. 
This rights-conscious frame stood in confrontation with the movement’s traditional position 
on pornography which saw America’s obsession with obscene material as a sin of moral 
recalcitrance with horrific cultural implications. Antithetical to the feminist civil rights 
position, this traditional view placed particular onus on wives, whose duty it was to ensure 
their husbands were sexually satisfied and would therefore not need to seek outside pleasures 
from pornography. Reflecting an Order of Creation mindset, the traditional line centred the 
needs of the male head of the household at the expense of the woman.  
As the Christian Right sought to reconcile such contradictory positions, the feminist 
movement was in its own state of crisis in the 1980s over debates about pornography and 
prostitution. Clashing ideological viewpoints about the extent to which women can exercise 
sexual agency under patriarchy, and whether pornography should be considered a form of 
“speech” worthy of protection, led to bitter and still unresolved divides between activists. 
Antiporn feminists were left enfeebled by these disagreements, which came to a head at the 
1982 Barnard Conference on sexuality in which organisers excluded antiporn feminists from 
the organising committee, prompting protests by the New York-based Women Against 
Pornography. For antiporn feminists, being associated with the moralists of the right-wing 
proved difficult to overcome. In contrast, liberal pro-sex feminists were given the upper hand 
due to the shift during this era away from a more class-oriented, state-managed economy to a 
hyper individualised and financialised economy which commodified their vision for freer 
sexual expression. Antiporn feminists retreated from view and a decade of vacuity followed, 
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in which the absence of an organised feminist challenge to pornography created a vacuum 
that could be filled by the Christian Right. 
By the 1990s a shift in rhetoric among Christian Right leaders seemed to acknowledge that 
hard line loyalty to biblical inerrancy had its political limits. While they had up until that 
point been value-laden, they had been policy-thin, and there was a need to tie moral issues to 
secular concerns like the economy. This strategy framed pornography as a central culprit in 
the breakdown of marriages, which can render women dependent on the state, rather than 
their husbands, causing great expense to the taxpayer. The feminist analysis of pornography 
also became very useful to the movement at this time, as it presented another angle of attack 
that could be misappropriated in the service of conservative political ends.  
The Christian Right’s appropriation of women’s rights language is in part a reaction to the 
resonance of pro-woman rhetoric to many women in the movement, and also an 
acknowledgment of the extent to which feminist principles have transcended political, as well 
as religious/secular divides. CWA, FOF and EF’s use of feminist rhetoric signals an obvious, 
if tepid, alignment with a more gender conscious politics that politicises women’s 
experiences. The groups’ consideration of power, agency and oppression in their antiporn 
discourse meets certain criteria for feminist consciousness, but the reality is a more complex 
identification with both traditional and radical perspectives on women’s roles. The effect is a 
mosaic of perspectives that look like an attempt to reconcile biblical mores with modern 
expectations, and which can all be traced back to two inharmonious schools of thought: the 
true woman and the liberated woman.  
Indeed, it is not only on the pornography front that pro-woman rhetoric is being assimilated 
into the discourse of the Christian Right. Retreating from a morality frame, antiabortion 
acitivists in the movement are attempting to connect with women using feminist language 
that constructs abortion-minded women as helpless victims of violent male abortionists, an 
aping of the feminist dominance-subordination dyad. Old tactics that demonised abortion-
minded women and privileged the zygotic bodies of their potential offspring have been 
replaced by gentler, more compassionate campaigns designed to reinvent the image of a 
movement which had become associated with extreme violence and coercion. And on guns, 
leaders on the right are urging women to join the macho firearm culture by assuring them that 
being armed will be a power equaliser, shielding them from male sexual violence. In each 
case, the Christian Right in alliance with other right-wing elements have developed their own 
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strain of pro-woman politics that repositions notions of equality, subjugation, dominance, and 
choice to fit conservative policy prescriptions. 
Through the Christian Right’s inversion of women’s rights arguments on pornography, they 
have gone about presenting the family values agenda as a natural ally of the ongoing civil 
rights project. The same was true of the nineteenth-century temperance movement, who 
under the stewardship of protofeminist Frances Willard managed to merge the interests of 
teetotallers and suffragettes under the banner of home protection. This allowed temperance 
reformers to frame women’s intent to win the vote as necessary in the fight against alcohol. 
Today’s Christian Right, brimming with their own home protection agenda, are proposing 
that a version of women’s equality tinged with conservative overtones is necessary to unmoor 
the grip pornography has on the culture. Both movements use the progressive expansion of 
women’s rights in the service of a prohibitive, repressive, censorial end. 
As the temperance precedent makes clear, movements for moral reform are not always 
ideologically pure, and can involve trade-offs and a negotiation of values to ensure the 
movement’s political survival. Instead of seeing today’s antipornography movement strictly 
as a kind of “new temperance” obsessed with once again regulating and repressing deviant 
behaviour, scholars must account for a more complex set of circumstances that acknowledges 
the way in which the Christian Right have confronted the political reality of women’s 
increased visibility and negotiated their values to adapt to a rights-conscious culture that is 
less tolerant of blatant misogyny than it was when the movement first emerged. In doing so 
they have reconceptualised women as more than a biblical abstraction, but rather capable of 
some degree of agency and deserving of equal rights. 
By appropriating feminist terms, the groups in this study enflame tensions with political 
rivals in the women’s movement, and provoke definitional questions about who gets to 
represent women’s rights.  Their new focus on the links between pornography and domestic 
violence, for example, suggest that past concerns that discussing the prevalence of domestic 
violence might undermine the institution of marriage are being overshadowed by the need to 
challenge perceptions that the Christian Right is a movement concerned primarily with 
maintaining male power at the expense of women. Indeed, the movement supports the 
patriarchal nuclear family, but it is attempting to frame the maintenance of heteropatriarchal 
structures as beneficial to women. Through the vehicle of pornography, the groups are taking 
established concepts from feminist discourse and contesting their meaning. Their critique of 
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hegemonic masculinity is a core example of this – problematising the way pornography 
encourages men to see women as inferior, while simultaneously endorsing a view that 
naturalises men’s superiority over women.  
Essentialising assumptions about women’s intrinsic virtuousness and men’s unrestrainable 
virility in the groups’ antiporn material are part of a long tradition in women’s movements of 
using women’s supposed moral superiority as a powerful political symbol. Temperance 
reformers thrived on this narrative, and antiporn feminists have used these assumptions to 
their advantage. The belief that violence is an inherently male phenomenon, fused in male 
consciousness, has allied antiporn feminists and members of the Christian Right for decades. 
The right’s appropriation of feminist discourse has occurred against the backdrop of this 
ideological alignment, in which maleness is constructed as unaccountable and animalistic.  
But far from adopting an indiscriminate appropriation of women’s rights language, the 
groups allay their pro-woman arguments by regularly pivoting back to a conventional 
antiporn narrative that sentimentalises mothers and children, obsesses over transgressive 
sexual practices, and accuses feminism of helping create the social conditions under which 
pornography could thrive. They oscillate perplexingly between an accusatory posture toward 
feminism, and a more open stance willing to work with certain antiporn feminists. In this 
strategy they seem to be navigating the precarious terrain between dogmatism and 
pragmatism. 
This tactic is emblematic of Ellen Flournoy’s (2013) notion of “pick and choose 
conservatism”. A contradictory approach that allows the Christian Right to seize aspects of 
feminist discourse they like, while aspects they do not like are held up for vicious critique. It 
is in many respects a coping mechanism. During the lifetime of the Christian Right, 
increasing numbers of women have migrated from the domestic sphere to the public sphere. 
To remain of the view that women ought to cede all responsibility to their husband and carry 
on quietly with the unremunerated work of caring for children is in the present-day American 
context a proposition that does not resonate with great numbers of women, even those who 
lean conservative. The groups are cognisant of this, and are therefore reconciling their 
domestic ideology with a conservative version of feminist ideology by locating women’s 
empowerment in the heteropatrichal institution of the nuclear family. Repeatedly, the groups 
use the notion of the family as a safe space in which women can retreat from the violent 
misogyny of pornography. Contrary to temperance reformers who identified the home as a 
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site of hostility in which drunkard husbands would take out their grievances on their wives 
and children, today’s Christian Right largely absolve husbands of blame by locating the 
problem in the external institutions of government, media, and left-wing political movements 
who they accuse of hypersexualising women as part of a plot to undermine the strength of the 
family. 
That women are on the one hand deserving of equal rights, and on the other must remain 
deferential to their husbands and tethered to their caring responsibilities is a manifestation of 
the competing narratives within today’s Christian Right. Praise for nineteenth-century ‘true 
woman’ ideals have been revitalised by conservative leaders like Schlafly and LaHaye who 
assure their women adherents that piety and purity confer on women special powers of sexual 
persuasion. The female body in pornography is therefore not only contaminated, but 
represents a complete relinquishment of power to the unbridled sexual appetite of men. It is 
by strategically withholding affection and manipulating their husband’s weaknesses that 
women bridge the power imbalance in their relationships with men. To progressive feminists 
this might seem like little more than the product of dyadic relations of dominance and 
subordination between the sexes. But through an emphasises on the right to be treated as a 
woman – in the idealised feminine sense of the word – the Christian Right converge the two 
poles of the true woman and the liberated woman.  
For both the Christian Right and antiporn feminists, there is a thrust of fundamentalism that 
underpins their positions, simplifying the Christian Right’s co-option of ideas. Both 
movements frame pornography in absolutist terms as an outright evil with no redeeming 
qualities. The more liberal notion that a woman can exercise sexual agency in pornography is 
dismissed by antiporn feminists as an extension of patriarchal logic. The Minneapolis 
antiporn ordinance cemented this in a legal framework, emphasising that pornography can 
only be degrading, and if it is not, it falls outside the definition of pornography. This moral 
absolutism appeals to the Christian Right whose strong oppositional posture has always been 
a central feature of their political efforts.  
Broader social, economic and political factors also go toward explaining the decline of 
antiporn feminism and its attendant consequences in terms of rhetorical appropriation. With 
the rise of neoliberalism since the 1980s and a declining focus on class politics, a self-
oriented politics took over large elements of the left, including the feminist movement. This 
has had two significant consequences in the antiporn context. It has diminished the influence 
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of antiporn feminists whose analysis centres on the structural influences that coerce women 
into pornography, instead elevating an individualist interpretation that imagines women can 
defy structural impediments to power and have a liberating experience in the sex industry. 
The depoliticisation of class has also increased the political leverage enjoyed by the Christian 
Right, whose movement is premised on exploiting a sort of essentialist tribalism that pits 
disparate groups against each other based primarily on identification with certain social 
groups. A weaker antiporn feminist movement and a politically dominant Christian Right 
permits conservative leaders to seize concepts and arguments developed by their subordinate 
foe, reinventing the meaning of the original work in the process. Taking discourse that was 
intended for a radical end and putting it to use for the preservation of the nuclear family. 
What is more, the co-option of feminist discourse poses a threat to the feminist position 
against pornography. The continued use of pro-woman, rights-based arguments by Christian 
Right leaders means the movement is now occupying ideological terrain well outside the 
realm of morality and sin, to the extent that their adoption of pro-woman arguments, coupled 
with biblical gendered language, constitutes a new rhetorical tradition that amounts to a 
paradigm shift. The effect is that, in the context of pornography, the civil rights frame starts 
to become instinctively associated with the politics of the Christian Right. This undermines 
the progressive case against pornography by conflating the family values agenda of the 
religious right with the more radical, counterhegemonic project of antiporn feminists.  
A weakened antiporn feminist position means that pornographers and the content they 
produce escape a meaningful critique grounded in a structural or institutional analysis of the 
harms of pornography. The Christian Right might borrow feminist terms, but they fail to 
connect these concepts with a critique of broader structures of male dominance, because to do 
so would contradict their foundational belief in an order of creation and male primacy. 
Without a prominent structural interrogation of pornography, the liberal, anti-censorship 
angle moves into the centre of feminist discourse, shifting the frame from ‘structures of 
dominance’ to an individualised focus on a kind of ‘sexual agency’ which defies structural 
barriers. 
It is not a coincidence that the Christian Right has sought to formulate their own conservative 
version of feminism at the same time as the feminist movement has undergone its own 
process of depoliticisation. As feminism has mutated from a politics grounded in a left-wing 
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materialist analysis of power, to a set of ideals based increasingly on the framework of 
identity politics, it opens itself up to a hijacking of sorts by right-wing dissidents. 
By seizing arguments developed in the feminist tradition, an emerging consensus that moral 
arguments are no longer sufficiently persuasive reveals itself on the Christian Right. It is in 
some respects an implicit admission of the success feminist activists have had in defining and 
determining the meaningful categories in the pornography debate. It also underscores the 
superiorly positioned status of liberal, secular discourse in the United States. In adopting the 
progressive frame of rights and equality, the Christian Right concedes that approaching the 
issue from a purely scriptural perspective undermines their ability to influence policy and 
attract new adherents for whom feminist arguments might have some resonance. 
The perception that antiporn feminism has been hoodwinked and manipulated by moralists on 
the Right has inflicted devastating damage to the feminist critique of pornography. But a 
political inversion, in which the Christian Right are succumbing to the influence of feminist 
ideas, is apparent in their approach to pornography. The widespread use of feminist 
arguments by groups on the Christian Right challenges the dominant paradigm of the 
movement’s family values agenda; premised on the maintenance of heteropatriarchal gender 
norms which insist on women’s subordination to male primacy. Pornography has become an 
exception to this rule. For the women effected by it, Christian Right leaders are re-evaluating 
their instinctive response and initiating a conversation about women’s equality. Whether or 
not this transcends rhetoric and leads to policy outcomes more sympathetic to women 
remains to be seen. 
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